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SUMMARY
This thesis is an inquiry into the ethical aspects of the 
ad vo cate 's  function within the a dv er sarial system. Specifical ly, 
it ad dre sse s the question whether that function is inhe re ntly 
uneth ica l in so far as it s u b o r dinates  truth to client interest.
While many of the issues dealt with are common to both civil and 
criminal proceedings, the inquiry con cen trate s mainly on the role 
of the advocate in criminal p roce ed ings and p a r t i cula rl y on that 
of defence counsel.
The a d v o c a t e 's role is examined  within the context of the 
pri nc iple s unde rlying the adve rsaria l system; in particular, 
the r e la ti onship  in that system between the pursuit of truth and 
its reco gnitio n of other values ass ocia te d with ind ivi du al 
freedom and autonomy. ■
The thesis is seque nt ia lly st ructur ed  as follows:
Part One The uniquenes s of the profes sional a d v o c a t e - c l i e n t -
court rel ationsh ip  and the duality of the a d v o c a t e ' s  
pro fes sion al  o bl igation s to his client on the one 
hand, and to the court and the law itself on the 
other.
Part Two The rat ionale of the adversar ial trial p r o cess  as
one reflecting a balance between truth d i s c o v e r y  
and the reco gnitio n of moral and social va lues which 
it deems to be ne ces sar y for the prot e c t i o n  of the 
rights of the individual; comp arison with the 
in qui sitoria l process.
Part Three/
V i 1 .
Part Three An exa mi nation and appraisal of the role of criminal
defence counsel; including  a discourse on the moral
concepts of t ruth fu lness and deception so far as
relevant to that role; and an examinat ion of
specific sit ua ti ons in which ethical probl ems most
commonly arise.
Part Four The di stinct ive features of pro se cu ting counsel' s
function as co mpare d with that of defence counsel.
Part Five General review and conclusions.
Although question ing some features of the ad ve rsaria l process - 
and some aspects of the p ro fession al  precepts go verning the 
ethics of advocacy - the thesis may be seen as an ethical 
vi nd icat io n of the ad vocate's  role when viewed in the context 
of the values and ultimate obj ec tives of the system.
PART ONE
THE P RO FESSIO NA L RELA TI ONSHIP 
Sections
1.1 The Lawyer and Profess ional Obligation
1.2 The Lawyer as Advoca te
1 .1 The Lawyer and Profe ss ional Obligation
Fu nda mental to any p ro fession al  occupation is the p r o f e s s i o n a l -  
client rel ati onship.  Fu ndamental  to that relati onship 
is the concept of obligation: the obligation to sa f e g u a r d
the client's inte rests  and to advise and assist him or her 
zealously and dis passio nately .
These factors often give rise to ethical problems which are 
common to all prof e s s i o n s  - though more apparent in some 
than in others. The medical profess ion is a notable ex am pl e 
of one in which impor tant ethical issues often arise - the 
doctor c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  opposed to abortion but called upon 
to perform one or another faced with a decision whether 
to pre scribe a co n t r a c e p t i v e  for an under-age girl. In 
situations of this kind, the proper guiding princip le seems 
clear enough: the doctor, in making his decision, must
be mo tiv ate d only by his patient's best interests; that
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is to say, by his p r of ession al  rather than his personal 
per cep tion of those interests. His professional o bl ig ation 
must ove rride  any personal or religious beliefs or attitudes. 
This princ ip le applies to all professions.
But, of course, in p r o f es sional  relationships, this principle  
of prec ede nce of the client 's interests has wider implicatio ns. 
It post ula tes such precedence, not only over the p r o f e s s i o n a l ' s  
own personal views or scruples, but also - in regard to the 
particular matter for which the relationship exists - over 
the interests of all parties outwith that immediate 
relationship; the client, and he or she alone, is the 
pr of es siona l' s central and pa ramount concern. His or her 
interests take preced ence over the interests of all others.
On this point, the view has been expressed that since:
"Ethics, se rio usly cons id ered as in philosophy, 
usually speak in terms that require treating all
other persons on an equal f o o t i n g ....the central
problem in pro fess ional ethics can be descr ibed 
as the tension between the client's preferred 
position resulting from the professional c o n n e c t i o n  
and the position that everyo ne else is accorded  
by general prin ciples of morality and legality." [1]
In so far as this infers that precede nce  for the client is
per se u n e t h i c a l , it seems a qu estionable pr oposition. Such
precedence need not n e c e ssaril y affect the intere sts of 
others. In so far as it may do so, however, it seems clear 
that the principle of the p ar amount cy  of the cl ie nt 's 
interests does not mean total disregard for the int e r e s t s  
of others who may be affected. As will be later discussed, 
a /
a pro f e s s i o n a l  may, in certain situations, be per ce ived as 
also having obligat io ns to persons other than his client.
Another imp ortant q u alifi ca tion to the precedence of the 
client' s int erests is the professional's obli gation to his 
profession: to act ho no ura bly and in a law-abiding manner.
However impera tive his duty to his client, this is not seen 
as j u s t ifyi ng  wron gdoing or transgressing the canons of 
conduct of his pro fess ional  body.
This diversi ty  of duties - and the potential for confl ic t 
in the int eract io n of one with the other - are common to 
all professions.  But for the purpose of analysing  the 
lawyer's position  - and, specifically, those aspects of his 
role with which we are mainly concerned - certain 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  factors m a y b e  identified.
The pri nc ip le of precede nc y of the client's in terests over 
the personal moral views or attitudes of the p r o f e s s i o n a l  
adviser is, as has been said, not distinctive to the 
lawyer. But there is a sense in which it may often be 
said to have a parti cular cogency in the l a w y e r- cl ient 
relationship; for the lawyer, particularly when acting, 
for example, as defence counsel in criminal pro ce edings , 
may often be called upon to act for someone who, in the 
popular conception, may be the most despised of persons, 
accused, perhaps, of a morally repugnant offence or of 
whose way of life the lawyer, personally, may st r o n g l y  
disapprove.
F urther/
Further, the nature of the circumstance s in which a lawyer, 
again p art ic ularly in the criminal sphere, is often called 
upon to render his pro fessio na l services, adds p a r t ic ul ar 
emphasis and urgency to his commitment to his client. He 
is his client's champion against a hostile world; in many 
cases, indeed, the only person to whom he can turn in the 
face of powerful forces ranged against him.
The lawyer, neverthele ss, is also per ceived as having 
obligatio ns  to other indi viduals as well as his client, such 
as, for example: "the client's family and other people
towards whom the client is under a legal or moral 
o b l i g a t i o n ." [2]
It may be noted that the other individuals referred to in 
this quote from the D ecl ar ation of Perugia do not - 
expli cit ly at any rate - include a person or persons with 
whom the client and his lawyer may be in legal co ntention . 
This does not mean that lawyers and their clients are 
perceived as having no obligation s whatever to such persons. 
But the reason why legal opponents of the client are not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  men ti oned in this context may be in di c a t i v e  
of another crucial aspect of the lawyer's role which is 
relevant to the ethics of his calling. In sign i f i c a n t  areas 
notably litigation - contentio n is, by definition, the 
lawyer's business - contention between the int er es ts of his 
client which he is p r of ession al y bound to uphold and the 
interests /
5.
interests of his client's antagonist which (as regards the 
partic ula r issue in contention), he is bound to oppose.
r
For this reason, the remarks of Hazard as quoted above may 
seem more apposite to the lawyer than to other p r o f e s s i o n a l  
people. Indeed, on his view of the strict ethical pr incipl e 
of treating all people on an equal footing, he con cl udes 
that the lawyer's business is inherently unethical because:
"... a lawyer usually intervenes in rel at ionsh ips 
between others with a predis positio n to treat.the 
one who is his client with greater solicitude than 
he treats the other, regardless of the merits of 
their res pective positions. According to any 
'nonlegal' ethics, intervention on these terms is 
diff icu lt to justify. It violates the pri nciple 
of equal treatment inherent in all forms of 
uni ver sali st  ethics. It lacks the invol un tarism 
that is present in the ethical dilemmas of everyda y 
life. For the lawyer does not merely encounter 
choices between the conflicting interests of other s 
but makes a business out of such encounters, and 
takes partisan positions for money. Thus, his 
vocation violates the concepts of ethics held both 
by phi loso ph ers and in folklore. On this analysis, 
the idea of an ethical lawyer is therefore an 
im possibil ity." [3]
On the other hand, as against this somewhat radical view - 
which, if valid, would morally condemn the litig ious lawye r - 
there is the contrary view that the l a w y e r ’s function, far 
from vio lating the principle of equal treatment for all, is, 
in f a c t , n e c e s s a r y  to preserve equality in law; as in, for 
example, civil cases where the ordinary citizen is facing 
a powerful opponent such as a large corporation or, in 
criminal cases, where he is cont ending for his liberty, or 
possibly /
possibly his life, with the mighty State; and indeed, for 
this reason, the lawyer is sometimes referred to as the 
"equalizer". [4]
It is nev erth eless true that the view of the lit ig ating  
lawyer as a "hired gun" - prepared to plead causes for money 
"regardless of merit" is a persistent factor in attacks upon 
the ethics of his function. Such criticism is not, however, 
normally based on violation of an ethical princ ip le of 
equality of treatment; nor is the fact that a lawyer 
und ertakes causes for money commonly seen, per s e , as the 
basic ethical issue of his role - but rather the a p p a rentl y 
con fli cting principles and values involved in his role.
It is here that we turn to the most marked and, for our 
purposes, the most relevant, distinction between the lawyer 
and other profe ssional people; for, while the other 
dis ti ng uishin g factors men ti on ed may be said to make him 
pa rti cularly  vulnera ble to ethical problems in the pr actice  
of his profe ssion - or,-at any rate, to give rise to pr obl e m s  
of a different order from those which confront other 
pr of ess ion als - the most fruitful source of such p r o b l e m s  and 
that which is most cha ra c t e r i s t i c  of the u n i q ue ne ss of the 
lawyer in this regard, is the nature of his p a r t i c u l a r  
obligati on to his pro fe ssion - to the professio n of the l a w .
The lawyer 1s re la tio nship with and commitment to his p r o f e s s i o n  
involves a dimension which does not exist in other p r o f e s s i o n s  -
a dim en si on which, some may argue, constit utes an inherent 
co n t r a d i c t i o n  and an intrinsic ethical conflict. The 
pr ofess io n of "the law" has a different nuance from, say, 
the pro fess io n of "medicine" or "accountancy". Pr of es sionall y,  
the law is, to be sure, a science and a discipline; but "the 
law" itself is much more; it is a concept, a principle, or 
a complex of principles, woven into the fabric of society; 
an essen tial com ponent of its structure. It is also an 
ideal necess arily associ ated with the concept of justice.
But the lawyer is distinctive, not only in regard to the 
nature of his p r o f e s s i o n , but also as regards his r e l a t i o n ­
ship with it. he is not merely a prac titio ne r of the law.
He is, in fact, pe rce ive d prof es siona lly as an integral 
part of the infras tr ucture which upholds it. He is an 
"officer of the law" and, as such, one whose p r o f e s s i o n a l  
duty it is to "serve the interests of justice as well as 
of those who seek it". [5] He is thus seen as being 
p r ofes si on ally committed, not only to the in terests of his 
client but also to'the principle of the law itself - and 
its concomitant, justice.
It is perhaps, above all, this duality of function and 
loyalty which di stinguishe s the lawyer from other p r o f e s s i o n a l  
people and is at the core of many of the ethical p r o bl em s 
peculiar to his role in society; for although h i m s e l f  a 
servant of the law, he is often perceived, when acting in 
pursuit /
pursuit of his client's interests, to be in confli ct with 
i t . This apparent contradiction gives rise to the ethical 
dilemma often seen as being inherent in his function - the 
r ec oncilia tion of his duty to his client with his duty to 
those other int erests to which he is also perceived, 
professionally, to owe allegiance - law and justice.
Thus, the quest ions are often posed and argued - not only 
among laymen but also, as will be discussed, withi n the 
profession itself: where does the lawyer's paramo un t duty
lie - to his client or to the law? And if to the law, 
does this paramount  allegiance extend, not only to the 
associated ideal of justice, but, even more p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y ,  
to "truth and justice"?
1 .2 The Lawyer as Advocate
Taking the profession as a whole, the lawyer as court 
litigator is a minority role. Apart from speci al is ts, such 
as ba rristers in Britain, most lawyers spend little time 
in the cou rtroom - and indeed there are many who never 
appear in court. Nev erthele ss  the lawyer as l i t igator has 
a high profile in the public perception of his function.
It is in this role also - as advocate in the courts - that 
the ethical questions we have me nti oned seem to arise most 
acutely. It is here that the apparent conflict of duties 
seems most evident and it is this role, consequen tl y, which 
has been the most fertile source of the cyn ic ism of which 
the lawyer has tra ditiona ll y been the victim. It is the 
advocate who has been the most popular target of wits and 
satirists, being variously de scribed as a legal m e r c e n a r y  
or "hired gun"; as one who, in the words of Swift, is 
prepared to prove "that white is black and black is white" 
according as he is paid [6] and of whom Macaula y is said 
to have observed that he would not enquire:
"whether it be right that a man should, with a 
wig on his head and a band round his neck, do 
for a guinea, what, without those appendages, 
he would think it wicked and infamous to do for 
an empire." [7]
While the more discerning critic may not take such rhe to ri c 
too seriously, many do have genuine di ff icult y /in .under­
standing how a professional man can hire his skill and wits 
in the service of what, at times, appear to be du bious 
causes without detriment to his integrity and, if his 
pleading /
pleading be successful, to the cause of justice.
A frequently quoted answer was that given by Dr. Johnson:
"Sir, a lawyer has no bu sin ess with the justice or 
injustice of the cause which he undertakes, unless 
his client asks his opinion, and then he is bound 
to give it honestly. The justice or injustice of 
the cause is to be decided by the judge. Con sider  
Sir; what is the pur pose of Courts of Ju stice ?
It is that every man may have his cause fairly tried
by men appointed to try c a u s e s . A lawyer is not
to tell what he knows to be a lie; he is not to 
produce what he knows to be a false deed; but he 
is not to usurp the pro vince of the jury and of the 
judge and determine what shall be the effect of 
evidence, what shall be the result of legal 
argument. As it rarely happens that a man is fit
to plead his own cause, lawyers are a class of the
com munity who, by study and experience, have 
acquired the art and power of arranging evi dence 
and of applying to the points at issue what the 
law has settled. A lawyer is to do for his client 
all that his client might fairly do for h i m self 
if he could. If, by a su perio rity of attention, 
of knowledge, of skill and a b e t t e r  method of 
communication, he has the advantage of his 
adversary, it is an adva nt age to which he is 
entitled. There must always be some advan tage 
one side or the other, and it is better that 
advantage should be had by talent than by chance.
If lawyers were to underta ke no causes till they 
were sure that they were just, a man might be 
precluded altoget her  from a trial of his claim 
though, were it jud icia ll y examined, it might be 
found a very, just claim." [8]
Plausible as it sounds, and often though it is inv oke d in 
defence of the ad vo cate's role, it would appear that this 
line of argument has never quite carried c o n v i c t i o n  as a 
complete vindication of that role; nor has it su f f i c e d  to 
allay public scepticism. The doubts persist - and not only 
among lay people. It may be significant that the opi ni ons 
e x p r e s s e d /
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expr ess ed in the pas sage quoted were in answer to a question 
put to Dr. Johnson by his biographer, Boswell, him se lf a 
member of the Scottish Bar. While lawyers the mse lves may 
be satisfied that no question of personal or profes si onal 
integrity arises when an advocate champions a cause which 
he, personally, may believe to be unjust, they are by no 
means unanimous in their percept ion of their own function 
as profes sional pleade rs in relation to important ethical 
issues. Eminent me mb ers  of the profession  differ in their 
views about crucial ethical aspects of the advocate's  role - 
pa rti cularly  as to where his paramount duty lies.
Oh this point, the dive rgence of view is well i llust ra ted 
in an exchange between Lord Brougham and Lord Chief Justice 
Cockburn, the occasion being a dinner in honour of an 
eminent French advocate. In the course of his remarks,
Lord Brougham is report ed as saying that the qualiti es  of 
an advocate were:
"to reckon everything subord inate  to the interests 
of his client - to have no purpose except to 
serve his cause effectively - to make no dev ia tion 
or digression to please either jury or judge, or 
the populace or the Crown, but to do his duty 
looking only to the success of his client."
Lord Cockburn is reported as replying:
"My noble and learned friend, Lord Brougham, whose 
words are the words of w i s d o m , s a i d  that an 
advocate should be fearless in carrying out the 
interests of his client; but I couple that with 
this qu ali ficatio n and this restriction: that
the arms which he wields are to be the arms of 
the warrior and not of the assassin. It is his 
duty to strive to accompl ish the interes ts of 
his client per fas but not per ne f a s ; it is 
his /
his duty to the utmost of his power, to seek 
to reconcile the interest he is bound to 
maintai n and the duty it is incumbent upon 
him to discharge with the eternal and immutable 
interests of truth and justice." [9]
The dive rgence revealed in this exchange is more than one of 
emphasis. it reflects an important difference as to the true 
nature of the advocate' s role and his relative p r i o r i t i e s  - 
a conflict of view as to the relative priorities of the 
values which he should acknowledge. It poses the qu es tions : 
is there inherent in the advocate's function an ethical 
conflict between his duty to his client and his o b l i g a t i o n s  
as an officer of the law? Can his duty to the law be said 
to extend to a prior commitment to "the eternal and 
immutable interests of truth and justice" - or is his 
paramount loyalty to the interests of his client - "to 
reckon everything subordinate"  to those int erests? And - 
whichever or whether either of these proposi ti ons may be 
valid - can the adv ocate's role, in so far as it may in volve 
the avoidance or subordin ation of truth, be seen to be i n h e r e n t l y  
unethical?
No proper attempt to seek an answer to these q u e s t i o n s  can 
be made without first examining the system in which the 
advocate operates - and the values which that system it se l f  
may be seen to acknowledge; in particular, the place wi th in  
the system of the value of truth as an objective in the 
pursuit of justice. Only by so doing can we obtain a prope r 
perspective of the advocate's role.
Fundamental / '
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Fundamental to the pursuit of truth is the d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
of f a c t . Courts and advocates are, of course, c o n c erned 
with questions of both law and fact, but, in terms of their 
significance as affecting a court's decision - and important 
as issues of law undoub tedly are - issues of fact are of 
greater import. The fact of a case must be a s c e r t a i n e d  
- o r  held to have been a scert ai ned - before the law can 
be applied. The American judge, Jerome Frank, c r i t i c i s e d  
the legal establi shment for devaluin g the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of 
fact as compared to law in litigation:
"..... most books by learned lawyers talk as if 
the chief difficulty in the job of the courts 
inheres in de termini ng what rules should be 
applied, what the rules mean, their extent and 
interpretation. I think those books are g r os sl y 
misleading. I grant that so met imes such rule- 
diff icu lties exist. Otherwise, I as an upper- 
court judge, would have almost nothing to do.
But the other part of the job of the courts, that 
part which is assigned almost entirely to trial 
courts - the ascertain me nt of the facts of 
individual law suits - presents a far more 
difficult, a far more baffling, problem." [10]
And pointed out that:
".... no matter how certain the legal rules may 
be, the decision remains at the mercy of the 
courts' fact-finding. If there is doubt about 
what a court, in a law-suit, will find were the 
facts, then there is at least equal doubt about 
its decision." [11]
It follows that the main influenc e which the a d v o c a t e  exerts 
upon a court's decision will, more often than not, depend  
primarily on his pre sent ation of the factual as p e c t s  of 
his case - and that it is this aspect of his fu nc t i o n  which 
is /
is central to its ethical implications.
Further, while, as will be later discussed, the advocat e's 
position in regard to the disclosure of matters of law is 
fairly clear, his obli ga tions in relation to the disclo sure 
to the court of matters of fact, are much less so.
For these reasons, we shall, in the course of this inquiry, 
primarily address those que stions which relate to the 
advocate's perceived rights and obl igations in re gar d to 
the disclosure or s u p p r essio n or manipul ation of fact: 
what, for example, is his position reg arding r e l evant  facts 
concern ing  his client's case which are known to him but 
not to the court? To what extent does the c o n f i d e n t i a l  
nature of the relati on ship with his client ju stify his 
w ith holding  or con ceali ng  those facts? Is he justified, 
in cross- exa mination,  in casting doubt upon t e s t i m o n y  which 
he knows to be true? What is his perceived po s i t i o n  in 
the face of a client's intention to commit pe r j u r y ?  In 
criminal trials, what is his position as defenc e counsel 
when his client has c o n f i d e n t i a l l y  admitted factual guilt? 
What are his pro fess ional rights and o b l i g at io ns when acting 
as pr osecuto r? In what respects do they differ from his 
role as defence counsel?
The ethical problems of forensic advocacy are in h e r e n t  in 
both civil and criminal procedures. However, while  many 
of the principal issues are applicable to both areas, the 
criminal /
criminal process has features which are p articu la rly 
pertinent to the ethics of the advocate's role. Central 
to the criminal process is the vital issue of the freedom 
of the individual - and the conflict between that freedom 
and the duty of the State as guardian of the public 
interest through the main t e n a n c e  of law and order. But 
the preserva tion of i ndivi du al freedom and dignity is also 
vital to the public interest. Thus there is in the 
criminal process an u n d e rl yi ng tension between these 
competing int erests and the ne ces sity to maintain a fair 
balance between them. This dichotomy of function in the 
ad ministrat ion of the criminal law is often re fl ected in 
an apparent moral a m b i guity  in the role of the adv oc ate 
- particularly of the defe nce  advocate - in the cr imi na l 
courts and, as compar ed  with the civil process, tends to 
bring into sharper focus the ethical issues arising from 
the apparent conflict  between the advocate's  duty to his 
cause and his obligations to society and the law itself.
We may also note other important features of the criminal 
process which have sign i f i c a n t  imp lica tions in re lat io n 
to the advocate's role: the principal of the p r e s u m p t i o n
of innocence and the priv ilege against s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n .  
Both features give rise to another marked d i s t i n c t i o n  
between civil and crimi nal procedure. A cardinal  
principle of our criminal law is the acc used's right to 
remain silent. Strict ly  speaking, neither he nor his 
counsel /
counsel is required to say anything other than to tender 
an oral plea of not guilty. Specifically, w h a tev er  defence 
counsel's knowledge as to the truth or falsehood of 
pa rticular al leg ations by the prosecution, he is not 
obliged either to affirm or deny them. The onus is 
entirely on the prosec ution to establish its case in all 
its aspects. In civil cases, h o w e v e r , t h e  p l e a d i n g s  of 
both parties are in written form and, while the onus of 
proof rests upon the plaintiff, "the defender in a civil 
litigation is not, like an accused in a criminal action, 
entitled to sit back and put the opposing party to pro of 
of every element in the case against him whether he knows 
it to be true or false...." [12] This d i s t i n c t i o n  between  
civil and criminal procedure and the relatively p r i v i l e g e d  
position which it gives defence counsel in c r i mi na l cases 
have, as will be seen, important ethical i m p l i c a t i o n s  in 
relation to the advocate's function.
For all these reasons, it is pro posed in this i n q u i r y  to 
concentrate mainly on the advocate as a pleadar in the 
criminal courts. However, since many of the is sues dealt 
with are also relevant to civil proceedings, some of the 
authorities and examples cited will be taken from civil 
sources.
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PART TWO
THE TRIAL IN AD VERSARIA L PROCEDURE  - A SEARCH FOR TRUTH? 
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2.5 Summary
2.1 Origins and Nature of the Advers arial  System
The origins of the a d v e r s a r i a l  trial system as p r a ct is ed 
in Britain and America and other common law j u ri sd ictions , 
are obscure. Various views have been expressed. The 
American, H.J. Abraham, asc rib es to Professor Max Radin 
the view that the system:
"has been in vogue since its adoption in Rome 
in the fourth or fifth century B.C. when - for 
better or worse, and quite conce ivably the latter - 
the judge's task changed from determinin g the truth 
to the umpiring of a comp eti tion. " [13]
As regards the conceptual origins of the advers ar ial 
method, Sheriff Stone asserts an even earlier source:
"The theoretical origins of our adversary system  
of attaining the t r u t h .... ar e to be found in the 
dialectical methods of the ancient Greek phi losoph er s, 
who developed the view that the conflict between 
alternative cont e n t i o n s  was the best way of 
conducting an inquiry." [14]
The /
The umpireal role of the advers arial judge and the arguments 
for and against the c o n t en ti on that adversaria l conflict 
is the best way of co n d u c t i n g  an inquiry, are later 
discussed, but here we may also note the " fight s u b s t i t u t e " 
views as to origin such as the con tenti on of Jerome Frank 
that the system has its origins as a legal ised substitute 
for private fights or feuds [15] and the st ate ment by 
Professor Hazard of Yale Law School that "its ant ecedent 
is often said to be the Norman trial by battle." [16]
However, whatever its origins and whatever legal or social 
philosophy may have i n f l ue nced its adoption, it is a 
system which, in those countries in which it is practised, 
is deeply rooted, not only in the legal systems of such 
countries, but in the cu ltural trad iti ons and c o n s c i o u s n e s s  
of their societies; a fact which may explain its app arent ly 
uncritical - or, at any rate, largely uncr it ical - accept ance 
by those societies as a judicial process for the eliciting 
of facts upon which crucial rights, the personal freedom 
- and, indeed, in some jurisdictions,  the l i f e -  of a 
citizen may depend. Thus, Professor Wol fram of Cornell 
Law S c h o o l :
"There is no reason to think that the adversar y 
system sprang fully in t e l l e c t u a l i z e d  from the 
brows of a Solon. Many of the rules and pra ct ices 
of the adversaria l system are imp ortant pro du ct s 
of history or culture. The adve rs ary system in the 
United States is cu ltu r e - b o u n d  beyond an extent 
that most lawyers would prefer to admit. The same 
social system that supports prof es sional p r i z e ­
fighting and football, but outlaws chicken fighting, 
can be seen m i r rore d in the set of c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
rules that limit yet then allow agg ressi on  and 
competition in the legal arena." [17]
While /
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While these remarks were made in an American context, there 
seems no reason to suppose that the system is any less 
"culture-bound" in Br ita in or any other country in which 
it i's practised; nor are the contr adict ions to which 
Wolfram refers any less evident.
Although there may be differen ces as to particulars, in 
general and in substance, the system is essentia lly the 
same in all a d v e rsar ia l jurisdictions. Its common and 
fundamental features may be summarised as follows.
Essential Features
As the descr ipt ion implies, the system is a combative 
process: one which, in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson:
"sets the parties fighting." [18]; a gladiatori al contest, 
the gladiators being, in criminal trials, the re sp ect ive 
advocates for the accused and the Crown or State. During 
the trial it is they who play the main part in the 
proceedings. They conduct the int errog ation of w i t ness es  
- by way of exam in atio n - i n - c h i e f ,  cross-e x a m i n a t i o n  and 
re-examination. A s ignific an t ingredient in the outcome 
of the contest may often be the skill employed by the 
advocates in their i n t e r r ogat io ns and pr es entat ion of their 
cases - the object being to present and marshall the evi de nc e 
in the manner they deem best suited to their r e s p ective 
causes. This they do, not only by the adroit p r e s e n t a t i o n  
of the evidence of their own witnesses, but also by trying 
to /
to discredit opposing evidence - at least, to the extent 
that the rules of proce du re and professi onal ethics allow.
The judge, by contrast, does not, by and large, intervene 
in the conduct of the proceedings. He - a n d  the jury, 
where there is one - are "both neutral and passive" [19].
The judge's role is esse n t i a l l y  that of an impartial 
arbiter - prono uncing as required on disputed point s of 
procedure. Although he may, on occasion, inter vene to. ask 
a question on a t e c h n ic al ity or to clarify an ap paren t 
abiguity, he plays no subs t a n t i v e  part in the i n t e r r o g a t i o n  
of witnesses. In the words of Sheehan, dealing with the 
system as practised in Scotland:
"The function of the judge is not to act as
inquisi tor  and inquire into the matter....
The judge's role is to 'preside at a forensic 
contest between two parties' to ensure that 
the rules of law are applied and to decide on a
verdict (except where there is a jury). He
must arrive at a de cision on the facts s u b m it ted 
to him for judgme nt." [20]
Abraham confirms this point: the judge:
"is not in any sense an active elicitor of 
truth regarding the testimony presented." [21]
On the other hand, it would, as both these writers e m p h a s i s e  
be wrong to deprecate the function or ove rst ress the 
passivity of the judge's role. Thus Abraham:
"He is - or cer tainly he is expected to b e - i n  
complete charge of c o u rtroom  procedure, and as 
such possesses a con si d e r a b l e  residue of what in 
legal parlance is termed judicial discretion. In 
this connection, that intr ig uing compound noun 
demands an applica ti on - '....enlightened by 
intelli gen ce and learning, cont ro lled by sound 
pr inciples of law, of firm courage combined with 
the calmness of a cool mind, free from partia lity, 
not swayed by sympathy nor warped by pre judic e nor 
moved by any kind of infl uence  save alone the
ove rwh elmi ng  passion to do that which is j u s t 22 ] . 
Sheehan, /
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Sheehan, quoting from an English case, makes a similar 
point - albeit in somewha t less idealistic terms:
"in the system of trial which we have evolved 
in this country, the judge sits to hear and 
determine the issues raised by the parties, 
not to conduct an inv estigat io n or exam in ation 
on behalf of society at 1 a r g e .... however a judge
is not a mere u m p i r e  his object above all is
to find out the truth and do justice ac cording 
to the l a w ." [23]
It cannot, of. course, be denied that, however passive or 
rel atively inert the judge's role compared with that of 
the contending advo ca tes during the course of the trial, 
he - and the jury, where there is one - play a cruc ial 
and obviously essen tial part in adversarial pro ce ed ings. 
Further, while we cannot discount the fa llibi lity of any 
human judgments and their vuln era bilit y to p r e j u d i c e  - 
even if only s ubconsc io us - we can probably accept the 
basic assumption of the system that judges at any rate, 
(juries, perhaps, more questionably), are in the main 
un influence d by par ti san conside ra tions and are ho n e s t l y  
activated by the sole desire to discover the true facts.
However, the fact must be acknowledged  that, to wh a t e v e r  
extent the ad versa rial judge is motivated by the 
"overwhelming passion to do that which is just", he can 
only do so within the limitat ions imposed by the system. 
That system requires that the only relevant ev id ence 
upon which his (or the jury's) verdict can be based is 
the /
the evidence c om petentl y presented  to the court at the 
trial. But it is the partisan  advocates of the contend ing  
parties who largely con trol the nature of that evidence 
which is, therefore, in the main, likely to be highly 
selective and biased in favour of one side or the other.
As will be discussed, however, the justificati on advanced 
for the system is that the biased evidence of one side 
will be count er acted by that of the other, it being the 
function of the court to produce a balanced judgment 
from a consid er ation and weighin g of both. Those who 
support the adve rs arial method argue that truth is more 
likely to emerge from such a balanced judgment of c o n f lictin g 
t h e s e s .
Nevertheless, viewed purely as a fact-finding process, 
the rationale of the system may, perhaps, seem puzzling  
to a disint erested  observer. Indeed, divorced from 
the historical and cultural traditions and loyalties 
referred to by Wolf ram  (supra), some may question whether 
it would be adopted by any of the countries which practise 
it were they to devise a system d_e n o v o . Such a doubt 
would appear to be shared  by, for example, the present 
Commissioner of the M e t r o p o l i t a n  Police in England. [2 A ]
No balanced assessment of the merits of the system can, 
however be made without taking into account other important 
features which are p e r c eive d by its support ers as e ns hr ining 
the principles of i n d i vi dual liberty and justice and 
which are later discu ss ed in the context of moral and 
social /
social values. Pre- emine nt  among these are the principle 
of the p r e s u m p t i o n  of innocence and the privilege against 
se l f -incri mi nation.  These two principles are related.
Since an accused person is presumed innocent until and 
unless proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt, he is not 
required to prove - or, indeed, even to assert - his 
innocence. [25] The onus rests entirely upon the 
prosecution to produce evidence sufficient in law to 
prove guilt and the accused is entitled, if he so chooses, 
to remain silent and put the prosecution to proof. It 
is for this reason that the system is sometimes given 
the a lt er native  d es ig nation "accusatorial" - since "it is 
left to the pro s e c u t o r  to bring an accusation and produce 
evidence to justify it". [26]
While much is made of these, and other, adver saria l 
principles or values by apologists for the system - 
Abraham, for example, reg arding them as being " fund am ental 
to the notions of liberty and justice that pervade the 
political system of the liberal and democratic west" [27] - 
they are not all the subject of universal acclaim; nor are 
they u ni ve rsally  percei ve d as indicative of the s u p e r i o r i t y  
of the system relative  to other systems of crimina l justice.
Before explo rin g the merits of these opposing views, it may 
be ins tructive to examine briefly the very di fferent  process 
of criminal justice with which the adversarial sy ste m is 
often compared and which' is commonly called the " i n q u i s i t o r i a l  
system.
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2.2 The Inq uis itori al  System Compared
A b r a h a m ’s comment (supra) ass ociating the adver sarial 
concept of criminal justice with the "political syste m of 
the liberal and, demo cr atic west" is puzzling if that phrase
is taken, as p resuma bl y it must, to include the count ries
/
of the west Europran continent; for in those coun tr ies
^ ' 
it is the i n quisi to rial and not the adversary sy stem  which
is practised. The d i f f erence between these syst ems  is
fundamental. It reflects, not merely a pro cedural
distinction, but a rad ic ally contrasting j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l
approach to the rel a t i o n s h i p  between the state and a
suspected criminal. A look at the main features of the
in qu isi tor ial system - of which we shall take the French
model as an example - may serve to bring into clea rer focus
the imp lic at ions and idios yncra si es of our own system  in
regard to notions of truth, justice and individ ual liberty.
While, as between the two systems, there are many d i f f e r e n c e s  
in regard to detailed procedure, for the purposes of this 
inquiry three main c o n t r a s t i n g  features may be identified: 
first, the p relimi na ry in ve stigation (the enquete) by an 
examining mag istrate  (the juge d 1 i n s t r u c t i o n ); second, 
the roles played by judge and counsel at the trial itself; 
third, the nature and source of the evidence on which the 
verdict is b a s e d .
2 .2 . 1 /
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2.2.1 The Pr el iminary Inv estigation
In France, the most serious category of criminal offence, 
"crimes", must be referr ed by the public pro se cu tor to an 
ex ami ni ng mag is tr ate for a preliminary investigation.
Alleged offences of a less serious order, "delits", may 
also, at the discret ion of the prosecutor, be so referred.
The examini ng m agistra te  is an independent official. He is 
not a member of the prosecution. His function is not to 
pron oun ce on the guilt or innocence of the suspect but to 
direct and supe rvise a thorough investigation into all 
aspects and to decide whether there is suffici ent evi dence  
against the suspect to warrant his being sent for trial.
The prel iminary  i n v e s tig at ion is intensive and wid e-ra nging.
A crucial dist inctio n between it and the pr e-t rial inquiries 
of the prosecu ti on in the adversarial process is that the 
French enquete is non -partisan, its purpose being to discover 
and record in the "dossier" (infra) - for the i n f o rmatio n 
of all the parties involved, namely, the prose cution,  the 
defence and the court - all pertinent facts i r r e s p e c t i v e  of 
whether these are fav ourable or otherwise to the suspect. [28]
Although the p relimi na ry investi gation is con d u c t e d  in 
private, the s u s p e c t ’s lawyer is entitled to attend all 
me eti ngs between his client and the examining m a g i s t r a t e  
and be kept informed of the progress of the inv estig at ion.
It /
It is, h o w e v e r , the m agist ra te who conducts all interro ga tions 
of the suspect and witnesses. He has, apparently, sweeping 
powers. He alone may summon witnesses and compel them to 
appear before him. He may also, it would seem, detain the 
suspect in custody, should he deem this necessary, until the 
completion of his in vestiga tions. [29] He also has the 
power to commission experts to report on special aspects.
Of particular si gn i f i c a n c e  in regard to the exposure and 
elimination of per ju red te stimony is a pro cedure peculia r to 
the system - the " c o n f r ont at ion de temoins" - whereby the 
magistrate can arrange for parties who are telling a p p a rently 
contradict or y stories to confro nt each other in his pr ese nce 
with a view to ch al l e n g i n g  and eradicating di screpan cies.
The results of his in v e s t i g a t i o n s  are compiled by the 
magistrate into a "dossier" which, if he decides that the 
suspect should be sent for trial, is made avail able to the 
presiding judge (but not to the jury) at the trial as well 
as to the prosecu ti on and defence.
2.2.2 The Roles of Judge and Counsel
If the alleged offence is of a serious nature - a "crime" - 
the appropriate court is the Cour d'assise c o m p risin g the 
presiding judge, two other judges as "as sesseurs" and a 
jury. However, before the case is sent for trial to that 
c o u r t , /
court, the de cis ion of the examining magistrate so to do 
must first be r a t ifi ed  by another body - the "Chambre 
d 1 a c c u s a t i o n " , (which also acts as an appeal court to decide 
on appeals against rulings of the examining magistrate 
during the enquete).
At the trial itself, the proceedings and the respective 
roles of the p r o f e s s i o n a l  par ticipants are markedly diff erent 
from those a pplica bl e to the adversarial trial. As bet ween 
judge and counsel there is, indeed, a virtual reversal of 
roles as regards the eliciting of evidence. Compared with 
their ad ve rsarial cou nterparts, the inquisitorial adv oc at es 
for the opposing sides play a minor part. They do not 
examine or cr os s - e x a m i n e  witnesses in the manner of 
adversarial counsel. In this and in other respects it is 
the pre siding judge who has the dominant role - a pos it ive 
and co ntrol ling role, contra sting  sharply with the 
relatively passive and mainly umpireal function of the 
adversarial judge. At the inquisitorial trial it is the 
presiding judge's function actively to interrogate the 
accused and all witnesses. Counsel may suggest ques ti ons 
for the judge to put to witnesses, it being in the judge's 
discretion whether, and in what manner, to do so; and the 
prosecutor, it appears, may, on the conlusion of the judge's 
examina tio n of the accused, put questions direct [30]; 
but it is the judge who is the main interrogator.
The control of the presiding judge also extends to the 
citing of witnesses; for although the witnesses are initially 
cited by the c o n t end in g parties, t h e j u d g e  may direct other 
witnesses to be summon ed  if he considers this necessary.
He may also - like the examining magistrate in the 
preli min ary i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  - arrange for witnesses giving 
con tradi ct ory ev idence to confront each other.
Another dist i n c t i v e  feature of the inquisitorial jud ge's 
role is that, at the conc lusion of the trial, he - with his 
two assesseur s - retires with the jury to consider both 
verdict and sentence.
2.2.3. Nature and Source of Evidence - the Dossier
The dossier in which the exa mining magistrate c o m pi le s the 
results of his pr el i m i n a r y  investigations is of major 
sig nificance in the i nq ui sitoria l process and its 
implications as affectin g the attitude towards and the 
outcome of a criminal trial are indicative of another major 
d is ti nguishing feature as compared with the a d v e r sar ia l 
process .
Several important facts may be noted as regards this 
document. First, as has been said, it is made available , 
not only to the prosecution, but - unlike the police  p r e ­
trial /
trial info rmatio n in the adversarial procedure - also to 
the defence and the trial judge. Second, as has also been 
said, since it contains the results of a wi de - r a n g i n g  and 
n o n-pa rt is an investigation, it will reveal all facts 
unc overed by the examining magistrate - and not only those 
deemed to be indicative of the guilt of the suspect. Third, 
in acco rdance with the French principle that "on juge 
l'homme, pas les faits", its comprehensive ness extends, not 
only to all the discove red evidence pertaining to the offence 
but to the whole life history and personality of the suspect 
including, (this, no doubt, an objectionable factor in the 
eyes of adv er sa rial pra ctitioners), any previous c o n v i c t i o n s  
against the suspect. [31]
Finally - and perhaps most fundamentally -it is l a r ge ly on 
the basis of the information before him, as c o n t a i n e d  in the 
dossier, that the presiding judge will conduct his 
in te rr ogatio ns  at the trial. It follows that, a l t h o u g h  the 
dossier itself is not made available to the jury, the 
evidence it hears elicited at the trial is likely, in the 
main, to follow the inf ormation contained within the dossier.
The importa nce  of the dossier in the French p r o c e d u r e  is also 
underlined by a further fact noted by Sheehan. In the Cour 
d'assise which sits with a jury, witnesses are alwa ys  cited 
because the jury, which does not have access to the do ssier 
i t s e l f , /
itself, must hear the oral evidence. However, in the lower 
courts, where there is no jury, it appears that the 
pro sec utor will often not cite witnesses to the trial on 
the grounds that their evidence has already been given to the 
examining magistr ate during the preliminary i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
and is contained in the dossier which is before the judge. 
[32]
2.2.4. Conclud ing Comments on the Inquisitorial Sy ste m
To many of those reared in the adversarial tradition, the 
inq uis itorial  process may appear alien to familiar noti ons 
of individual freedom and justice. The d e s i gn ation 
"in quisitorial" is itself possibly emotive - if not, indeed, 
pejorative - evocative of Torquemad a or the Star Chamber.
On this point, it has been sugge sted that a less, in vi dious 
appellation would be "interrogative". [33]
To some extent also, criti cism of the system by a d v e r s a r i a l  
lawyers may perhaps be influenced by a tribal l o y alt y to our 
own ways and by a distaste for all things foreign to our 
traditions. But there may be more rational g r o und s for 
c r i t i c i s m .
In the first place, British lawyers and their c o l l e a g u e s  in 
other adv ersarial countries probably tend to have an 
instinctive aversion to judicial interrogation b e h i n d  closed 
doors /
doors - albeit by a m a g i strat e pr of essiona ll y commi tted to 
impartiality and in the presen ce of the suspect's  lawyer. 
However, on this point, it can be argued that the privacy 
of the preliminary i n v e s tigatio n is designed both to protect 
the reputation of a person whom the mag is tr ate event ually 
decides should not be sent for trial - and to avoid 
improperly prej udici ng  a suspect who is.
A more cogent cri tic is m commonly expressed is that the 
inquisitorial procedure  is inconsis ten t with our highly 
valued principle of the pre sump ti on of innocence. Some 
critics, indeed, would go further and assert that it is in
fact based - at least, by impli catio n - on a p r e s u m p t i o n
of guilt [34]; that although, in theory, the onus of 
proving guilt rests, in the inquisitorial  process, as it 
does in the adver sarial system, upon the pro secut io n, the 
fact that the examining mag ist ra te - after such a thoroug h 
and non-partisan in ves t i g a t i o n  - has adj ud ged the evidence 
against the suspect to be suf ficient  to warr ant his being 
sent for trial - an asse ssmen t su bse quent ly ratified, in 
the case of serious crimes, by three senior judges  of the 
Chambre d'a ccusation - c a n n o t  but in fluence the trial judge 
and jury in favour of a presumpt ion of guilt. French 
apologists, as one would expect, strongly r e p u d i a t e  this 
accusation - asserting, among other arguments, that the 
principle of the pres u m p t i o n  of innocence is in h e r e n t  in 
the French Declarat ion of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen [33]. While this may be so, it does not, of course,
meet /
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meet the criticism  since constitut ional  dec laratio ns, however 
impressive, cannot per se affect the practical c o n s e qu en ces 
of the system.
A more forceful point which the French might make is that 
this particular cri ti cism of their system applies also to the 
adversarial process - in so far as the mere fact of an 
accused having been brought to trial may give rise to a 
pre sumption of guilt in the mind of the trial court. Given 
the human tendency to reason that "there must be so m e t h i n g  
in it or he w o u l d n ’t be there", this is no doubt an inev i t a b l e  
factor in any criminal process. However, as be tw een the two 
systems, the inqui sitorial pre-trial process, given its 
nature and purpose as an intensive and in dependen t 
investigation, would seem to be more likely to give rise to 
an inference of guilt; for, in the ad versa rial system, 
the pre-trial police information on which the de c i s i o n  to 
prosecute is normally based, is clearly or ie ntated towards 
the prosecution - and recognised as such by the trial court.
On the other hand, it may also be argued in favour of the 
French procedure that the intensity and th or o u g h n e s s  of the 
preliminary inv estigat io ns reduces the risk of an inn ocent 
person being sent for trial. On this point, Sheehan, 
referring to cases in the lower court (the tribun al 
correctionnel), quotes the low average acq uittal rate of 
about five percent - though ack nowledg in g that this is a 
d o u b l e - e d g e d  argument [36].
A /
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A less easily defended cr it icism may be the fact, also noted 
by Sheehan, t h a t :
"all the facts con ce rn ing the background and 
personal life history of the accused (includin g 
any previous covictions) are made known to the
court before it reaches its judgment." [37]
While pointing out that any discl osure of bad c h a r a c t e r  or
previous convictions "should be ignored" when d e c i d i n g  on 
a verdict, he acknowl ed ges that:
"while a pro fess ional judge may be able to do 
this, a jury may have more difficulty in so 
doing." [38]
However, such criticisms notwithst an ding, it wou ld seem, 
on any objective view, to be difficult to resist the 
conclusion that the i nquis it orial process - viewed solely 
as a fact-finding exercise - is, ostensibly at least and 
whatever its other possible defects, a more d e t e r m i n e d  and, 
probably, more effective, method of unearthing the relevan t 
facts than is the adve rsarial method. The i n q u i s i t o r i a l  
system perceives this most crucial function as the excl us ive 
prerogative of the n o n - p ar ti san judicial role - both in the 
preliminary inve st igati ons and at the trial itself. The 
adversarial system, however, has no place for any i n d e pe nd ent 
functionary equipped with the necessary  powers to elici t 
all the facts so far as discoverable . In that system, this 
task is assigned to the partisan  protagonist s in the forensic 
contest.
This brief look at the in qui s i t o r i a l  system of the 
administr ati on of criminal justice may serve, as has been 
said /
said, to put into clearer p er sp ective  the i d i o s y n c r a s i e s  of 
our own system - p a r t ic ularly  in regard to what must be seen 
as the most radical di fferen ce  between the sy ste ms - the 
sharply contra sti ng methods of fact d e t e r m ination  - the 
pursuit of truth. But before attemptin g to draw any firm 
conclusions by way of com parison, we must further analyse 
our own system. For that purpose we will, at this stage of 
our enquiry, address two main questions: first, the concept
of truth as an objective in the trial process - and the 
conflicting views as to the best way of seeking it; second, 
the significan ce for the ad m i n i s t r a t i o n  of crimina l justice 
of those moral and social values ass ociat ed with the concep ts 
of individual liberty and justice and commonly p e r c e i v e d  as 
hallmarks of the adve rsarial philosophy.
As will be seen, all these factors are relevant to our main 
theme - the ethics of the ad vocate's role - since they are 
crucially pertinent to the moral and j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l  milieu 
in which he functions.
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2.3. Truth in the Trial Process
2.3.1 The Concept of Truth
The question whether, or to what extent, the adversarial 
trial process may be p e r c eived as being p r e - e mi nently  a 
search for truth, invites the fundamental que st io n - a s k e d ,  
not only by the "jesting Pilate" [39], but by p hilo so phers 
down the ages: what is truth? Pilate, acc or di ng to Bacon,
"would not stay for an answer"; nor need we; for, clearly, 
an exploration of this concept in all its philo s o p h i c a l  
aspects is beyond the scope and purpose of this inquiry.
However, two particul ar senses in which the word "truth" 
is commonly used - and, as will be later discussed, som et imes 
confused [40] - are relevan t to our theme: first, truth
in the ep istemo logical sense of fact de ter m i n a t i o n  - the 
veracity of objective facts; second, truth in the ethical 
sense of trut hfulnes s - the subjective conduct of i ndivid ua ls 
as regards speaking honestly.
The concept of truth in this, second, ethical sense is 
directly relevant to the ethics of the advo ca te's function - 
and is later discussed in the context of the moral issues 
involved in dec eption and lying [41]. For our im mediate 
purpose, however, we are here concerned with truth in the 
epistemo log ical sense - and its place in that p ar ti cular 
sense in the relative p ri or ities of the adver sa rial system.
2.3.2. /
2.3.2 Truth as a Product of Conflict
The main question here addressed is whether ad versaria l 
conflict, as p r a c tise d in our system, can be perc ei ved as 
an aid - rather than an obstacle to the pursuit of truth.
Within the legal p rof es sion in ad versari al ju risdiction s, 
con flicting views on this issue abound. On the p r o - a d v e r s a r i a l  
side, the view a t t r ib uted by Sher iff Stone [42] to the ancient 
Greek p hi lo so phers  that conflict between alte rn ative  
con tentions is the best way of conduc ting an inquiry, seems 
to command s ubstant ia l support and is probably the most 
common argument ad van ced in j u stific at ion of the system.
Sissela Bok, in dealing with the arguments adv anced  by 
adversarial lawyers to justify the ethics of their role in 
litigation, notes this defence as:
"  an appeal to the principle  of veracity.
Veracity itself will be advanced, many argue, 
if each side pushes as hard as it can to defeat 
the other." [43] -
Wolfram notes the same argument:
"An assumpti on that und erlies the advers arial 
system is that the mutual ly conten tio us 
strivings of relative ly equal advocates will 
make truth and justice apparent to the j u d g e ..."[44]
And a g a i n : '
"Ascertaining  truth is argued to be one of the 
chief ju s t i f i c a t i o n s  of the ad versaria l system.
It is claimed that it is designed to lead to 
the truth more surely than competing models  for 
litigation. The lawyers, co mmi tted to se ek ing 
a partisan victory in the trial by any legal 
means, are motivat ed  to search di ligently for 
facts /
facts and to test the evidence offered by 
the opposing party through cross-e xa minatio n 
and coun tereviden ce. Through the r e c i p rocat in g 
process of proof and challenge to proof, the 
fact finder is best able to determine where the 
truth lies . " [43]
We may note here also Wo lfram's  represen tat ion of what can 
be seen as tra ditional adve rsaria l counter -a ttack on the role 
of the inq uisitoria l judge:
"The adversary process is often contrasted with 
an arbitral system, in which a single i n q u isi to r 
is to decide a dispute, between parties with out 
advocacy from either side. The paradoxical 
position of the i n q u i si torial  judge is that, as 
a matter of p s y c h o l o g y , one searching for facts 
and for the limits and nuances of the law is 
much more likely driven to creative and ti r e l e s s  
effort if one is co mm itted to discovering su p p o r t  
for a thesis. But once the judge forms and p r o c e e d s  
upon a thesis, the natural human instinct is to 
resist sloughing off that thesis, and such su pport 
as has been gathered for it, in order to i n v e s t i g a t e  
conflicting or variant theses." [46]
The argument here would appear to be that the d i s c o v e r y  of
truth is less likely to be ach ie ved where the judge, as in
the inqui sitorial process, is initially inf lu en ced by only 
one thesis - that reflected  in the dossier - and is not 
subjected to the disc iplin e of weighing a l t e rnative  theses 
as in the adversaria l procedure. This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  seems 
to be confirmed by Wolfra m' s additional comment that - in 
a criminal c a s e -  t h e i n q u i s i t o r i a l  judge:
"may be ill dispos ed to take any stance but one 
antagonistic to the accused because, by prior
acquaintanc e with the facts from the dossier
prepared in advance by the committing m a g i s t r a t e ,  
the judge has already de veloped  a basis for 
d e c i s i o n ." [47]
Even /
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Even Jerome Frank - otherwise, as we shall discuss, a severe 
critic of what he con si ders the excesses and abuses of the 
"fight" element in the system - concedes the value of the 
basic adversarial principle:
"The zealously partis an  lawyers sometimes do 
bring into court ev ide n c e  which, in a 
di sp ass ion ate inquiry, might be overlooked.
Apart from the fact ele ment of the case, the 
opposed lawyers also illu minate for the court, 
niceties of the legal rules which the judge 
might otherwise not perceive. The "fight" 
theory, therefore, has invaluable qu ali ties 
with which we cannot afford to dispense." [48]
Among legal figures in Britain, we may perhaps cite the 
former Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, as a re pres e n t a t i v e  
of the view that there is no inco nsi stenc y be twe en  the 
combative nature of the syst em and its valid ity as a truth- 
finding process. Lord D e n n i n g ' s  perception of the system 
as regards its com mitme nt  to "truth and justice" are later 
discussed in the context of the advocate's role (Part Three), 
but - in relation to the be li ef attribu ted to him by David 
Pannick that a law case is "an inquiry to find out the 
truth" - we may note the dissent - and a degree of cyn ic ism - 
reflected in Pannick's commen t that "this'will come as a 
surprise to most lawyers who have always u n d e r s t o o d  judicial 
proceed ing s in the United Ki ngdom to be c o m ba tive rather 
than inquisitorial". [49]
This comment - in so far as it may be taken to imply that 
the combative nature of the system is i n c o n s i s t e n t  with the 
pursuit of truth - also comman ds  signific ant s u p port within 
the /
the profession. We may note, for example, the remarks 
of Lord J u s t i ce -C lerk T h om so n in a Scottish (civil) case 
deriding the notion that adversarial litigation is p r e ­
eminently - or even to any sig nificant degree - about the 
pursuit of t r u t h :
"Judges sometimes flatter themselves by thinking 
that their function is the asc er tainm ent of 
truth. This is so only in a very limited sense." [50]
Hazard also, while saying  that:
"....the a d v ers ar y system stands with freedom 
of speech and the right of assembly as a pillar 
of our c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  system."
acknowledges that:
"On the other hand, the adversary system in 
practice is known by its pra cti ti oners often 
to be anything but the truth-re ve aling process 
that it pretends  to be." [51]
And quotes Judge L e a rn ed  Hand:
"About trials hang a suspicion of trickery and 
a sense of a result  depending upon cajolery or 
w o r s e ." [52 ]
Wolfram - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the views expressed supra as to 
the merits of a d v e r s a r i a l  conflict - also gives e x p r e s s i o n  
to opposing views: '
"No logically d e f e n s i b l e  theory of the adversary 
system can ignore the importance, if not the 
contrality, of truth in litigation. Yet some 
observers of the American judicial system have 
wondered whether truth is a regularly achieved 
product of litiga tion, whether the dis covery of 
truth in l i t i g a t i o n  to the extent that it occurs 
is not more the result of seren dip ity than design, 
and whether ad v o c a t e s  are capable of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  
between truth and falsity in a careful and s y s t e m a t i c  
way. Those doubts are not weak, nor are they 
necessarily /
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nec es sa rily an adverse reflectio n upon the 
morals of lawyers. The search for truth is 
not the only business about which lawyers 
must concern themselves. They are also 
charged by their office with duties of 
zealo usl y fur thering the interests of theif 
clients and of m ain ta ining co n f i d e n t i a l i t y  in 
pr otect in g client information. Those three 
obj ec ti ves - truth, zeal and c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  - 
can pull in different d i r e c t i o n s . ” [53]
The adv oc ate's problem arising from conflict between truth 
and duty to his client is, of course, central to our theme 
and is later dealt with in detail, but in relation to 
Wolfr am' s exon er ation of lawyers in this passage, we may 
also note his remarks elsewhere in his book in the context 
of "cour troom forensics" and the advocate ' s "tools of the 
t r a d e " :
"Un for tunatel y, the tools of trade also, and too 
often, include dirty tricks, subterfuge, mi sleadin g 
and prej udicia l argument, distortion, obfuscation, 
m a n i p u l a t i v e  efforts to evade the rules of evidence, 
and an asso rtment of other forensic outrag es that 
try judges' and adversaries' souls rather than 
fairly try a contested question of fact or law." [54]
Finally, in this context, we may note the views of Judge 
Jerome Frank, one of the most out sp oken cri tics of the 
system as pre se nt ly practised. Frank, as has been said, 
does not appear to reject the a dv er sarial pri ncipl e as such, 
but, while co nce din g its "i nvaluable  qualities", he also 
adds :
"But fre quently the p a rtisa ns hip of the o'pposing 
lawyers blocks the unc ove ri ng of vital evi dence 
or leads to a pre se ntatio n of vital tes timony 
in a way that distorts it. I shall attempt to 
show that we have allowed the fighting spirit 
to become dang ero usly ex cessive. " [55]
As /
As we shall later discuss, Frank's strictures are 
par ti cu larly dir ect ed against some techniques often 
employed by lawyers when c r o s s - e x a m i n i n g  witnesses, as to 
which, however, he adds:
"However unp leasant all this may appear, do 
not blame trial lawyers for using the technique s 
I have described. If there is to be criticism, 
it should be directed at the system that 
vi rtually compels their use, a system which 
treats a law-suit as a battle of wits and wiles.
As a di s t i n g u i s h e d  lawyer has said, these 
st ratag em s are 'part of the m a n o e u v r i n g . . . .to 
which (lawyers) are obliged to resort to win 
their c a s e ..... under the present system it is 
part of a lawyer's duty to employ them because 
his oppone nt is doing the same thing, and if he 
ref rai ns from doing so, he is violating his 
duty to his client and giving his opponent an 
u n q u e s t i o n a b l e  advantage....' These tricks 
of trade are today the leg itimate  and accepted 
corollary of our fight theory." [56]
Of part icular  interest, in a social and political context, 
is Frank's suggestion:
"as an add iti onal partial e x p l a nation of the 
perpe t u a t i o n  of the excessi ve fighting methods 
of trials, both civil and criminal, the belief 
in un con t r o l l e d  competition, of unbridled 
individualism. I suggest that the fighting 
theory of justice is not unrelated  to, and not 
uninf l u e n c e d  by, extreme la iss e z - f a i r e  in the 
economic field." [57]
At the co nclusi on  of the chapter in his book in which these
issues are discusse d - headed "'Fight' Theory vs. 'Truth'
Theory" - he finally adds:
"A dis ti n g u i s h e d  legal historian, Vinagradoff, has said 
that an 'ancient trial' was little more than a 
'formally regulated struggle between the parties 
in which the judge acted more as an umpire or 
warden of order and fair play than as an in ve s t i g a t o r  
of /
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of truth'. To continu e that ancient tradition, 
unmodified, to treat a law-suit as, above all, 
a fight, surely cannot be the best way to 
discover the facts." [58]
We are confronted, therefore, with these two ..opposing schools 
of thought as to the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of the a d v e rsarial  system 
as a vehicle for the pur suit of truth in the sense of fact 
determination. We may note however that, despite their 
differences, they have in common one fundamental feature - 
the as su mptio n that, w h a tever the method adopted, the 
discovery of truth - the str iv ing to get at the perti nent 
facts - is a valid objec ti ve of the trial process. They do 
not differ as to the o b j ec tive - only as to the best means 
of trying to attain it.
There is, however, yet another view which q u e s t i o n s  - indeed, 
appears to repudiate - this assumption. While un or thodox  
in approach - and, perhaps, somewhat complex in c o n c epti on  - 
it nev ert hele ss  may contain elements of value in the context 
of the issues here discussed.
2.3.3 The Rel ativ istic View of Truth
We may take as an illu s t r a t i o n  of this view Zenon B a n k o wski' s 
exposition of it in his "The Value of Truth: Fact Scepticism
Revisited." [59]
As a basis for launching his thesis, he c r i t icises what he 
considers to be the rationa le  of Jerome Frank's atta ck on 
the /
the ad ve rsarial system:
"His whole cr itique is based on the idea that 
it is possib le to get really true facts about 
the world but that the adversar ial or 
acc us at orial system is the wrong way of goihg 
about it ....F ra nk and others think there must 
be a clear and obvious way of discovery  which 
settles all that one need or should do to 
find the truth. The truth, then, is something 
that can directl y be discove red  and we can 
test our art if icial conventio na l games such 
as the trial by reference to this direct 
di scovery ." [60]
Bankowski expounds his own views:
"...we do not have immediate access to the
'truth of the m a t t e r ' ......... we have to have
p ro ced ure s for discovery - the app rehensi on  
of truth - which cannot be separ ated out from 
the truth of the matter, justifica tion.  We 
cannot, when talking of what we know, separate 
the truth of the matter from our method of 
a ppreh en ding it... ..The search for truth is 
some thi ng we only undertake through inst itu tiona l 
p ro ced ure s which give us criteria enabli ng us 
to describe our activity as truth seeking. Now 
these cr iteri a are not obvious for all to see - 
they cannot be 'discovered' - rather they are 
nor mativ e. " [61]
The truth of any matter is, then, on this view, int ri n s i c a l l y  
linked with the proc edu res for its discovery. The truth
per se cannot be isolated and there is no "obvious way" of 
di sco vering it.
Applying this phil os ophy to the a dv er sarial  trial process, 
this is seen as a "truth certifying pro ced ure" in which:
"The conclusi on  comes from the judge or jury's 
view of a complex set of data that has been 
filtered through the trial and the laws of 
evidenc e and procedure. These p roce du res and 
cri ter ia are justified nor mativ el y and we 
cannot /
cannot say that a result obtained through
using one is wrong by reference to the
proce dur e and cri teria  of another. We can
compare c r i t e r i a  but in doing that we have
to ope rate at a diff ere nt l e v e l . We might
in fact find that both sets of procedure
are a p p r o p r i a t e  but in different circumstances. " [62]
From which it follows, on this view, that the a p p r o p r i a t e  
question is not "whether and can the jury get it right" 
b u t :
"whether the crite ri a in the trial have been 
followed: to use any other criteria would be
judging it by referen ce to another truth- 
ce rtify in g p r o c e d u r e .... 11 is not a question 
of whe ther the jury, in some absolute way, 
get it right but whether they fulfill their 
alloted role in the system." [63]
Although they do not affect the main theme, we may note in 
passing two points in regard to the criticism of F r a nk's  
viewsas here expressed. First, Fraqk does not appear, as 
Bankowski implies, to be attacking the adver sarial pr i n c i p l e  
as such but - as we have noted supra - only what he c o n s id er s 
to be its excesses. Second, it is clear from the genera l 
context of Fran k's book that he is far from h a r b ou ring the 
illusion that it is possible, by means of any trial process, 
to find absolute truth. On the contrary, he makes clear 
his belief that, given human fallibility, the trial pr oc ess 
"can never, be a c o m p letel y sci en ti fic inv est igati on  for the 
discovery of the true facts" [64]
That said,we may perh aps attempt to sum up the s u b s t a n c e  
of this part ic ular concept of the place of truth in the
trial /
45.
trial process: absolute truth is not a s ce rt ainabl e as an
in depen de nt entity; therefore, it is futile to try to 
search for it, is irrelev ant as an objective of a trial 
process and is not the appropri ate criterion for its 
just if icat io n. It s ub stitute s another kind of "truth" - 
one which, in the context of a trial process, ema na tes 
from and can only be justi fi ed as relative to the "discovery" 
or " i n s t i tu ti onal" proced ur es used in that process. In any 
particula r process, these procedures - provid ed they are 
correctly  followed - are product ive of the "truth" by the 
st and ards of that process. Truth, therefore, is sy stem- 
relative.
Two further points may be noted. First, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
procedure s which, on this view, validate the process, are 
those :
"i ns tantiat ed  in concrete social practices
justified  by appeal to appropriate values" [65]
But these values are not specified in kind and we may 
surmise - though it is not clear - that they are also 
perceived as relat iv is tic - in the sense that they are 
those which the pa rticular society using the p r o c e s s  ha pp ens 
to favour.
Second, in repu diating  the search for truth as a trial 
process objective, Bankowsk i points to the dang ers of a 
pr e o c c u p a t i o n  with e p is te mologi ca l objectives at the 
expense of other values:
"My /
"My claim is that such a search for truth is 
not only based on false premises and 
e p i s t e mo lo gical views that need to be more 
thorou ghl y explore d but is also liable to 
lead to dan gerous policy consequences. I 
am not claiming that such a 'search for truth' 
l e a d s i m m e d i a t e l y  to casting aside questions 
of moralit y and justice. The view I am 
at tacking would not, for example, ine vitably 
lead to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of torture even if 
torture were shown to be a particularly 
reliable way of getting at the truth. However, 
when e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  criteria are radically 
separate from moral ones, the temptation is 
always there." [66]
This point is, as we shall discuss, relevant to the questio n
of the place of moral and social values in the trial process.
2.3.4 Concluding Co mments
The question whether the adversarial trial process - 
par tic ular ly  in the cri minal sphere - is an effe ctive or 
appr opr iate medium for ascerta in ing the facts at issue in 
a legal dispute and the guilt or innocence of a person 
accused of a crime,is one which is clearly of much more 
than academic interest. It is vital for society.
It is, therefore, important that the arguments for and 
against the ad ve rsarial system - as compared with the 
ap par ently more d e d icated  fact-finding process in the 
in qui sitoria l system - be examined dispassionat ely, free 
from nat io nalis tic pr ejudice  and uninhibited by a 
rel uctance to change the traditional and familiar.
Looked at in this spirit, it may be doubted whethe r the 
ar guments /
arguments advanced in support of the adversarial principle - 
that truth is more likely to emerge from forensic conflict - 
suffice to alter the tentative view earlier expressed  that 
the inq uisitoria l method of intensive non -par tisan  inquiry 
seems a more ef fectiv e method.
The argument that a balanced judgment of disputed fact is 
best achieved when skilful advocates forcefully advance 
before an impartial judge their co nflicting  theses, may 
well have merit in certain circumstances; when, for 
example, the debate proceeds on the basis of known and 
agreed facts and the judge is asked to decide as bet ween 
opposing int e r p r e t a t i o n s  of or inferences from those facts. 
When, however, the facts themselves are, not only in 
dispute, but the subject of manipulation, supp re sion or 
distortion by the con te nd ing advocates in their as signed 
role as fact-el iciters, the argument seems less convin cing.
The extent to which such manipulation, suppres ion or 
distortion of per tin en t fact may be per ceived as a feature 
of the adversarial process is later discu ssed in the 
context of the ad vo cate' s role. For that reason, it may 
be premature at this stage to reach any firm con c l u s i o n  on 
comparison between the systems.
As against the inquis itori al  method, however, there may, in 
the light of what has been said, be some force in the view 
that it may tend to create in the minds of the trial judge
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and jury a p r e d i s p o s i t i o n  towards an assumption of guilt; 
that by reason of the fact .that, after such a w i d e - r a n g i n g  
and in depende nt inquiry, the examining magistrate has - in 
the light of the facts contained in the dossier which the 
trial judge has before him - decided to send the accused 
for trial, what the trial court is being asked to do is, 
in effect, to ratify the examining mag istrate's c o n c l u s i o n s  
as to probab le guilt. The fact - noted supra [67] - that 
witne sse s are som et imes dispe nse d with altogether in the 
lower courts may stren gt hen this suspicion.
Turning, however, to the relativistic theme, any c o m p a r i s o n  
between systems would, on this view, seem poi nt less - since 
truth is seen as sy s t e m - r e l a t i v e  and "we cannot say that 
a result obt ai ned through using one is wrong by ref e r e n c e  
to the proced ur e of another." [68] By the same token, 
one system, on this view, is as valid as the other.
It is, of course, clear that in any legal system a c o u rt 's  
decision is bound up with and follows from the p r o c e d u r e s  
applied by that system for the discovery of the facts. In 
so far as that decisi on may be said to represent the "truth" 
according to that system, the theory as expounded  may be 
said to have an element of realism. This concept of truth - 
seen as the end product of the trial procedures - as 
distinct from their motivati on  - can perhaps be p e r c e i v e d  
as a re alistic r e c o gnition  of the distinction b e t we en  truth 
in /
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in its normally accepted sense and "legal truth" or "truth 
a cc ording to law" - analogous to the di sti nction between 
factual guilt and legal guilt [69].
However, the pri nciple upon which this theory would seem 
to be based may have dis tur bing implications. It could 
perhaps be applied to justify any trial process, how ever 
irr ati onal or perverse, so long as the procedure is 
"in stant ia ted in concre te social practices" in a c c o rda nc e 
with "appropr iate values" [70].
As has been said, the nature of these values is not 
specified. If they are values which can o bjecti ve ly 
be per ce ived  as relevant to civilised moral and l i b e r t a r i a n  
co nsid e r a t i o n s  involved in the admin ist ration of justice, 
this may lend legitim acy  to the theory. But if, as 
may appear to be implicit in this exposition of it, they 
are simply values which any particular society has 
"ins tan tiated"  in its social practices as "no rmative", 
it could, presumably, be advanced to justify those "pol icy 
con seq uenc es " to the danger of which the author righ tly 
draws attention [71].
On this view, the ruling es tablishmen ts in some early 
or medieva l (and, indeed, more recent and existing) 
soc ie ties  might claim that their use of, for example, 
torture, was le git imised by their societies' nor m a t i v e  
pr ac tice s and values.
Althoug h /
Althoug h not explicit ly  advanced as such, this partic ular 
theory may possibly be intended, by implication at least, 
as a defence of the adv ersarial system - and may also, 
perhaps, be seen as an implicit recognition of that system's 
epi ste mo logica l weaknesses. The underlying theme would 
appear to be: it is impossible to find and futile to
search for objective truth; therefore, let us devise
a rationale which avoids the necessity of trying.
However, the parti cu lar rationale here advanced seems 
questionable. Accep ti ng that absolute truth is beyon d 
human reach - in the sense, at any rate, of ac h i e v i n g  
absolute objective certainty about past events; and even 
ac cepting also that truth in this sense may po ssi b l y  
be said to be n o n - ex istent within the human d i m e n s i o n  - 
this does not seem to be a valid reason for not striving,
as far as human limitati ons will allow, to get as near as
possible to it. In the context of a trial process, ethical 
principle would seem to demand this.
The reference in the discussion of this theory to values 
relevant to the trial process invites the question: what 
is the place of moral and social values in the a d v e r s a r i a l  
system - and how important are they in asses sing the merits  
of that system and of the advocate's role within it?
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2.4 Moral and Social Values in the Adversarial System
2.4.1 Individual Rights
The adver sarial system of justice has tra diti onall y been 
presented as refl ectin g the concepts of individual 
freedom and autono my - both in the broader context of 
political phi lo sophy and in the specific field of the 
adm ini stra ti on of justice. Thus, in the broader context, 
Professor Hazard:
"...key elements in the adversary system.... 
evolved as legal controls on government
absolutism in seve nteenth century England.
Thus, the adver sary system is not only a 
theory of adj udicati on  but a constituent of 
our history of political liberty." [72] .
While, in the legal field, this association of Ideas extends 
both to the civil and criminal law - what Professor Wo l f r a m
calls the principle of "rights vindication" [73] - it has
probably been more par ticula rl y perceived as re lev an t to 
the ad mini st ration of criminal justice - to the a w a r e n e s s  
of the need to protect the individual citizen from ex c e s s e s  
of state power. Thus, in this context, Wolfram notes the 
con ception as being:
"....that the autonomy and privacy of i nd ividua ls  
is not suf ficie nt ly respected by a state unless 
de pri va tions and ob lig ations that are imposed by 
law are exacted only following a public process 
in which the person charged with a civil or 
criminal wrong is given many procedural and 
forensic advantages. The extreme illus tr at ion 
is the pr esumptio n of innocence and all that it 
pro cedur al ly brings with it in the ide alized 
criminal- t r i a l . " [ 7 4 ]
Of /
Of p a r t icula r relev ance to our theme is the fact that these 
adv er sa rial pr in cip les or values tend also to be seen by 
some as ju st ifying  the relatively low priority a c c o r d e d  by 
the system to the pursuit of truth. Thus Hazard again:
"The real value of the adversary system...
...may not be its contribu tion to truth but 
its c o n t r ibutio n to the ideal of individual 
autonomy. This is the rationale underlyin g 
many rules that obscure truth, such as the 
pr iv il ege against s e l f - incrimi na tion... ."  [75]
The main features r e pres en ting these perceived values in 
the system may be sum mar is ed as follows:
1. The p r e s um ption of innocence - an accused is 
presu me d innocent of the charge libelled unless 
and until proved guilty after due process. He is 
never required to prove his innocence. The onus
of proving guilt lies entirely upon the p r o s e c u t i o n .
2. The pr ivilege against se lf -incrim in ation - an 
accused is not compelled to testify on his own 
behalf or to present a defence affirmative of 
his innocence. He is entitled, if he so ch o o s e s  , 
to remain silent and put the pro secution to proof.
3. N o n - d isclo su re of previous convictions - un like 
inquisi to rial procedure, except in certain 
ci rc u m s t a n c e s  - such as when the accused p r e s e n t s  
evidence as to his own alleged good chara ct er - 
previous convic tions are not revealed to the 
court /
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court until after a guilty verdict. The 
accused is entitled to have his case tried 
only on the basis of the evidence pertaining 
to the particular crime charged.
4. The rules of evidence - the relative s t r i c t n e s s  
and complexi ty  - as compared, say, with 
inquisi to rial procedure [76] - of the rules
of evidence and pro cedure which control, and 
may s ub st antial ly  restrict, the evidence which 
may co mp etently be adduced at the trial.
5. The right to counsel - the right of an ac cused 
to have his case zealously presented and argued 
a d vers ar ially by a skilled professional counsel 
to whom - as we shall discuss - consider ab le 
latitude is permitte d in regard to issues of
f a c t .
All of these features are commonly presented as e s s e n t i a l  
safeguards of individual rights in situations in which  the 
mighty State versus the humble Smith might o t h e r w i s e  be 
unfair and unequal contests.
2.4.2 The De Facto Guilty
N o t w i t hstandi ng  the merits commonly claimed for these 
p r i n c i p l e s , t h e r e  is far from being a conse nsus - ei ther 
within or outwith the pro fession  - as to their value in 
cumulo either as safegua rds of the public in ter e s t  in 
combating crime or as prec aution s against the risk of 
injustice to the innocent.
As /
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As to the former consideration, there seems to be a 
si g n ifican t school of thought that the ad ve rsarial  system, 
as it prese ntly operates, unduly favours the d_e facto 
guilty. In this context, one particular target of cr iticism 
is the accused's right to maintain silence. The natur e of 
the debate on this point is reflected in Sh erif f Macp h a i l ' s  
com me nts on the Thomson Committee's [77] c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of 
the question whether the law of evidence in Scotl an d 
should be amended to the effect of compelling an accu sed 
to give evidence at his own trial. In the event, the 
Co mm itte e - although recommen ding certain m o d i f i c a t i o n s  to 
this right [78] - did not recommend that an a c c u s e d  should 
be so compelled. However, Sheriff Macphail poses the 
ques tio n which is central to this debate:
"What should be the objective of our system of 
criminal pr ocedure and evidence? It has 
hitherto been thought more important for 
society that the innocent should be a c q uitted 
than that the guilty should be convicted. The 
Criminal Law Revision Committee, on the other 
hand, says that 'it is ajs much (author's 
emphasis) in the public interest that a guilt y 
person should be convicted as it is that an 
innocent person should be acquitted." [79]
And, elsewhe re in his discussion, he adds the commen t:
"...there is nothing repugnant about a man bei ng 
co nde mn ed out of his own mouth unless there be 
s om ething repug nan t about the t r u t h . . ."[80]
We may also note Sheehan 's question:
"whether the rights given to the a c c u s e d ... s h ou ld  
be allowed to hinder the inv estigation after 
truth on which all justice must be based, whe re 
the silence of the accused may only serve to 
obscure or at least conceal the t r u t h . .."[81]
We /
We may also note the view that these features of the 
adv ersarial system, taken cu mul ati vely - and referred 
to by Laurence Lust garten as "rules erecting high 
evid ent iary barriers to con viction" [82] - have u n d e s i r a b l e  
effects in regard to the attitudes and pr act ices of the 
police - imposing on the police, in Lustga rt en's view:
"...a co nsistent pressure, leading them to 
overstep their powers against those they 
'know' are guilty." [83]
Lustgarten, it must be observed, was writing in the 
context of police powers - including their p r o s e c u t i o n  
function - in England and Wales before the recent 
introduct ion  in that ju ris dic tion of the Crown P r o s e c u t i o n  
Service. But this, probably, does not affect his main 
theme .
The point might also, perhaps, be made that these 
"evidentiary barriers" to convict ion in the syste m tend 
to favour, in particular, the more affluent d_e facto g u ilty 
who can afford to engage expensive lawyers having p a r t i c u l a r  
skills and experience in the appropriate field. While 
this is doubtless true of any legal system, it may be seen 
to confer a more pro nounc ed advantage in a system in which 
the defence advocate plays such a crucial - and, to a 
certain extent, pri vil eged - r o l e .
2.4.3 The Innocent at Risk 
Conversely /
Conversely, however, the adversar ial system, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  
its traditiona l image as one designed to protect the 
innocent - even at the cost, in the view of some, of 
favouring the guilty - also is perceived by some as having 
the oppo site effect.
To follow, for example, Lustgart en 's theme: one of the
con seq uences, as he perceives it, of the system's " e v i de ntiary 
barriers" to conviction, is the incentive given to the police
to avoid the hurdle of these barriers and, as they and others
may see it - the forensic lottery of the trial - by see kin g 
to obtain a co nf ess ion from the suspect leading to a plea 
of guilty [84] - a situation not possible, inci de ntally,  
in the French system in which a guilty plea is not perm itt ed. 
This clearly has dangers for innocent persons who may, for
a variety of reasons, be mo tivated to make a false
confession.
In general terms, however, these seems to have ar isen in 
recent times a growing unease about the e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of 
the system - at any rate as it presently opera tes - as a 
medium for det ermin in g the guilt or innocence of a cr i m i n a l  
suspect and growing concern about misc ar riages of j u s t i c e  - 
actual or alleged. This concern may - in the view of some - 
take the form of opposition to the whole a d v e r s a r i a l  pr i n c i p l e  
as such and a plea for the adoption of the i n q u i s i t o r i a l  
method. Thus Ludovic Kennedy, in the context of an i n t e r v i e w  
with/
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with the Co mmi s s i o n e r  of the Metropolitan Police in 
L o n d o n :
"I had been int erest ed to see that in two recent 
articles the Com mi ssione r had queried the 
efficacy of our adv ersary system of criminal 
justice because for many years now and as a 
result of studyi ng numerous mis carriages of 
justice, I had become convinced that the 
i n quis it orial system, as practised in France 
and elsewhere, is superior to it. The e s s e n t i a l  
weakness of the adve rsary system, it seems to me, 
is its artificiality: where police m a n i p u l a t i o n
of evidence  can lead to the conviction of the 
innocent and the skills of counsel to the 
acquittal of the guilty." [85]
It might also be added here that the right of an ac cu se d 
to have his defence pre sente d by a zealous, p a r t i s a n  and 
skilful counsel may be seen as a feature which can ope rate
as much against him as for him; for it is o b t a i n e d  at the
price of having his inn ocence challenged by an e q u a l l y
zealous, partis an - and possib ly even more sk il ful -
prosecutor .
Two features, however, may be identified as s p e c i f i c  targets 
for criti cism in the context of the innocent a c c u s e d  - the 
absence, at any stage in the adversarial process of an 
independent inv estigator  and the conspicuous d i s p a r i t y  
between the inv esti gativ e resources of the state p r o s e c u t i o n  
machinery and those ava ilable to the normal accused. It is 
probably these factors, above all, that inf lu ence those 
urging a radical revision of the system.
2.4.4. Conc lud ing Comments
It would be foolish to ove r- stress the negative q u a l i t i e s  
of /
of the moral and social values reflected in the ad ve rsarial  
system of criminal justice - and, even more so, not to 
recog nis e the merits of the main principle which und er li es 
them: the pro tection of individual rights ag ai nst the
temp tatio n to excessive power to which all state 
bu r e a u c r a c i e s  are, at times, vulnerable. P r e - e m i n e n t  among 
those values - what must be regarded as u n e q u i v o c a l  in 
merit and the main bulwark against the erosion of those 
in div idual rights - is the pre sumption of innocen ce.
It would likewise be wrong not to recognise the d a ng er s in 
any system of criminal justice of an o v e r - zealou s 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n  with the pursuit of truth which these values 
may be seen as designed to counter.
In this connection, one must also ack nowledge a po s s i b l e  
weaknes s in the in quisitorial  method in so far as it would, 
as has been said, appear to be open to the a c c u s a t i o n  of 
creati ng an initial bias in the mind of the trial court 
against the accused, and - whatever the French C o n s t i t u t i o n  
may say - give rise to some doubt as to the op e r a t i o n ,  in 
practice, of the principle of the presumption of in nocence.
But to derive from such con si derations the i n f e r e n c e  that 
our ad versarial  system is superior to, and has n o t h i n g  to 
learn from, that of our Continental neighbours, would 
probab ly be simplistic. In the light of what has been said, 
there /
there would seem to be grounds for que st ioning whe ther - 
excepting the p r e s u m p t i o n  of innocence - those values which 
we acclaim, however well-in tentioned , operate in pra cti ce 
to the over-all bene fit of individual freedom and autonom y 
and, in particular, even if they, or some of them, do, 
whether they suffice to offset what probably must be seen 
as the most c on spicuo us  weakness - the absence of any kind 
of independent fact investigation.
In reflecting on these issues, two factors of fu nd a m e n t a l  
importance are worthy of note. In so far as the view may
be sustained - and there would seem to be cogent arg u m e n t s
for it - that some of the rules of the system p e r m i t t i n g  
the obscuring of truth, operate to the undue a d v a n t a g e  of 
t h e djL fa c to guilty, leading to their acquittal, not only 
the public interest  but individual freedom itself suffers; 
for, in the final analysis, such freedom is at risk in any 
society in which anarchy and violence reach u n a c c e p t a b l e  
levels.
Second, while there doubtles s are cir cu m s t a n c e s  in which 
the permitted conc e a l m e n t  or obfus cat ion of fact may benefit  
an innocent accused, generally speaking, where truth is
a casualty, it is likely to be the innocent who suffe r and
the guilty who gain.
In summary on this issue, while the co ncepts of in d i v i d u a l  
freedom /
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fre edom and autonomy which the moral and social values of 
the adversarial system are designed to protect, may be at 
risk from a too rigorous pursuit of truth, they may also be 
at risk from an over zealous pre oc cupati on  with such values 
at the expense of truth. What matters is the point of 
balance struck between them.
The ma in taining of a proper balance is the function of 
society acting through its legisl ators and its courts. But 
in the da y-to-day op era tio n of the system, the ethica l 
conduct of the advocate - the main focus of this in qu ir y - 
plays a vital role.
It is this latter point which is central to our main purpose. 
The issues so far dis cussed are relevant to that p u rpose  but 
we'are not primarily concerned with an a s s e ss me nt of the 
relative merits of the adversarial and i n q u i s i t o r i a l  s y stem - 
nor even, indeed, with the merits of the a d v e r s a r i a l  sy st em  
itself; but rather with the implicat io ns of the w o r k i n g s  
and objectives of that system, whatever its m e r i t s , in 
relation to the ethics of the roles of the c o n t e n d i n g  
advocates - and, specifically, their functions as re gar ds  
the elicitation and disclosure of fact. To this end, it 
has been necessary to look at the system in order to ob tai n 
a proper pe rspect ive of the context within which the 
adversarial advocate operates. Also, the com p a r i s o n  drawn 
between the rival system has been useful in that it serves 
t o /
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to throw into relief those peculiar features of our system 
which are of pa rt icula r relevance to our primary purpose.
In the light of what has so far been discussed, it seems 
clear that, wh ate ver dissensi on there may be as to the 
relative merits of the ad versarial  and i n q u i sitor ia l 
processes, one firm co nclusion at least can be drawn: by
reason of the domina nt role which the adv ersar ia l pr oce ss 
assigns to the advocates as fact eliciters and p r e s e n t e r s  - 
and the o pport un ity this affords for the m a n i p u l a t i o n  of 
evidence on which the verdict of the court will de pe n d  - 
it is that process which gives rise, in a much more acute 
form, to the ethical problems with which the a d v ocate has 
to cope - proble ms which have significant i m p l i c a t i o n s  for 
the a d m i n i st ra tion of justice.
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2 . 5 Summary
1 . The essential ep is temolog ic al feature of the 
ad versari al system is that it assigns to the 
par tis an and contending advocates the cr ucial 
function of fact elicitation. There is at no 
stage in the process an independent i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
of fact. The judge plays a mainly pa ssive and 
u m p i r e a 1 role.
2. In all these respects it differs from the 
inq uis itor ia l system which perceives the functi on  
of fact inv esti gation  as an independent ju d i c i a l  
pre ro ga tive both in the pre-trial stage and at 
the trial itself. While open to the c r i t i c i s m  
that it may create an initial bias on the part
of judge and jury against the accused - and 
possibly impair the princ iple of the p r e s u m p t i o n  
of innocence - it would e_x facie seem a more 
eff ective method of fact finding.
3. Given that, in the adv ersarial process, the 
eli cit ation and pre sen ta tion of the facts at 
issue are functions assigned to the pa r t i s a n  
advocates - and the op portu nity this af fords 
for manipulat io n of fact - the argument that 
truth is more likely to emerge from a b a l a n c e d  
judgment of co nflic ting conten tions lacks 
conviction. The relativisti c arg ument - in 
so /
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so far as it may be seen to deny the search 
for truth as a valid criterion of a trial 
process - also lacks credibility. „
4. The moral and social values asso ci ated with
the concepts of individual freedom and a u t o n o m y  
are important features of the adv ers ar ial 
system. However, while commendable in int ention,  
it may be qu e s t i o n e d  whether some of them, in 
effect, operate to the advantage of either the 
public or ind iv id ual interest or - in so far 
as they may do so - whether they suffice to 
justify t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  weak nesse s of the 
s y s t e m .
3. The proper cri te rion for the ass es sment  of any 
trial system is not the pursuit of truth per 
se - or its r ec og nition  of other moral and 
social values per se - but whether it may be 
perceived as m ai ntainin g a proper balance 
between these values.
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3.1 The Criminal Defence Lawyer ' .
Wolfram notes that in a Harris poll conducted in the United 
States in 1978, lawyers "ranked very near the bottom" in 
public esteem - along with "ad vert ising agencies, labor 
unions, and Congress". [86] He suggests as one of the 
reasons for this poor showing the fact that "many lawyers 
are forced into public p er forman ce s that may appear unsa v o u r y "  
and a d d s :
"The most obvious illust ra tion is the criminal de fe nse 
lawyer. It is probably accurate, if contro versial , 
to say that defense of persons accused of crime has 
led to more public antip athy toward the legal 
professio n than any other cause." [87]
In refer enc e to these remarks, we may also note, however, 
another, /
another, perhaps compensatory, aspect of the criminal defence 
lawyer' s public image - that of the fearless and skilled 
cha mpi on of the legally oppressed. In no other role is the 
tr adi tion of loyalty and ded ic ation  to the^ client so strongly 
m a r k e d .
It may, t h e r e f o r e , b e  said that whatev er ant ipathy or cy nic ism 
may be directed towards the criminal defence lawyer, it is 
often p a rado xi ca lly combined in some measure with a certain 
admiration; to such extent, indeed, that many of the most 
eminent have acquired, both within and outwith the pro fession, 
the status of folk heroes. To these facets of the defence 
lawyer's role, we may note yet another of cruc ial per t i n e n c e  
to the ethics of his function: the con siderable  latitude
which he is permitted within the ad versa rial system in 
de fer ence to his perceived duty to his accused client;' a 
latitude which reflects the "many procedural  and forensic 
advanata ge s"  [88] given by the system to accused persons.
The nature and limits of this latitude it is our pur pose to 
examine in detail, but we may here note that it is such as, 
in Wolf ram's words, gives the defence lawyer "sweeping powers" 
unique to the adver sar ial system. [89]
All of these features of the defence advocat e's function tend 
to make it the main focus of c on tr oversy  about ethical issues 
for the degree of latitude which he is allowed - and, indeed, 
in certain situations, required - to exercise in c o m p li ance 
with/
with his duty of loyalty to and zealous protect ion of his 
client 's interests, are often perceived  as being in conflict 
with the pursuit of truth in the public interest.
The controversy, it may also be noted, is not confined to 
the public domain. As will be discussed, important aspects 
of the criminal defence function are also the subject of 
pr o f e ss io nal debate. It is now proposed, therefore, to 
examine, in some detail, the various issues which are 
central to this debate as seen in the light of the views 
and pr o n o u n c e m e n t s  of various a uthor it ies within the legal 
profession.
3.2 Duty to Client and to the Court
In the light of what has .been said as to the duality of the 
function and perceived p rofess io nal loyalties of the advocate, 
it will be clear that his role involves a duality of 
pr ofess io na l r el at ionshi ps  - the rel atio ns hip with his 
client and his relat io nship with the court before which he 
appears. It is in the in te raction between these rel at i o n s h i p s  
that the conflict of ethical pr inc ipl e becomes manifest.
While, as in all issues of ethical conflict, there are many 
shades of opinion, the debate within the l e g a l .pr o f e s s i o n  as 
to the relative s ig ni ficance  of these rela ti onships  is, as 
will be seen, broadly c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by two opposing views.
We may note first, however, that the two re lat i o n s h i p s  are 
inte rde pendent ; the advoca te's views as to the nature of 
his rel at io nship with his client must impinge upon his 
perc eptio n of the nature and extent of his duty to the court. 
In particular, the advocate's perc eptio n of the point of 
balance between his duty to his client and to the court will 
depend upon the extent to which he considers hi ms elf  to be, 
not merely the client's agent and adviser, but, in a sense, 
his alter e g o .. One of the most explicit p rofessi on al 
p r o n o un cement s on this issue was contain ed in the first 
edition of the American Bar As so c i a t i o n ' s  Standar ds re la ti ng 
to the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n .of Criminal Justice which sought to 
define the role of defence counsel and the main points of 
w h i c h /
which may be summarised as follows:
1. His primary role is to act as "champion" for his client.
In this capacity he is the "equalizer" - placing his 
client on an equal footing under the law. This he does 
by "taking those procedu ral steps and reco mm ending 
those courses of action which the client, were he an 
expe ri en ced advocate himself, might fairly and properly 
take " .
2. In so doing, counsel must not be timorous - courage and 
zeal are necessary quali ties - a duty resting all the 
more heavily upon him since the accused may well be 
"the most despised of persons" - faced with a hostile 
world and called to "the bar of justice by his 
government". The accused must be able to rely on 
counsel as his "single voice" and with confid ence
that "his interests will be protec ted to the fullest 
ex tent consist ent  with the rules of procedure and 
standards of pro fes siona l conduct".
3. Counsel is an "inter mediary" - but not a "mere 
mouthpiece" or "alter e g o " o f  his client. He is not 
a "conduit for his client' s desires" nor "an agent 
permitted, and perhaps even obliged, to do for the 
accused everythin g that he would do for himself if 
only he possessed the ne cessary skills and training  
in law". As intermediary, "counsel expresses to the 
court objectively, in measure d words and forceful 
tone, what a partic ular def endant may be inc apable 
of express ing  him self simply because he lacks the 
educa tio n and training". [90]
Although, in this passage, the ABA mentions the fact that, 
in the past, the "occasional voice" has adv ocated the alter 
ego t h e o r y , it is strong in its cond emnat io n of this "spuri ou s 
view" which has been "totally and une quivoc al ly r e j ect ed  for 
over one hundred years under canons governing the Engl ish 
Bar ris ters and is similarly reject ed by canons of the A m e r i c a n  
Bar As so ciation and other rep utable profess io nal o r g a n i s a t i o n s "  
[91].
Although this par ticular edition of these ABA St an dards has 
since been superseded, its pr onou n c e m e n t s  on this issue
doubt les s /
do ubtless represent the general view of pr ofessional bodies 
in ad ve rsarial jurisdictions. While the current Bri tish Codes 
do not contain any express repu di ation of the alter ego theory,
they do stress the p r ofe ss ional ind epe ndenc e of the advocate
vis a vis his client. In England, a barrister:
"may not accept any brief or instructi on s which limit 
or seek to limit his ordinary authority or discretion. "[92]
and :
"In all cases it is the duty of the barrister to guard
against being made the channel for questions or
st atements  which are only intended to insult or annoy 
either the witness or any other person or ot herwise are 
an abuse of counsel's function, and to exercise his own 
judgment both as to the su bstan ce and the form of the 
questi ons  put or state me nts made." [93]
In Scotland, the adv ocate 's p rof es sional i nde pe ndence is more 
emphati ca ll y expressed, for, while he:
"must at all times do, and be seen to do, his best for 
his client and he must be fearless in de fending his 
client's i n t e r e s t s . .."[94]
The Faculty of Advocates exp ressly adopts the p ri nciple s
enun ci at ed in 1876 by Lord President  Inglis:
"....the nature of the ad vocate's office makes it clear 
that in the pe rformance of his duty he must be ent ir ely 
independe nt and act ac cor ding to his own d i s c retion and 
judgment...";
but not only that; the Scottish Faculty extends the concept 
of the advocat e's ind epen dence  to the point of e n d orsi ng  Lord 
President Inglis' view that it is an advoc ate's legal right 
to conduct the case:
" ....... without any regard to the wishes of his c l i e n t .... and
what he does bona fide acc ording to his own jud gm ent will 
bind his client...." [95]
This /
This stress in the British codes upon the independen ce  of the 
advocate in relation to his client may be indicative of a 
di ffere nc e in this context between the American and British 
systems a differe nce to which Hazard draws attention:
"In the English s ys tem... th e bar rister is insul ated from 
the case in several imp ortant ways. An English 
bar rister has no cont in uing relation with any client; 
his fee is fixed before trial in nego tiatio ns  to which 
he is not a party and on a basis unrelated to eventual 
victory or defeat; the case is placed with a bar rist er  
through a solicitor as intermediary; and b a r r is te rs 
as a group are small in number, aristocratic, clannish, 
and closely tied to the judiciary. The barri ste r is 
thus strongly identif ied as an officer of the court and 
as a gatekee per concerni ng what kind of evidence will
be o f f e r e d  In the Americ an system, however, the
advo cat e's rela tions hi p to his client's cause is much 
more dependent and i n t i m a t e . ..."[96]
The di st in cti on here drawn between the American advoca te  and 
the English barrister (which term, as used by Hazard, we may 
also take, presumably, to include his Scottish c o u n t erpar t)  
may explain why the British codes do not deem it nec e s s a r y  to 
expressly repudiate the alter ego concept - for such 
rep ud ia tion is no doubt implicit in the emphasis which they 
place upon the advocate's i n de pendenc e of and det a c h m e n t  from 
the c l i e n t .
In making this distinction, Hazard's point is that the more 
intimate relat ionship between the American advocate and his 
client ex ace rbates the conflict between the a d v o ca te 's duty 
to his client and to the court. His comparison, however, 
while it may be valid as between the American advocate and 
British barristers, is not so apposite as regards the sol i c i t o r  
branch /
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branch of the British legal system for the solicitor 's court 
role is not, of course, limited to that of an int er mediar y 
between client and barrister. He also plays an imp ortant 
role as an advocate in his own right in the numerous cases 
where a bar riste r, is not involved. Contingency fee 
arrangem en ts  apart, in that role the solicitor is pro bably 
as closely assoc iated with his client as is his Ame ri ca n 
counterpart. In legal terms (in Scotland, at any rate) 
the soli cit or's relatio ns hip with his client is perceiv ed  
as different from that between barrister and client. Lord 
President Inglis, elsew here in the passage quoted above 
from the Scottish A d v o c a t e 's Guide, is also quoted as pointin g 
the contrast: the solicitor - unlike the "advocate" (in
the strict professio na l sense of that term in Sco tl and as 
eq ui valent to the English "barrister") - enters into a 
"contract of emp loyment" with and is an "agent" of his client. 
As such, a solicitor m u s t " a s  a general rule" follow the 
client's instruc tions but:
"the general rule is subject to several q u alific at ions.
The agent, of course, cannot be asked to follow the 
client's inst ruction s beyond what is lawful and proper.
For the agent, as well as the counsel, owes a duty to 
the court, and must conform hi mself to the rules and 
pract ice s of the c o u r t  " [97]
(It may be noted here that accor ding to the modern usage 
of the term "contract of employment", a sol icitor could 
not be said to enter into such a contract; the s o l i c i t o r -  
client rel atio nship  being more a p p r o priat el y seen as one of 
a g e n c y .)
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But, whatever the d if ference s in this context between 
America and Britain or between barr ister s and so li citor s 
within Britain, it is clear that the lawyer, in all 
ad ve rsa ria l countries and wh ate ver his status, is in no 
sense seen by the pro f e s s i o n a l  bodies as a puppet of his 
client, obliged to act accor din g to the client's dictat es
i
irr es pe ctive of legality or propriety. It is in this 
pej or ativ e sense that the ABA, in the passage quoted above, 
uses the terms "mere mouth pi ece" and "alter e g o " and 
di sting ui sh es such a "spurious view" of the advocat e' s 
function from his duty to take only that action which the 
client, were he an e x p e rien ce d advocate himself, might "fairly 
and properly" take.
However, while the alter ego concept, in the sense in which
that term is used by the ABA, is clearly rejected, in the
broader context this rejection may need to be. q u a l i f i e d . '
While it is true that the advocate cannot be seen as the
"mere" mout hpi ece of his client he is, in an import an t sense,
the client's mou th pi ece n e ve rt heless  - his "single voice" as
the ABA themselves put it. Moreover, according to Hazard,
it would seem that, in America at any rate, and wh a t e v e r  the
ABA view, some lawyers consider that:
"  duty to client requires aiding him in wh a t e v e r  the
client feels he must do to vin dicate himself in court.
The advocate is then absolved because he is merely  an 
i n s t r u m e n t . " [ 9 8 J
In his discussion of this subject, Hazard himself  cl early 
disapproves of such an attitude and, in the light of what 
has/
has been said, it would certa inly also be repudiated  by the 
legal pro fessi on al - b o d i e s . But if the advocate is not 
pe rc ei ved by such bodies as being required to assist "in 
whatev er the client feels he must do....", he is nev er t h e l e s s  
au t h o r i t a t i v e l y  seen as having:
"....the same pr ivileges as his client of as serting 
and def ending the client's rights by the stat eme nt 
of every fact and the use of every argument that is 
p er mitted by the prin ci ples and practice of the 
l a w . " [99]
In this limited, but important, sense, it may, perhaps, be 
argued that the advocate can indeed be seen as a legal alter 
ego of his client - in that there is vested in him all the 
rights and priv ileges accorded to his client by law for the 
pur pos es of his defence.
If so, this poses the question: what are the i m p l i c a t i o n s  as
affe cti ng the in ter action between his duty to the client and 
his duty to the court? It is true that the pers ona of his 
client which the advocate may, in this juristic sense, be 
said to adopt, is qualified in an important particular:  it 
is a persona clothed in his own professio na l integrity. His 
o bliga ti on s are limited to "what is permitted by the p r i n c i p l e s  
and practice of the law". Nevertheless, if the a d v oc ate - 
albeit only in this juristic sense - can be seen as the legal 
alter ego of his client, it may seem reas on able to argue that, 
while ack nowle dg ing his duty to the court and the law itself, 
his primary loyalty must be to his client and that, in his 
role as defence counsel in criminal proceedings, his 
p r o f e s s i o n a l /
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p ro fe ssiona l commitment must be his client's commitment, 
namely, to prevent his being convicted.
Such a view - in so far as a c k n o wl ed ging loyalty to the client 
as the advocat e's primary duty - is not, however, un iversa ll y 
accepted within the legal profession. There are those who 
mai nt ain - in the traditi on of Lord Cockburn [100] - that his 
duty to his client, however imperative, is s u b s ervient  to his 
duty - not only to the court - but to those con cepts which 
they appear to see as synonymo us with it: "truth and justice".
Thus Lord Denning in Rondel v. W o r s l e y :
"(Counsel) must accept the brief and do all he h o n o u r a b l y  
can on behalf of his client. I say 'all he h o n o u r a b l y  
can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has 
a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a mi stake 
to suppose that he is the mout hp iece of his client to say 
what he wants; or his tool to do what he directs. He 
is none of these things. He owes allegiance to a higher 
cause. It is the cause of truth and justice." [101]
This was a civil case but Lord Den ning's remarks were d i r ected  
to the conduct of a barrister in a criminal case. Rondel was 
suing a barrister, Worsley, for prof es sional ne g l i g e n c e  arisi ng  
from a criminal case six years pr eviously in which Rondel was 
u ns uc c e s s f u l l y  defended by Worsley. The case is a u t h o r i t y  for 
the principle that an action cannot be mai nta in ed ag ainst a 
barri ste r for negli gence in the conduct o f a  cri min al or 
civil cause, but for our purposes its sig nific an ce lies in the 
fact that Lord Denning not only rejected - in a c c o r d a n c e  with 
the con sensus view of legal p r o f e ss io nal bodies - the 
"mouthpi ece " theory, but expre ssed a principle which is not 
to /
to be found (explicitly, at any rate) in any profe ss ional 
code: that the ad vocate's paramo unt all egian ce is not to
his client but to "truth and justice". This seems con si stent  
with the view attribut ed to Lord Denning by David Pannick [102] 
that a law case is "an enquiry to find out the truth" and 
would seem to be saying that the primary function of the 
advocate is to aid the court in that objective.
This, however, is reject ed by other legal a u t h o rities who, 
in the tradition of Lord Brougham, mainta in that the adv oc ate's 
duty is "to reckon ever yt hing subordinate" to the clie nt's 
interest [103] - a view reflected, as regards crim inal defence 
advocates, in Wolfram's st ateme nt that the advoca te in this 
role is perceived as one who "owes loyalty to his or her 
client alone" [104]. One of the most forceful e x p o nents 
of this school of thought is Dean Freedman of Hofstr a 
Un iv ersity Law School in the Uni ted S t a t e s . Dea lin g with 
the subject in the context of the primary objec tive of a 
criminal trial p r o c e s s , h e  not only repudia tes the view that 
the adversa rial trial is pr e - e m i n e n t l y  a search for truth 
and that the defence counsel's primary function is to assist 
the court in finding the truth, but states that c o u nsel' s 
duty to his client may, on occasion, necessit ate his being 
an obstacle to that objective:
"...under our adv ersary sys tem,,th e interests of the 
state are not absolute, or even paramount. The 
dignity of the individual is resp ected  to the point 
that even when the citizen is known by the state to 
have committed a heinous offense, the individual is 
neverth el ess accorded such rights as counsel, trial 
by jury, due process, and the privilege against self- 
incrimination. A trial is, in part, a search for 
truth. Actually, however, a trial is far more than 
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a search for truth, and the con stituti on al rights 
that are provided by our system of justice may well 
outweig h the t r u t h - s e e k i n g  value - a fact which is 
mani fe st  when we consider that those rights and others 
g ua ra nteed by the Const i t u t i o n  may well impede the 
search for truth rather than further it...." [105]
A cc or ding to Freedman, it follows that:
"  the defense lawyer's pro fes siona l obli ga tion
may well be to advise the client to withhold the
t r u t h  Justice White has observ ed that although
law en fo rcement officials must be dedicated to using 
only truthful evidence, 'defense counsel has no 
co mp arable obl iga tion to ascer tain or present the 
truth. Our system assigns him a different mi ssion.. ..
...(W )e .... insist that he defend his client whether 
he is innocent or guilty. ' Such conduct by defense 
counsel does not cons ti tute obstructi on of justice.
On the contrary, it is 'part of the duty imposed on 
the most honorab le defense counsel from whom we 
counten an ce or require conduct which in many ins ta nces 
has little, if any, relation to the search for truth'.
The same obse rvatio n has been made by Justice Harlan, 
who noted that, 'in fulfillin g his prof ession al  
re sp on sibilities'  the lawyer 'of necessity may become 
an obstacle to t r u t h f i n d i n g ' ....... " [106]
In passing, two points of interest may be noted here. First, 
the dis ti nc tion made in the quote from Justice White be tween 
the pro fes siona l obli ga tions of "law en fo rcement o f f i cial s"  
and those of defence counsel - a dis tinct io n which will 
be later dis cussed in the context of the role of the ad vocat e 
as prosecutor; second, the d isti nc tion impl ici tly drawn in 
the same passage between "truth" and "justice", con ce pts 
which, in regard to the questions at issue, are freq u e n t l y  
juxtaposed; for although, in Freed man's view, defence 
co uns el's professio nal oblig ation "may well be to advise  
the client to withhold the truth", he does not c o n sider that 
such conduct consti tutes "ob struc ti on of j u s t i c e " . This 
distinc tio n, as we shall later discuss, is of s i g n i f i c a n c e  
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in re latio n to the ethical imnplica ti ons of the adv oca te's 
f u n c t i o n .
Con fr onte d by such appa re ntly diametrica ll y opposed views as to 
his primary function, it would seem that the advocate must steer 
a cautio us - and perhaps, on occasion, a perilous - path between 
his duties to his client, to the court, and to "truth and 
justice". In his efforts to rec oncile these often conf l i c t i n g  
duties, he does not appear to be greatly assisted by officia l 
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  on the subject. That conflict does, indeed, exist 
between these duties is ex plicitly recogn ised in such 
p ro no uncements . Thus, for example, the Scottish Ad vo c a t e ' s  
Guide sees the advocat e's duty to his client as "only one of 
several duties which he must strive to reconcile". [107] More 
spe cif ically, the D ec laratio n of Perugia states that:
"a lawyer ' s f u n c t i o n ....... lays on h i m  a variety of duties
and ob lig ations (sometimes app ea ring to be in conflict 
with each o t h e r ....... )"
and proceeds to identify several parties to whom the ad vocate
has a duty - the client, his family and others to whom the
client is under a legal or moral obligation, the courts, the
legal profes sion and the public. [108]
Such pronounce ments, however, afford no guidance as to the 
relat ive  priority of these co mpe ting interests. Moreover, 
such guidance as is ava ilable in regard to the ethical 
li mitati ons upon the advocate's duty to his client tend 
often to be expressed in g e n e ra li ties which, however c o m m e n d a b l e  
in principle, are of little pr actic al value in dealing with 
actual situations. Thus, as we have been, he is ad vised
by Lord Denning that he must do all he "honourably" 
can /
can on his client's behalf; by Dr. Johnson, that he is to 
do for his client all that his client might "fairly" do for 
himself' [109’]; and by the Scottish Advocates' Guide that 
he must not go beyond what is "lawful and proper". The 
dif fi cult y is that it is the i n te rp retati on  of such 
exp re ss ions the mselves  which is in question.
In order, therefore, to attempt a more precise and realist ic 
ass es smen t of the ethics of the advocat e's role in the 
a dv er sarial system, we must look beyond such g e n e r a li sa tions.  
We must examine in some detail how that system - and the 
advo cat es within it - operate in practice. In partic ular,  
we must explore the question as to whether, and if so, to 
what extent Freedman may be right in main ta ining that "the 
de f e n c e , l a w y e r ' s  profession al  obli gat ions may well be to 
advise the client to withhold the truth" and that, (quoting 
Justice Harlan), the advocate himself, in fulfilling those
obligations, may "of n e c e s s i t y  become an obs ta cl e to
t r u t h - f in di ng.... "
This means that we must look closely at what must be 
regarded as the essence of the matter - the adv oc ate's 
position in relation to FACT.
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3.3 Fact and Law
As has been said in another context, while opinion is free, 
facts are sacred. Even more so, one would suppose, should 
this apply to a legal process in which the a s c e r ta inment of 
truth is claimed to be the main objective. While ac cepting 
that the absolute truth about anything is probably beyond 
human reach, it would seem clear that the extent to which a 
court can arrive at the nearest possibl e ap pr ox i m a t i o n  to it 
must corr espond to the extent to which it is app rised  of the 
relevant facts. It would, therefore, also seem r e a s on able 
to conclude that it is the advocate's role in rel at ion to 
the disc los ure of known facts which is the main test of his 
com mit ment to truth and the main criterion of the real nature 
of the adver sar ial trial process.
In the context of criminal trials, Sheriff Marcus Stone 
confirms the central impo rtance of factual issues:
"It is se lf-evident  that the fact-f inding process is the 
heart of the matter in criminal trials. Provided that 
the evidence led by the p ro se cution is suf fi ci ent in 
law for possible conviction, the real issue is almost 
always one of fact rather than law...." [110]
Also, Frank, as we have seen, forcefully makes the point that 
it is the fact rather than the legal element which is both 
the more si gnificant  and the more uncertain in court 
trials. [111]
While, clearly, there is often ample scope for disput e as 
to what the law is on any part ic ular issue, most would 
proba bly  agree that it is more easily accessible to d i s c o v e r y  
and consensus than dispute d fact. Moreover, in regar d to 
the elic it ation  of fact, as distinct from law, the court is, 
as /
as we have also seen, entire ly dependent, or virtually so,
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on the partisan skills of the cont ending advocates. For 
these reasons, one might expect that, as between fact and law, 
the disco very of fact would be subject to the more rigorous 
control. But here an apparent paradox emerges; for while - 
as we have discussed and as will later be examined in more 
detail - the advocate, pa rt i c u l a r l y  when acting as cri minal  
defence counsel, is allowed consider ab le latitude in regard 
to facts adverse to his client's case, he is held on a 
tighter rein in regard to matters of law:
"...this House expects, and indeed insists, that a ut horitie s 
which bear one way or the other upon matters under debate 
shall be brought to the atten tion of their Lo rd ships by 
those who are aware of those authorities. This 
o bs er vation  is quite i r r e s pect iv e of whether or not 
the particu lar authority assists the party which is 
so aware of i t ........ "
Thus, Lord Birke nhead in The Glebe Sugar Refining Company v. 
Trustees of the Port and Harbours of Greenock [112] in a 
ruling held to be the main aut ho rity on the point in the 
United Kingdom. Generally speaking, the principle  here 
enunciated, applies in both civil and criminal p r o c e e d i n g s  [113] 
and its implications, as pointi ng the contrast with the 
advocate' s perceived obli gations  in regard to mat te rs of 
fact, merit further analysis and comment.
The circu ms tances which occ as ioned Lord B i r k e nh ead's rema rks 
in the passage quoted related to a section of a local Act 
which had not been referred to by either party in the lower 
court but which the House of Lords held to be crucial - 
indeed, on which they mainly based their decision which 
reversed the judgment of the First Division of the Court of 
S e s s i o n . /
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Session. It may be noted that in this case Lord Bi rkenhea d 
absolved counsel involved in the case from blame because he 
c on si dered that they, themselves, were unaware of the existen ce 
of the section in question, but he found it:
"...very dif ficult to believe that some of those i nstru ct ing 
learned counsel were not well aware of the e x i s t e n c e , a n d  
the possible importan ce  and relevance, of the sect ion  in 
question .." [114]
It may be noted, however, that in the light of a more recent 
case, the principle  en un ciated  by Lord Bi rk enh ead is not to 
be construed  as meaning that an advocate is guilty of improper
conduct merely because he argues a point in law which a court
holds to be "bad". In Abraham v. J u t s u n , the c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
related to the awarding of personal costs against a so li citor 
by the Di vi sio nal Court because, in that Court's view, he had, 
at a previous hearing in the Mag istrates' Court, "taken a 
thor ou ghly bad and unme r i t o r i o u s  poi nt . . . . w h i c h  had had the 
effect of causing all the costs in the Divi sional Cou rt." The 
Court of Appeal revers ed this judgment, Lord Dennin g ob s e r v i n g  
that the solicitor in question had not:
"in the least degree (been) guilty of any miscon duct.
The points which he took were fairly a r g u a b l e .... as 
it turned out, both points were bad points; but the 
appellant was not the judge of that. The m a g i s t r a t e s  
had their clerk to advise them on the law. He was to 
advise them whether the points were good or bad. It 
was not for the advocate to do so....it was . . . . h i s  duty 
to take any point which he bel ieved  to be fairly ar gu able 
on behalf of his client. An advocate is not to usurp
the provin ce of the judge. He is not to determine  what
shall be the effect of legal argument. He is not guilt y 
of mis co nduct simply because he takes a point which the 
tribunal holds to be bad. He only becomes guilty of 
miscond uc t if he is dishonest. That is, if he kno w i n g l y  
takes a bad point and thereby deceives the cou rt..." [115]
On /
82.
On analysis, it may be dou bted whether the light cast by Lord 
Denning on this issue is p a rticula rl y luminous. Where and 
how does an advocate draw the line between a "fairly arguable" 
and a "knowingly" bad point? It will be noted that Lord 
Denni ng 's  remarks regar ding the advocate's  usur ping "the 
provin ce of the judge" echo those of Dr. Johnson [116]. He 
might well have added the further statement by John son that 
"an argument which, does not convinc e yourself, may convinc e the 
judge to whom you urge it". [116] On this reasoning, there 
can be nothing r e p r e he nsible in an adv ocate's making  the best 
of a line of argument of the merits of which he is not hi ms elf 
co nvi nced - and which, indeed, if he himself were the judge, 
he might reject as "bad".
However that may be, what does seem to emerge clearly, from 
the Glebe Sugar case at any rate, is that, on points of law, 
as distinct from fact, the mere c onside ra tion that a p a r t i c u l a r  
auth ori ty does not favour his client 's cause, does not, in 
itself, justify an Adv ocat e' s failure to bring it to the 
a tt ention of the court if he is aware of its existence.
For the reasons given above, we now address the qu e s t i o n  as to 
the rational justi fic ation, if any, for this d i st inction . In 
the Glebe Sugar case, Lord Birk en head prefaced the remarks 
quoted above with the o bs er vation  that:
"It is not, of course, in cases of complic ati on, possi bl e 
for their Lordships to be aware of all the authoriti es , 
stat uto ry or otherwise, which may be relevant to the issues 
which in the part ic ular case require decision. Their 
Lord shi ps are therefore very much in the hands of counsel, 
and those who instruct counsel. .. ."
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It m u s t , of course, be allowed that no judge, however learned, 
can be expected to know all the law, or , indeed, even a 
sig nific an t part of all the law; but the legal authoriti es 
bearing on any particul ar issue are usually readily acce ssi ble 
to judges who, normally, have ample opp ort un ities and 
facili tie s - in the form, one would suppose, of an exten sive 
legal library - to look them up. Indeed, in Glebe S u g a r , one 
of their Lordships at least took the trouble to do so — as the 
report of the case makes clear:
"While the case was under c o nsi de ration Lord Atkins on  called 
the attention of their Lordshi ps to section 23 ...." (the 
no n-d i s c l o s e d  authority), wh ereupon  "the appeal was set down 
for further judgment upon the effect of that section." [117]
For the same reasons, it may be dif ficult to accept that judges, 
in respect of relevant legal authorities, are "very much in the 
hands of counsel" or, at any rate, that they ought to be so.
It is the function of the advocate to argue the law. It is 
the function of the judge to discover and rule upon it. So one 
might reaso nably argue. Moreover, in so far as it might be 
allowed that a judge, in regard to points of law, was, to any 
degree, in the hands of counsel, he is certa inl y not so in the 
same sense or.to anything like the same degree as he is in 
regard to issues of fact.
In this context, the authors of "Lawyers" pose the question:
"why is there a greater duty to disclose law rather than fact?" 
They tentativ ely suggest: "is it largely to avoid e m b a r r a s s m e n t
for the j u d g e s ? " [ 1 1 8 ]  But even if such a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  
may have inf luenced the Glebe Sugar ruling, it can ha rdly be 
advanced as a ratio d e c i d e n d i . Two factors, however, might be
advanc ed as justifying a d i s t i nc tion between d i s c l o s u r e  of fact 
and /
and law - though not n ecessar il y as justifying the ratio nale 
of the Glebe Sugar ruling in itself.
First, que stions of law, as distinct from fact, are matt ers 
purely for prof essiona l debate and de liberation  as betw een 
adv ocates and judge. The di sclosure of legal auth o r i t i e s  does
not impinge upon the advocate' s duty to his client in the same
way as dis closure of fact. Certainly, the outcome of legal 
debate may well have serious c on se quence s for the client, but, 
in so far as the only point at issue is the law a p p l i c a b l e  to 
facts admitted or held as proved, the requir ement that an 
advocate must bring to the attention of the court all a u t h or it ie 
known to him as relevant to the issue - whether or not such 
aut horit ie s assist his client's case - is not pe r c e i v e d  as 
infr ing ing his duty to his client. True, he has a duty to
his client to make the best possible case for him both in law
and fact - and to argue as best he can any "fairly arg ua bl e" 
point of law - but this is not seen as justifying  de li b e r a t e  
de ception of the court on matters of pure law.
Second, and more particular ly, questions of law do not involve 
the crucial issue of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  as between adv oc a t e  and 
client. Whatever c o n s i d erat io ns may influence an a d v ocate to 
pursue or not to pursue, to disclo se or not to disclose, a 
purely legal point, they will not generally involve any 
conflict between the duty to honour his client's c o n f i d e n c e s  
and his duty to the court. And, as will be seen, it is this 
conflic t which is at the heart of many of the most c r i ti ca l 
issues /
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issues which arise in regard to the ethics of the adv oca te's 
role.
Some further remarks of Lord Birkenhead  in Glebe S u g a r , 
albeit made in the context of the disclosure of legal 
auth or ities and not of factual information, are of relev anc e 
to the main purpose of this inquiry. After c ri ti cising  
"those instruct ing learned counsel" for their failure to 
direct attention to the statu tory provision in question, he 
observed:
"A similar matter arose in this House some years ago, and 
it was pointed out by the then pre siding judge that the 
wi t h h ol di ng from their Lordships  of any authority which 
might throw light upon the matters under debate was 
really to obtain a decision from their Lordshi ps in the 
absence of the material and the inf ormation which a
proper ly informed decision requires ....... and to obtain
a decision  founded upon imp erfect knowledge. The extreme 
im pr op rie ty of such a course cannot be made too p l a i n . . . "[119]
Althoug h he does not use the term, Lord Bi rkenhead is here 
talking about deception - delib erate and culpable deception, 
as he perceived it, of the court in regard to a ma terial  point 
of law. But would not the same st rictures apply - a_ fortio ri - 
to dec eption as to material points of fact - i n f o rmation  in 
regard to which the court is wholly dependent upon the 
advocate? Indeed, if one were, in the quo tation given, to 
substitute  the one word "fact" for "authority", could it not 
be said that this "withholding"  - or worse - in order to ob tain 
a decis ion from a court "founded upon imperfect k nowl ed ge" is 
what happens in courts every day? Is there any valid 
justif i c a t i o n  for such decep tion? If so, what are its limits 
of /
of p e r m i s s i b i l i t y ?  Do these limits extend beyond decep tion 
by silence - mere "w ithholding"  - to positive attempts to 
conceal material  facts; to dis tort io n by c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  
tactics; even to lying?
These and other like qu est ions it is the business of this 
inquiry to explore. It is such issues that are the subject 
of co nfusion both within and outwith the legal p r o f ession  - a 
co nfusion reflected not only in the co nflictin g opinions and 
diverse beliefs of various writers and authorities, but even, 
it would appear, in stat em ents by the same authority. Lord 
Denning, for example, the author of the emphatic s t a t em ents 
i n R o n d e l , supra, as to the ad vo cat e's duty to the "higher 
cause" of truth and justice, ex pre sse d in an ear lier case, 
Tomblinq v. Universal Bulb C o m p a n y , a somewhat more equi vo cal 
view of an advocate's duty - citing* with apparent app ro va l 
Cicero's dictum that while it is the duty of the judge to 
pursue the truth, "it is per mi tt ed to an advocate to urge 
what has only the semblan ce of i t . " [120]
The context in which Lord Denning made this o b s e r v a t i o n  will 
be later examined [121] but, on the face of it, the two 
st atements  would seem difficult to reconcile.
With a view to exp loring these quest ions in greater detail, 
it is proposed to examine those specific areas where the 
probl ems  associate d with them appear to arise most acutely.
Before doing so, however, it may be useful, in order to c o m m a n d  
a better persp ect ive of the advo cate's  role in this context, 
to have a brief look at general and p h ilos op hical c o n ce pts of 
dec ep tion  and attempt to assess their relevance to the 
ad vo cate 's  function.
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3.4 Deception and Lying
3.4.1 Rel evance for the Advoca te
"A lawyer is not to tell what he knows to be a lie" [122]
"I don't see why we should not come out roundly and say that 
one of the functions of the lawyer is to lie for his c l i e n t . "[12!
These two views could be taken, on face value, to rep re se nt 
extremes of co nflicting  opinion as to the adv oca te's ethics.
But such a conclusion m a y b e  premature. We must first ask 
what is meant by "lie" in each of these statements; what is 
a lie? Can its meaning be legi ti mately res tri cted to an actual 
sta tement intended to mislead ? Or is it capable of 
i n t e r p re tatio n in a wider sense - any deliber ate attempt to 
deceive: to make others believe what we ourselves do not
believe - by whatever means: gesture, disguise, innuendo,
even mere silence? In other words, is decep tion in any form
a l s o a l i e ?
This question is important for the advocate pro f e s s i o n a l l y ,  for 
he is told by his pro fe ssional  bodies and by the courts that 
he must never lie to a court. If lying is i n t e rpr et ed in the 
wider sense of any form of deception, this has serious 
imp lic atio ns  for him. When, for example, an advoca te 
d elibe ra te ly withholds from the court a crucial fact known to 
him - or, in cro ss-ex am ination , attempts to dis cre di t the
test imo ny of a witness which he knows to be true - is he, in
effect, "lying"?
But in the context of the ethics of the adv ocate's function,
we /
we must ask the further questions: whatever latitude in regard 
to questions of fact he may or may not be permitted professionally 
does it matter - in moral terms - whether to deceive is also to 
lie? Is not to do either to act dishon estly and there for e 
morally wrong?
But is it always wrong? Are there circu ms tances in which lying 
or any other form of de cep tio n can be justified? And does the 
advocate have any pa rticular j u st ificat io n?
These que stions are clearly of rel evance to our theme for we 
cannot appraise the ad vo cate' s function in ethical terms 
without reference to moral principles.
However, before disc ussing them further, we may note a related 
aspect - the different senses in which the word "truth" is used - 
and sometimes confused - and the cons eq uences  of this co nfusion  
for pro fe ssion al  ethics in general and for legal ethics in 
pa rticular  .
3.4.2 Truth and Truthfuln ess
We have earlier noted the two different senses of the con cept of 
truth - the e p iste mo logical  and the ethical. [124] The former - 
with which we have dealt in Part Two in relation to the natur e of 
the ad ver sarial system - concerns the a s ce rt ainmen t - or 
attemp ted  asc erta inmen t - of objective fact; the latter, the 
concept of truth fu ln ess - speaking or acting honestly.
Si ssela Bok, in her book on "Lying", expresses the view that 
p hilos op he rs such as Plato have tended to be p r e o c c u p i e d  with
the ep is tem o l o g i c a l  concept - giving rise to the "great risk of 
a co nceptual muddle" of confusing:
"the moral domain of intended tru thfu lness and deception, 
and the much vaster domain of truth and falsity in 
general. The moral question of whether you are lying 
or not is not settled by e stabl is hing the truth or 
falsity of what you say. In order to settle this 
question, we must know whet her you intend your st atement 
to m i s l e a d ." [ 1 2 5 ] [ B o k ' s  emphasis]
Bok's "conceptual m u d d l e " w o u l d  seem to have support on a 
point of particular  relev ance to court proceedings: what is 
meant by the phrase, "the truth, the whole truth, and noth ing 
but the truth". She quotes J.L. Austin:
"Like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an ill us ory ideal 
(the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth 
about, say, the battle of W a t e r l o o ...... )" [126]
Austin here uses "truth" in its e p is temolo gi cal sense but, as
Bok points out, this it not the sense in which it is used in
court but refers to testify in g honestly - the p r o s c r i p t i o n  of
intentio nal deception:
"It is to this question alone - the intentional m a n i p u l a t i o n  
of in for mation - that the court addresses itself in its 
request for 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth' "[127]
It is, then, the criterion  of truth in the sense of t r u t h f u l n e s s
which is applied by the court in this context. For a wi tn ess -
as for anyone else - what matters, in moral terms, is not
whether what he says is o bjecti ve ly true or false, but wh et her
he believes it to be true or false.
Stone makes a similar p o i n t :
"It is an essential element of lying that the w i t ne ss  should 
believe that what he states is untrue ..... "
Such /
Such a witness, therefore, is still a dishonest witness even 
if his testimony which he believ es to be incorrect "happens to 
be obj ec ti vely accurate" [128]
We may note here also two further co nse que nces - in Bok's 
perc ept ion - of the traditio nal pre oc cupatio n with the 
e p i s t e mo logic al  concept of truth to the relative neglect of 
the e t h i c a l .
First, she believes this to be a partial reason for the pauc ity 
of debate within the field of moral philosoph y on the concept 
of de cep tio n [129] and, in regard to lawyers, points in 
par ticular to the absence of analysis and debate within the 
legal prof ess ion in regard to the problems of and possibl e 
j u s t i fica ti on  for dec eption by a lawyer in court. On this 
point, she quotes from a textbook on the p rofes si onal 
r es po ns i b i l i t i e s  of lawyers:
"There is simply no consensus, for example, as to the law yer 's 
duty to the court if he knows his client is lying. In that 
and other situati ons a lawyer can only be sens it ive to the 
issues involved and resolve these difficult cases as 
r es po nsi bly as he or she is able."
Bok adds the comment:
"Closer to the throwing up of one's hands one cannot get.
To leave such a choice open to the sensitive and the 
r es po nsi ble without giving them criteria for choice is to 
leave it open as well to the in sensitiv e and the cor ru pt " [130]
As will later be seen, it is not quite correct to say that no
guida nce  is given to the lawyer in situations where he knows his
client to be lying - or to be intendi ng to lie - but, p a r t i c u l a r l y
in the criminal sphere, there would appear to be a d e f i c i e n c y  in
this respect and such guidance as is avail able may not be very
helpful [131]
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Secondly, this absence of analysis of the concept of decept io n 
is seen by Bok to give rise to another co nsequ ence which is 
relative to a matter we have earlier discussed:
"This absence of real analysis is reflected also in te aching 
and in codes of p r ofess io nal ethics. As a result, those 
who confront difficul t moral choices between t r u t h f u l n e s s  
and deception  often make up their own rules. They think 
up their own excuses. . . .One deserves mention h e r e .. .. .It 
holds that since we can never know the truth or falsity of 
anything anyway, it does not matter whether or not we lie 
when we have a good reason f o r d o i n g  so." [132]
While it would probably be unfair to represent it as a
ju stif i c a t i o n  for telling lies, the rel ativ istic view of truth
which we have looked at [133] might possibly be one of the
at titudes here criticised.
As for the "throwing up of hands", it probably must be co nc eded 
that Bok's quote from the legal textbook, given supra, may 
indeed be typical of some p r o f e ssiona l pron ou n c e m e n t s  within  
the legal est ablishment. It may, of course, be argued that the 
" in sen sit ive and corrupt" will remain so whatever (cri te r i a  for 
choice were devised and would doubtless find ways of 
ci rcu m v e n t i n g  them. For others, however, the c r i t i c i s m  may 
be valid. The absence of clear criter ia other than the ex er cise 
of indivi dual judgment in regard to the p ermissi bl e limits of 
decep tio n in court, not only leaves the co n s c i e n t i o u s  ad vocate 
wi thout guidance but, on occasion, may put him at c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p r o f e ssio na l risk: leaving him to steer pe ri lously  b e t we en the
Scylla of being accused of failing in his duty to his clien t and 
the Charybdi s of being disc i p l i n e d  for failure in his duty to 
the court.
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In particular, he may be left on occasion to decide on his own 
r e s p o n si bilit y the question: what is a "lie"? And can it be
justi fie d in his client's int erests?
3.4.3 What is a "Lie"
This, as has been said, is an imp ortant question for the advocate 
not only morally but pr o f e s s i o n a l l y  for, in the United Kingdom 
and elsew here in adversaria l jurisdict ion s, the general 
co nsensus within the legal prof essio n seems to be that a lawyer, 
whatever latitude he may be permitted in other respects, must 
not lie to the court.
As Mon ta igne said, the lie has many faces [134], but, broadly
speaking, it can and has been defined in two ways: the first,
in the sense in which the word is probably most often used in
normal speech - that is, an actual statement directly
communicating, with intent to mislead, what the c o m m u n i c a t o r
does not believe to be true: the "clear-cut" lie. Bok he rse lf
adopts this definition for the purposes of her book but
ack no wl edges that some p h il os ophers - citing St. Aug u s t i n e  as
an example - adopt a wider definition, equating lying with
decep tio n in general, i.e.:
"When we undertake to deceive others in ten tiona lly, we 
c om mu nicate messag es meant to mislead them, meant to make 
them believe what we our selves do not believe. We can do 
so through gesture, through disguise, by means of action 
or inaction, even through silence... " [133]
However, whatever de fi nit ion of the lie is adopted, they have
one element in common - the intent to deceive; and it would
seem difficult to resist the logic of the view that, in moral
terms, /
terms, that is what matters. If I wish to implant in the mind 
of another the belief that something  is true though I my self 
believe it to be untrue, it does not matter whether I do so by 
an overt sta tement or by another method of deception. The 
distinction, therefore, between the narrow and wide de fi n i t i o n s  
would seem to be one of form rather than substance. On this 
view, one can, therefore, reas onably agree with Bok that it does 
not really matter, morally speaking, which way lying is defined, 
"so long as one retains the p rerog at ive of morally e v a l u a t i n g  
the i nt entio na lly mis leadi ng  s t a t e m e n t  "[136]
However, as has been said, it does matter, p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  
speaking, for the advocate. If a lie is to be i n t e r p r e t e d  as 
in cluding all forms of deception, then, clearly, there is a 
diff icult y - and not only for him but for the whole a d v e r s a r i a l  
system; for, in the light of what has been earlier di s c u s s e d  
and what will later emerge, it seems manifest that the 
ad versar ial trial process - wh ate ve r merit may be cl ai med for 
it in other respects - may be reas on ably de scr ibe d as a legal 
framework of condoned deception by the ad versaries - indeed, 
in a sense, of pr of e s s i o n a l l y  imposed deception, in the case of 
criminal defence counsel; for it is to be reme m b e r e d  that 
def ence counsel is pr o f e s s i o n a l l y  proscri bed from d i s c l o s i n g  
to the court adverse facts co nfided by his client, h o weve r 
relevant and material, and that, as has been said, even mere 
silence can, in certain sit uations, be a form of d e c e p t i o n  - 
and theref ore included in the broad sweep of the wider d e f i n i t i o n  
of lying. And, of course, there are many other forms of deceptioi 
which are normal features of the adversarial system  - a sy stem
in which even such as Lord Denning concede that it is per mi tted 
to an advocate to urge, not the truth, but "only the semblance" 
of it [137].
In the light of the absurdi ti es which, for these reasons, would 
o th erwise result, it must be assumed that when it is said that 
an advoca te must not lie to the court, the word "lie" is used 
in the normal sense of everyday speech - the overt lie: making
an untrue statement - either directly  or indirec tly through his 
client, such as, for example, being a willing acce ss ory to 
perjury .
This does not, of course, settle the moral question as regards 
other forms of dec eption in court - nor indeed the p r o f e s s i o n a l  
imp lic atio ns  of such other forms as regards pe rceived p e r m i s s i b l e  
limits which it is our purpose to explore.
3.4.4 Ar gum ents for J u s t i fi ca tion
Given that the ethical issues inherent in the a dvocate 's  
function involve not only overt lying - such as perj ury by the 
client - but other forms of deception, we shall, in d i s c u s s i n g  
the relevance to the advocate of the arguments com monly  
advanc ed in justification, regard such arg uments as app l i c a b l e  
to all forms of in tentional  de cep tio n - lying in the wider 
sense .
It would seem that the traditiona l Chri sti an view - fo llowin g 
the A u g u s t i n e / A q u i n a s  doctine - is that all lies are i n t r i ns ically  
wrong; though reco gn ising degrees of "abhorre nce" - rang ing 
from the venial "white lie" to the most serious - the " m a l icious " 
lie [138] .
Kant /
95.
Kant was a notable exponent of the extreme abs olutist  view, 
prohi bit ing all lies - even those told for the best of
motives [139]; a view also ex pre ssed in the rustic wisdom of
Dickens' Joe Gar gery in "Great Expectat ion s":
"There's one thing you may be sure of, Pip, namely that 
lies is lies. However they come, they didn't ought to 
come, and they come from the father of lies, and work 
round to the same." [140]
But such extreme views, however exemp lary in precept, are 
difficult to sustain in practice.
Broadly speaking, the arguments most commonly advanced in 
j us ti fic ation may be said to concern those lies whose pro fessed 
purpose is, one way or another, to avoid harm - or, at any rate,
to do more good than harm. However, in view of the prominence,
in the pro fessio na l context, of those relating to p rofess io nal 
con fiden ti al ity - and although these can be seen as another 
variant of av oidance  of harm - it may be conve nient to deal 
with the arguments under two heads: first - in the general
context - those based upon the avo idance of harm principle; 
second - in the p r o f e ssional  context - those relating to 
profess ion al co n f i d e n t i a l i t y  and, specifically,  l awyer -c lient 
confiden tia lity.
The Avoidance of Harm - The most obvious example of this kind
of argument is that relating to a situatio n in which a lie is
necessary to prevent great and immediate harm to someone - what
may be called the "common sense" argument. Thus Dr. Johnson:
"The general rule is, that the truth should never be violated; 
there must, however, be some exceptions. If, for instance, 
a murderer should ask you which way a man has gone." [141]
Such extreme and clear -cut sit uations are, however, relati ve ly
rare /
rare in everyd ay life where si tu ation s tend to be somewhat less 
urgent and more complex. It is then more likely to be a que sti on 
of weighing  the c o n s e qu en ces of lying or not lying - what Bok 
refers to as the u tili ta rian crite rio n and the Be nt hamite  school 
which held that what mat ters is not the lie itself but the 
c o n s eq ue nces attendant upon it [142]. Bok sees' this as another 
example of the common sense approach and as being in line with 
how people, in practice, usually behave, that is:
"In choosing whether or not to lie, we do weigh ben efits 
against harm and ha ppiness  against u n h a p p in es s..." [143]
While it is dou btless true that this is the cr iterion people
normall y apply, it suffers from the dis ability that it is not
always easy in complex situ ations to assess con se quenc es.
M o r e o v e r , a  person disposed to lie may well be bias sed  in the
w e i g h i n g .
It is also important to note that a truly moral, appr oach would 
probab ly require rejec tio n of the view that lying, per s e , is 
morally neutral and would postulate, in the we ig hing process, 
an initial pr es umption or negative  weighing  against lying as 
something, ideally to be avoided. [144] This is p r o bably  again 
in line with how most people - at any rate, c o n s c i e n t i o u s  peopl e 
normall y behave.
Pr of essi on al  Co n f i d e n t i a l i t y  - The lawyer is not, of course, 
unique as regards the ethical problem s arising from the concep t 
of pro fe ssiona l confid entia li ty. Other p r o f es si ons - n o t abl y 
the medical pr of essio n - share these problems. Also, there are, 
among these professions, common factors in their a r g u m e n t s  in 
de fence of confidenti al ity: the harm which d i s c los ur e of a
c o n f id en ce /
c on fid enc e might cause to the patient or client; the latter's 
right to privacy and the claimed inviolab il ity of the implicit 
p ro fe ssiona l promise of confidentia li ty.
There is also a further argument relevant both to the doctor and 
to the lawyer: that breach of trust by unauthor is ed discl os ure
of conf idenc es  would deter people from confiding in their doctor 
or lawyer and, therefore, from seeking and obtai ning the benefit 
of medical or legal assistance.
However, there are important d iffere nc es in this context between 
the legal and other professions. For purposes of comparison, 
we may again take the medical profess io n as an illu st ration.  
First, crucial as it is in the field of medical ethics, the 
c on f i d e n t i a l i t y  of the do c t o r - p a t i e n t  relation sh ip is not so 
vital to the structure of the medical services system as is 
that of the lawyer-c li ent re lat i o n s h i p  to the legal system. 
La wye r - c l i e n t  co nfid e n t i a l i t y  is a basic and essential feature 
of the adver sar ial system of justice and any s u b s tan ti al er os ion 
of that concept would threaten, if not destroy, the f u n d a menta l 
pri nc iple s of that system; for the advocate could not 
e f f e c ti vely function as the zealous champi on and p r o t e c t o r  of 
his client in accordance with those pr inciples if the client 
could not repose complete con fid en ce in him. It is ma in ly  for 
this reason that lawyers attach so much importa nce to 
con fid entia li ty .
Second, the trilateral r elat io nship which normally gives rise 
to the ethical issues of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  is also s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
dif fe rent  as between doctor and advocate. The third pa rt ies
who normally feature in the doctor's problems in regard to 
issues of disclosure, are not in the same profe ss io nal 
r elati on sh ip to him as is the court to the advocate. Such 
ob ligat io ns  as the doctor may, or may not, be pe rceived  as 
having to such parties are of quite a different order from the 
advocate' s pr of ess ional obliga tions to the court - and through
it to the law itself - of which, as was noted at the begi nning
of this inquiry, he is also the servant.
Third, there is also an impo rtant  difference as regards the 
s ig ni ficanc e to the third party .of the confident ia l i n f o r m a t i o n  
which the pro fess ional in each case seeks to withhold, suppres s
or ot her wis e obfuscate in de fer enc e to pro fess ional
co nf id ent iality. In the doctor's case, the in fo r m a t i o n  in 
question may indeed be of imp ort ance to the third party; in 
the lawyer's case, however, in so far as it is mater i a l  to the 
issue before the court, it relates to the essential fun ction  
of the c o u r t .
For all these reasons, the concept of, and the p r o blems  arising 
from, pro fess ional con f i d e n t i a l i t y  tend to feature more 
p ro mi nently  in the legal than in other professions.
3.4.5 The Validity of Arg uments for Jus ti ficatio n
Which, if any, of these argum ents advanced in defence of lying 
or deception, in certain s i t u a t i o n s ,’ could be validly in vo ke d 
by the court lawyer as a moral j u s t i f ic ation?
In add ressing  this question, it may be conveni ent to follow the 
sequence in which these arguments have been discussed.
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The Avoid an ce of Immediate and Serious Harm - As has been said, 
the extreme situati ons in which this particular a r g u m e n t -  the 
"c omm on sense" Johnso nian argument - is likely to apply are rare 
in the everyday life of ordinary people. At first sight, it may 
also seem ina pp ropri at e to the ad vocate's situation  - at least 
in the context of the extreme c ircumst an ces cited by Dr. Johnson:
"If a murder er ....... " ; but, in the case of the cr imina l defence
advocate particularly, perhaps not all that inappropriat e; for 
it is not dif ficu lt.to envisage a situation  in which defence 
counsel, in a criminal t r i a l , m a y  be faced with a decision  
whether or not to lie - or to be party to a lie - as the only 
means of saving his client from an unjust fate; such as, for 
example, in a murder trial where, although counsel knows, or 
sincerely believes, his client to be innocent, the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  
evidence against him is so great that he is in grave danger of 
being convicted  and thereby forfeit ing his liberty - or even 
his life. Given the two quotes from Dr. Johnson - the "murderer" 
example and "a lawyer is not to tell what he knows to be a 
lie" [145], it is in teresting to spec ulate what his answer 
would have been if asked whether, in such a situation, it would 
be right for the lawyer to lie to save his client. Indeed, 
there may be those who would see the "murderer" example as 
cited by Dr. Johnson as a not too fanciful analogy in that 
those rad ically opposed to capital pu nishment may well cast 
the state in the role of a "murderer" when it sanctions  state 
execution. This, no doubt, would be a very extreme view but, 
nevertheless, it is an ex tremely serious situation  and poses 
a /
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a p ar ticula rl y dif ficult and delicate question. It may involve 
the ad vocate's acting as an acce ssory to perjury - the "most 
abhorre nt"  of lies [146] - and one un equivocal ly pr oscribe d 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l y . [147]. All that one may, perhaps, safely say 
is that, viewed only in terms of strict moral principle - and 
p ro fe ssiona l pros cripti on  apart - the argument that lying may 
be justi fied to avoid serious and immediate harm may have 
a p p l ic at ion to this and similar extreme situations.
Weighin g the Conseque nc es - As has been said, the avo id ance of 
harm argument for j u s t i fi cation  tends, in less extreme and more 
complex situations, to merge into what may be seen as the most 
s ignif ic an t and relevant for ordinary people in most s i t u at io ns 
in real life - what Bok refers to as the uti li tarian  cri terion: 
that what matters is not the lie or deception per se but the 
co ns e q u e n c e s  flowing from it; that, therefore, in de ciding  in 
any part ic ular case, whether or not to lie or deceive, one must 
attempt to weigh the likely consequences; assess the overall 
goodnes s or badness of the options; weigh the benefit s agai nst  
h a r m .
What app licat io n does this have to the court lawyer?
As we have discussed, in the absence of clear p r o f e s s i o n a l  and 
posit ive  guidance as to the proper course to take in some 
delicate sit uat ions - such as, for example, when a lawyer knows 
that his client is lying to the court - it seems to be this 
principle, in effect, which the advocate is som etim es  a d v ised 
to apply; the res olving of such problems is left to his 
indi vid ual r e sp onsib il ity - to his own "s en sitivity" [148].
This would seem to be another way of saying that he shoul d weigh 
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the c o n s e qu ences  of the options. In such situations, this may 
also seem, therefore, to be the most relevant pri nciple for the 
lawyer as well as for ordinary people.
But certain caveats must be entered.
The proper moral app li cation of this principle relies greatly 
on personal integrity. The "in sen sitiv e and corrupt", to use 
Bok's phrase - or, even if not corrupt, the less sc ru p u l o u s  - 
could well take a biassed view of the con seq uence s and invoke 
the pr inciple as j u s t i f ic ation for dubious conduct. It must 
also be rem emb ered in this context that, in acc or da nce with 
the gene rally accepted princ ip les of utilitarianism , the 
c o n s e qu ences which are to be weighed are not only the 
c o n s e qu ences to the weigher - or, in the case of the advocate, 
to his client (though the latter must be a major factor) - but 
the c o ns equenc es  to all parties and interests involved.
There is also the further im por tan t factor, already me nt ioned , 
which is as applicabl e to the advocate  as to people in ev er y d a y  
life, that lying or de ception is not to be percei ve d as m o r all y 
neutral and that his asses sment of the c onse qu ences of such 
conduct in any situation should include an initial p r e s u m p t i o n  - 
or negati ve  weighing - against it.
Pro fessi on al  Conf id e n t i a l i t y  as J u s t i f ica ti on - This is the
argument most often invoked by lawyers as j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for what
they may see as nec essary deviati on s from truthful ne ss. Thus
Pro fessor Wolfram:
"By turns sacred and co nt roversial,  the pr inciple of the 
c on f i d e n t i a l i t y  of client i nf or mation is w e l l - e m b e d d e d  in 
the tradit ional notion of the An g l o - A m e r i c a n  c l i e n t - l a w y e r  
re la ti onship ."  [149]
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And :
"The assurance of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y .........is pur chased only
at the price of exclu ding from trials evidence from lawyers 
and clients about their c onversa ti ons - a det rac tion from 
the search for truth that is 'plain and concret e'." [150]
Bok has scant sympathy for the concept as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for
u n t r u t hf ulnes s and believes that: .
"Lawyers see it as so m anife st ly different from the shadier 
pr ivileges  claimed through the ages, ranging from the feudal 
sexual privilege  to the excesses of 'executive privilege' 
as to require no defence." [151]
Whether lawyers adopt such an ja priori assumpt ion may be 
questionable. However, whether they do or not, the arg um en ts 
they advance in support of the privilege must be looked at 
objectively. They are cogent argum ent s which, as has been said, 
go to the heart of the adv ers ar ial system of justice. They 
involve weighty consider ations. Nevertheless, it may be 
questioned  whether they c o n c l usi ve ly demons trate that professions.' 
confidentia li ty, per s e , provides  a special moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
which overrides veracity in all circumsta nces.
Apart from arguments already me nt ioned as su pportin g the san ctity  
of confi dent ia lity,  much is also made of the element of the 
implied pro fes siona l promise not to disclose c o n f i d e n c e s  - and 
of the alleged invio labil it y of that promise. B u t e a n  such a 
promise per se provide an absolu te moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for not 
breaking it under any c i r c u m s t a n c e s -  irrespe ct ive of the harm 
which may result? Such an absolut is t position is not easy to 
defend for it is not difficult to envisage si tu ations  where the 
keeping of a promise, (even assum in g that it is not an 
in t r i ns ically evil promise), would cause much more harm than 
breaking i t .
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These c o n s i derati on s would seem to invite the conclusion that 
there are and must be limits to the pri vilege of profession al  
co nf id e n t i a l i t y  and it may also seem reasonable to conclude that 
the moral cri terion for det erm in ing those limits is probably, 
in the final analysis, that which we have discussed and des cr ibed 
as the "weighing of the conseq uences " - the indi vidual' s 
pe rc eption of the overall goodness and badness of the effects 
of his decision. In its a pp licati on  to the advocate, this 
would mean that, however cogent the arguments in favour of 
co nf ide nti ality, they cannot, in themselves, be reg ar de d as 
conclusive but merely as some of the factors - albeit important 
factors - to be assessed in the weighing of the conse quenc es .
3.4.6 - Summary
The main co nclus ions which we can, at this stage in our inquiry, 
derive from this dis cu ssion  on the moral pri nci pl es involv ed  
in lying and deception, may be su mmarised as follows -
(1) The dist inction between the narrow and wider d e f i n i t i o n s  
of lying is one of form rather than substance. The 
common factor is decepti on and the intent to deceive.
(2) However, professio na l ethics in the ad versaria l system do 
recognise a distinction. Althou gh the advocate is 
forbidden to lie - or to be an acc essory to a lie by his 
client - he is permitted  to practise other forms of 
deception; to urge the "semblance" of truth. It must, 
therefore, be assumed that the "lie" which is 
pro fe ss ionall y pros cribed  is only the overt, cl e a r - c u t  
lie.
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(3) The argument most commonly advanced by lawyers for the 
ju s t i fi cation of lying or deception is that based upon 
the sanctity of pro fess ional  confidenti ality. However, 
this, per s e , cannot provide absolute moral justi f i c a t i o n  
but must be seen as but one factor - albeit a cogent 
factor - in the advoca te's asse ssm ent of the consequences.
(4) Viewed only in terms of moral pri nciple - and profe s s i o n a l  
and legal or di nan ces apart - this weighing of the 
conseque nc es for or against lying or dec eption would 
appear to be the most relevant for the advocate as it is 
for people generally - involving the principle that it is 
to the conse qu ences and not to the lie itself that he must 
look for the moral criterion. While this pr in ciple rejects 
the concept of lying as i n trinsi ca lly wrong, there must 
always be an initial p resum pt ion against it.
Before att emp ting to 'draw final conclusions, we must now turn 
to the actual workings of the ad versarial system and to a more 
detaile d analysis of the a d v o c a t e ’s role within it - p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in those specific areas where the ethical issues arise most 
acutely. Four such areas may be id entified -
No n- Di s c l o s u r e  of relevant facts - with particul ar ref e r e n c e  
to the di st inction drawn, or attem pte d to be drawn, be tween 
passive "withholding"  and positive attempts to "conceal". 
C r o s s - E x a m i n a t i o n  Tactics - with par ti cu lar re ferenc e to the 
ethics of dis cre di ting testimony known to the c r o s s - e x a m i n e r  
to be true.
Perjury - the adv ocate's  position when r e pres en ting a p e r j u r i o u s
client. '
The "Guilty Accused" Sit uatio ns - the advocat e's posit i o n  where 
his client has c o n f i d entiall y admitted his factual guilt.
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3.5 - N o n - D i sc losure - " Withho ld ing" and "Concealing"
3.5.1 - Int roduction
Central to many of the problems co nfronti ng the advocate - 
particu lar ly, though not exclusively, in his role as criminal 
defence counsel - is the question as to what extent he is 
permitted, or, indeed, obliged, in the interests of his client, 
to keep the court in ignorance of pertinent facts which he deems
to be adverse to his client's case - and the means he may
legitima te ly  employ to achieve that objective.
This issue features in all the situa tions we shall examine, but, 
here, we address two par ticul ar  questions: first, to what
extent can the legal limits of permi s s i b i l i t y  in this cont ext -
in so far as these can be inferred from available  case law - b e  
per ce ived  as recognis ing or refl ec ting a di st i n c t i o n  be twe en  a 
passive "with holding" of i nf or mation  and a positive c o n t r i v a n c e  
to conceal it? Second, in moral terms, can any firm line be 
drawn between these concept s?
Also, while, as will later emerge, most of the issues arisin g 
in conn ection  with the s up pr essing  of adverse facts in volve 
the concept of professi on al confide nt ia lity, we are here 
co ncerned with the non-d i s c l o s u r e  of facts which are wit hin 
the ad vocate's  knowledge but which are not n e c e s s a r i l y  of a 
c on fi dentia l nature; being facts which may not be di r e c t l y  
perti nen t to the alleged offence itself or other issue before 
the court but which, nevert heless,  may be c o n s id er ed by the 
court to be of material import as regards the issue it has to 
decide.
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3.5.2 - The Limits of Per missi bility.
On this, as in so many other ethical issues, the adv oca te 's 
position does not seem to be greatly facilitated by the 
p r o f es si onal guidance which he is som etimes offered; gui da nc e 
which, on the face of it - and sometimes emana ting from the 
same source - often seems contr adictory.  On the one hand, he is, 
for example, told to be "open and truthful" with the court and, 
on the other, that, "in present in g the facts of a case you have 
a duty only to refer to those favourable - unless you are 
p r o s e c u t i n g .......... "[152]
Again, he is told by Lord Denn ing that while he must not 
"kn owi ngly mislead" the court, he is at liberty to ex erci se  
his disc re tion as to what facts he should disclose ac c o r d i n g  
to whether or not they are to his client's advantage  [153].
It would seem, however, that attempts have been made to lay
down rea sonable criteria for d e m a rc at ing the limits of permissibly
con duct by an advocate in this context. The aut hors of "Lawy ers"
point to an alleged d is ti nction between "conce almen t"  and
" wi th hol ding" of evidence:
" Co ncealme nt involves a positive  attempt to prevent i n f o r m a t i o n  
being discovered, whereas w i t h h o l d i n g  is a mere failure to 
disclose. Gener ally speaking, it is unethical for a lawyer 
to conceal the facts, but ethical for him to wi t h h o l d  them. "[15
They proceed to quote from an A u s t ra lian p r a c t i t i o n e r s  ha n d b o o k  
a ruling which arose from the question as to whet her a defenc e 
counsel had an obliga tion to reveal to the court pr ev ious 
c on vi ctions  against his client which had been conf i d e d  to him 
by his client:
"1. If the prosecut io n says nothing about pre vi ou s c o n v i c t i o n s  
it is the duty of counsel not to disclose them where he has 
acquired kn owledge of them from his client or from e n q u i r i e s
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made on behalf of his client or in any other manner covered 
by pr ofessiona l privilege without his client's specific 
instructions.
2. It can never be his duty in any event to volunteer 
pre jud ical matter unless he conceives  it to be in his 
client's interest to do s o  ..."[155]
This quote is of interest in so far as it makes the point that 
it is not only the right but the duty of defence counsel not to 
disclo se prbjudical i nfor ma tion - whether or not such i nf ormati on  
is covered by p r of essiona l co nfid e n t i a l i t y  - but it does not 
seem to provide authorit y as such for the alleged d i s t i n c t i o n  
between co nc ealing and withhold ing, nor do the au thors cite any 
specific authority. Indeed, they themselves pose the question: 
"Is it sensible and des irable to dis ti nguish betw een active and 
passive conduct if both result in the court getting a false 
im pression? " [156]
While, in modern times, there seems to be a con se nsus for the
view that counsel has no duty to reveal info rma tion adverse to
his client, that may appear to be at odds with the o b s e r v a t i o n  
of Lord Esher in the case In Re G. Mayor Cooke in re gard to the 
duties of a solicitor:
" .His duty w a s ............... not to fight unfairly, and that arose
from his duty to himself not to do anything which was deg r a d i n g  
to himself as a gen tleman and a man of honour. He had, 
however, a duty to the court and it was part of that duty that 
he should not keep back from the court any i n f o r m a t i o n  which 
ought to be before it and that he should in no way m i s l e a d  the 
court by stating facts which were u n t r u e ...... "[157]
The tenuous nature of the d istin ct ion between proper and imp ro per
conduct in this context and the precarious  nature of the ethical
tight rop e which the advoca te has, at times, to walk is
p a r t i cula rl y illust rated  by two more recent English cases which
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merit exa mi nation in some detail - Tomblinq v. Univer sal Bulb 
Company L t d . [158] and Meek v. Fleming [159].
3.5.3 - The Cases of Tom blinq and Meek
Both of these cases involved an applicatio n by one of the par ties 
for a new trial on the ground that the court of first in st an ce 
had been misl ed as to mat eri al fact. In T o m b l i n q , the 
app li ca tion failed. In M e e k , it succeeded.
Tomblinq - Counsel for the p l a i nti ff  had produc ed as a 
pri ncipal witness a person who had been a prison go ver n o r  but 
who, at the time of giving his evidence, was resident in a 
prison - not, however, as governo r but as an inmate followin g 
his con vi ct io n for a mot oring offence - a fact known to the 
pl ainti ff 's  counsel but not dis cl osed to the court. The facts 
are summ ari sed in the judgment of Somervel l L.J.:
"Mr. Meikle started life in the prison service. He became 
a prison governor. He left the prison service el even days 
after (his) first conviction. At the time he gave ev i d e n c e  
he was in prison. He was brought to the court in charge of 
a warder in plain clothes. The fact that he was in pr iso n 
was unknown to the defendants' advisers, and, as the wa rde r 
was not in uniform, did not become apparent either to them 
or the judge. It was known to the pl ainti ff's s o l i c i t o r  and 
counsel. There is an affidavit  by the p l a i nt if f's s o l i c i t o r  
that no request or su gg estio n was made by him or on the 
plai ntiff 's  behalf that the warder should be in plain clothes. 
There was a letter from the Prison C omm is sioners  that normally, 
when pro ducing a prisoner in court, uniform is worn by the 
escort, but in certain cases di scretion has been e x e r c i s e d  
and the escort has worn civilian clothes.
The first five questions put to Mr. Meikle by Mr. M a c D ermot,  
counsel for the plaintiff, were as follows: !(Q) Is your
full name Ale xander Barthwic k Meikle ? (A) Yes. (Q) Do you 
live at 96, Church Road, Stoneygate, Leicester? (A) Yes.
(Q) I think you are a qua li fi ed eng ineer? (A) Yes, I am.
(Q) After serving in the first world war, I think you became  
a prison governor for about five years? (A) Yes. (Q) You 
later entered the em pl oymen t of Prior Stokers, L i m i t e d ?
(A ) Y e s .
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Mr. MacDermot, though .he knew that Mr. Meikle had been brought 
from prison, did not know of the other matters. Mr. Elwes 
relied par ticu larly on the second question as to where Mr.
Meikle lived. Mr. MacDerm ot told us that this was in Mr. 
Meikle's proof. No doubt that remained Mr. Meikle 's home 
though he was te mp oraril y in prison. Mr. Mac De rmott told us 
that he consider ed the question whether he ought to inform 
the court that the witn ess  came from prison. He came to the 
conclus io n that it was not his duty so to do. He relied, I 
think with force, on the fact that there is no duty to inform 
the court of previous con victions. On the question  whether 
the court should be aware in all cases that a wi tness comes 
from prison, as it is when the escort is in uniform, I desire 
to express no opinion as it does not seem to me ne c e s s a r y  to. 
do so. I can see argu ments on both sides. The first qu esti on  
here is whether there was som et hing in the nature of a 'trick', 
though that is not a term of art and was not defined. Mr. 
Ma cD er mott was, I think, in a diffi cult position. Kn owing 
what he did, and having had more time than he had to co nsider  
what was the right course, I think that it would have been 
better if he had omitted to put the questions as to the 
witness' address and previous positi on as a prison governor, 
but I cannot regard what happen ed in this case as a 'trick'...
..Mr. Elwes' a r g u m e n t ....... must be that the court should be
more ready to grant a new trial if there has been s o m e t h i n g  
in the nature of a 'trick'. I can find no authority for this, 
and it seems to me wrong in principle. The que st ion w h e th er  
there should be further li ti gat ion must depend on the nature 
of the evidence and not on the c i r c u ms tances  which p r e v e n t e d
its being a v a i l a b l e . ........ it is perhaps u n n e ce ssary to point
out that, if there is a failure by those who owe a duty to the 
court to carry out that duty, there are steps which can be 
taken to deal with that matter. For reasons, which I hope I 
have suf fi ci en tly indicate d it seems to me, in itself, 
i rr ele van t to the question whether there should be a new 
trial." [160]
It was against this bac kgr ou nd that Lord Denning invo ked the
Cicero quote [161]:
"The duty of counsel to his client in a civil c a s e -  or in 
de fending an accused person - is to make every honest e n d e a v o u r  
to succeed. He must not, of course, knowingly m i s l e a d  the 
court, either on the facts or on the law, but, short of that, 
he may put such matters in ev idenc e or omit such ot hers as in 
his descre ti on  he thinks will be most to the adv a n t a g e  of his 
client. So also, when it comes to his speech, he must put 
every fair argument which appears to him to help his cl ient 
towards winning his case. The reason is because he is not the 
judge of the cr edibilit y of the wit ne ss es or of the v a l i d i t y  of 
the arguments. He is only the advoca te employed by the client 
to speak for him and present his case, and he must do it to the 
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best of his ability, without making himself the judge of its 
correctness, but only of its honesty. Cicero makes the 
d istin ct io n that it is the duty of the judge to pursue the 
truth, but it is perm it ted to an advocate to urge what is only
the sembl anc e of i t ......... Tried by these tests, I see nothing
improper in the conduct of the case for the plaintiff. There 
is no duty on counsel to tell the judge that a witness comes 
from prison to give evidence, any more than there is to tell 
the judge that he has had previous convictions. It is 
irre le va nt save as to his credit, and no counsel is bound to 
bring before the judge the d i sc re ditable  facts in the life of 
his witness; for they do not mean that he is not to be 
believed on this occasion. Counsel did indeed ask the witness 
if he lived at 96, Church Road, Stoneygate, Leicester, to 
which he answered 'Yes'. If that had been done knowing ly  to 
mislead the court, it would be improper. But after hearing 
Mr. M acD er mott I am quite satisfi ed that it was not done to 
mislead. The question was only asked so as to give the man's 
pe rma nent address, wit hout disc losing  the d i s c r e d i t a b l e  but 
irrelevant fact that he was at present in prison for a mot or in g 
offence." [162]
Singleton L.J., in his dis sent in g judgment, took a differe nt  
view:
"  In view of these co n s i d e r a t i o n s  I should have been
disposed to direct a new trial, but, as the other me mber s of 
the Court take a diffe rent view, I content myself by e x p r essing  
regret that a false picture of the witness Meikle was before 
the judge. It ought not to have been so." [163]
Meek - A chief inspector of police had been sued for damages 
for assault and false imp risonment. By the time of the trial 
however, he had been demoted to sergeant. The d e m ot io n was not, 
apparently, con nected with the assault charge but with a sep ar ate 
disci p l i n a r y  offence which, however, appears to have in volv ed  
the deception of a court. The demotion  was known to the 
de f e n da nt's counsel but not to the plaint if f or his co un sel or 
the trial court. the-'plaintiff lost his case but, upon the 
demotion coming to light, applied for a new trial. The facts 
which , for the purposes of analysis, it is again n e c e s s a r y  to 
recount in some detail, appear from the judgment of Ho lr oy d 
Pearce L . J . :
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"The def endant attended the trial not in uniform, but in plain 
clothes, whereas all the other police witnesses were in uniform. 
Thus there was no visible sign of the defen dan t's altered status 
He was cons tantl y addressed by his counsel as 'Mr.' and not by 
his rank of sergeant. Counsel tells us that he would so address 
a sergeant in the normal case. When the defendant entered the 
witness box, he was not asked his name and rank in the usual 
manner. No suspicions were aroused since no one had any reason 
to suspect. The p laint if f's counsel, however, and the judge 
frequently addressed the defendant, or referred to him, as 
'inspector' or 'chief inspector', and nothing was done to 
disabuse them. The def endant started his evidence with a 
brief summary of his career up to the time when he was chief 
inspector at Cannon Row police station, but no re fer ence was 
made to his reduc tion in rank. In c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  he was 
asked: 'You are a chief inspector, and you have been in the
force, you told us, since 1938? (A) Yes, that is true.'
That answer was a lie. Later: ' (Q ) You realise, as chief
inspector, the importance of the note being accurate? (A) The 
importance of it convey ing to me what I want to give in 
evidence.' He was asked further: 'Let us und er stand  this.
You are a chief inspector. How old are you? (A) I am forty-
six years of age.' And again: (Q) I am not asking' you whet her
you took part in the inquiries, but whether you as a re s p o n s i b l e
and senior adult man - never mind about you being a chief
inspector - had no anxiety about this case, no concern or 
interest? (A) No, I can only repeat I have nothing to fear.' 
The judge referred to the def endant as 'inspector' or 'chief 
inspector Fleming' many times in his summing-up to the jury.
It is clear that he re asonably co ns ide red that the d e f e n d a n t ' s  
rank and status were relevant on c r e d i b i l i t y i n  a case where 
there was oath against oath, and where there was a que st ion of 
the de fe nda nt' s conduct in the course of his d u t y ...... Nor was
the defe nda nt's counsel prepar ed to forgo the adva nt age to be 
derived from the status in the police force of his wi tn es s in 
general.... In his opening speech for the defence, counsel
stated that the jury had not yet had an op po rtunity  of 
liste nin g to persons against whom it was at times f a s h i on ab le 
to make wild hysterical allegations, but who could not have 
reached their pos itions unless they had shown to those who 
con tr olle d the M e t r o polita n Police a substantial degree of 
re spo nsibili ty. They were not conce rned here with some 
newcomer to the force who had only just finished his course, 
and was out in the street full of enthu si asm to arrest the 
first person he c o u l d .......
(In T o m b l i n q ) the failure to reveal was not a p r e m e d i a t e d  line 
of conduct. Nor was the con vi ction for a motorin g of fence so 
relevant on cre di bilit y as the demoti on o f a  chief in s p e c t o r  
(who is a party to the case) for an offence which c o n s i s t e d  in 
de cei ving a court of law as to the accurate facts r e l at in g to 
an arrest. There is no authority where the facts have been at 
all similar to those of the present case, but in my ju dgment  
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the principles on which we should act are clear.
Where a party delib er ately mislea ds the court in a material 
matter, and that de ception  has probably tipped the scales 
in his favour (or even, as I think, where it may reas onably 
have done so), it would be wrong to allow him to retain the 
judgment thus'u nfairl y procu r e d . . . I n  every case it must be 
a question of degree, weighin g one pri nciple against the other.
In this case it is clear that the judge and the jury were 
m is lea d on an important matter. I appreciate that it is very 
hard at times for the advocate to see his path clearly betw een 
failure in his duty to the court, and failure in his duty 
to his client. I accept that in the present case the dec ision 
to conceal the facts was not made lightly, but after anx ious 
considera tio n. But in my judgment the duty to the court 
was here un wa rrantably su bo r d i n a t e d  to the duty to the client....
It was argued that the defendant was justified in that a party 
need not reveal som ething to his discredit; but that does 
not mean that he can by implication falsely pretend (where 
it is a material matter) to a rank and status that are not 
his, and, when he knows that the court is so deluded, foster 
and confirm that delusion by answers such as the defend an t 
gave. Suqqestio falsi went hand in hand with suppres si o 
v e r i . . . . . . " [ 1 6 4 ]
The concurri ng judgment of Wilmer L.J. con cen trated, in the 
following passage, on di stin g u i s h i n g  T o m b l i n q :
"I think' that the exception al nature of the present case beco mes 
clear when regard is had to the features which d i s t i n g u i s h  
it from Tomblinq v Universal Bulb Co. Ltd. There the 
application was to adduce further evidence by way of cross- 
e xa mi nation of a witness for the plai ntiff  in resp ect  of 
matters going to his credit. True, he was an imp or ta nt 
witness, but failure to disclose his record was only of 
in cidental significance. But here we are conce rn ed with 
the evidence relating to the character of one of the part ies 
to the suit, and it is a case in which the cha ra ct er of the 
parties was of pec uliarly vital significance, so that failure 
to disclose the de fenda nt's record amounted in effect to 
pr esenting  the whole case on a false basis.
Next, the matter sought to be proved against the wi tness in 
To mbl ing's case was his con vi ction  for a wholly ir re l e v a n t  
offence, that is to say, a motoring offence. Here the ma tter 
sought to be proved against the defendant was an of fence 
involving not only the dece ption of a court of law, but also 
a question of police discipline, a matter which, I sh ould have 
thought, was of crucial importanc e having regard to the issues 
to be determined. Lastly, in Tomblin g's  case what was done 
was not done knowingly to deceive the court; see per Dennin g 
L.J. Had it been done knowingly, Denn ing L.J. would have 
regarded it as improper; and it is to be inferred that he 
would /
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would have con curred in the view of Singleton L.J. that a 
new trial should have been directed.
In the present case there is no doubt that the course taken, 
which had the effect of deceiving the court, was taken 
del ibe rately. Counsel for the defendant has so informed 
us with complete candour. I accept his assur anc e that the 
decision was not taken l i g h t l y , but after careful consideration, 
and in the belief that the course taken was proper in all the 
circums tan ces. But for my part I am in no doubt that it was 
a wrong decision. I would venture to follow the example of 
Sing let on L.J. in Tomblin g's  case in quoting from Lord 
Ma cmi llan on 'The Ethics of Advocacy'. This is what Lord 
Ma cmi llan said: 'In the discharge  of his office the advocate
has a duty to his client, a duty to his opponent, a duty to 
the court, a duty to the state and a duty to himself. ' It 
seems to me that the decision which was taken involv ed 
ins uff icie nt  regard being paid to the duty owed to the court 
and to the plaintiff and his a d v i s e r s .......... [165]
3.5.4 Analysis of Tomblinq and Meek
The question to which both these cases were ad dresse d was 
wh ether the circ um stances  in each case were such as to warr ant 
a new trial. They were not concerned per se with what may 
co nstitute  improper conduct by counsel. But in the light of 
the jud gments in each case, it is not always easy to sep ar ate 
these issues. However, in T o m b l i n q , Somervell L.J. cl early 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d :
"  if there is a failure by those who owe a duty to the
court to carry out that duty-, there are steps which can be
taken to deal with that m a t t e r  .it seems to me, in itself,
i rr ele van t to the question whether there should be a new 
trial." [166]
Pr esumabl y "steps which can be taken" means d i s c i p l i n a r y  action. 
However, as we have seen, what mattered, in his view, was "the 
nature of the evidence" and not "the c irc um stances  which preven te  
its being available".
The other judges do not so clearly di stinguish  but, taki n g  their 
j u d g m e n t s /
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judgments as a whole, what seems to emerge as the di stinctiv e 
feature of improper conduct in this context is, in Lord 
Denning's  words in T o m b l i n q , for counsel "knowingly to mislead" 
the court. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e  form of the question put by the 
p la in tiff's  counsel to wit ness Meikle: "Do you live at.....", 
he did not consider that this was done to mislead, but if it had 
been done "knowingly" to mislead, it would have been "improper".
This criterion of improper conduct by counsel seems also to be 
reflec ted  in the judgments in M e e k . There, Wilmer L.J. 
di s t i ng ui shed between the two cases: "....in Tom bl in g's case
what was done was not done kno wingly to deceive the court", 
whereas: "In the present case there is no doubt that the 
course taken, which had the effect of deceiving the court, 
was taken de liberate ly." Counsel's decision so to do "involv ed 
insu ff ic ient regard being paid to the duty owed to the court...".
Likewise, Holroyd Pearce L.J. co nsidered that while, in T o m b l i n q , 
the failure to reveal "was not a p r em ed itated  line of conduct", 
Meek was a case in which "a party deliberat el y misl ea ds the 
court in a material matter" and that the advo ca te's duty to the 
court had been "u nw arrantably s ubord in ated to the duty to the 
client..."
However, in both cases also, the right of counsel to sup pr ess 
facts adverse to his client's case was not - per se - 
challenged, and, indeed, was s pecif ic ally defended by Lord 
Denni ng in Tomblinq where he says that, while counsel must not 
knowingly mislead: ".....short of that, he may put such matter s
in evidence or omit such others as in his disc ret ion he thinks 
will /
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will be most to the ad vantage of his client". But given that, 
in both cases, the counsel in question freely admitted that 
they had delibera te ly decided to keep the court in ignor ance 
of the facts at issue - namely, in T o m b l i n q , that the witness 
Meikle was in prison and, in M e e k , that the defendant had 
been demo ted - the question arises: what was per cei ve d as
di s t i n g u i s h i n g  deliberate no n - d i s c l o s u r e  from "knowingl y 
m i s l e adin g" ?
On this point, the o b s e rvation s of Holroyd Pearce L.J. in Meek 
are, perhaps, the most revealing:
"It was argued that the defendant  was justified in that a 
party need not reveal something  to his discredit; but 
that does not mean that he can by implication falsely pretend 
(where it is a materi al matter) to a rank and status that 
are not his, and, when he knows that the court is so deluded, 
foster and confirm that delusion  by answers such as the
de fendant gave. Suq qestio falsi went hand in hand with 
sup pr es sio v e r i .......... "
These remarks would seem to suggest that the dividi ng line 
between perm is sible  n o n - d i s c l o s u r e  and no n - p e r m i s s i b l e  
"misleading" is perceived to be the point at which the pass ive 
becomes the active - where the "suppressi o veri o b j ec ti ve of 
counsel, achieved by a purely passive - albeit, d e l i b e r a t e  - 
omission to reveal, merges into or is allied, with a p o s itive  
c o n t r ivan ce  to suggest a falsehood.
In T o m b l i n q , it was considered  - in the majori ty view - that 
this dividing line had not been crossed; in M e e k , that it had. 
In T o m b l i n q , the issue of pr opriety of conduct involv ed 
co n s i d e r a t i o n  of two factors - the precise form of the q u e st ion 
to and answer from the wit ness Meikle in regard to his place 
of residence and the fact that his prison escort - contrary, 
a p p a r e n t l y , /
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apparently, to normal practice - was in plain clothes. As for 
the latter factor, the court, it appears, was satis fied that 
the civilian apparel of the escort had not been contrived  by 
the pla inti ff 's advisers or by the witness himself in order to 
deceive. As for the place of residence, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the
ambigu ity  of the question "Do you live a t  ", this, as has
been said, was, in Lord De nning's opinion, merely designed to 
give the man's permanent address "without disclosin g the 
discred it ab le but irrelevant fact" that he was in prison. In 
other words, in the majority view at any rate, counsel had 
not stepped beyond the perm issib le  bounds of mere n o n - d i s c l o s u r e  
by also contriving to suggest a falsehood. The dissent in g 
judge, Sin gleton L.J., took a dif ferent view - r e g r et ting that 
"a false picture of the witness Meikle was before the judge".
In M e e k , however, the suggestio falsi element was, in the 
court's view, all to apparent. The court's re as oning here, it 
would seem, was that it was not merely a matter of counsel 's  
exerc isi ng his right not to reveal something to his cl ient's 
discredit - namely, the fact of his demotion in police rank - 
but that he had contrived by various means to sugg est - by 
im pl ica tio n at least - that the defendant retained the rank 
which he had lost. These means included the fact that the 
defend ant  (in plain clothes, unlike the other police w it ne sses) 
was addressed by counsel by the amb iguous "Mr."; that, when 
he entered the witness box, he was not asked his name and 
rank in the usual manner; that although frequen tly add r e s s e d  
by opposing counsel and by the judge as "inspector" or "chief 
inspector", nothing was said to disabuse them; and that his 
c o u n s e l , /
counsel, in his opening speech, sought to derive an adv antage 
from his client's senior rank as former chief inspector.
It may be surmised that each of these factors, taken by itself, 
might not, perhaps, have been seen as conclus ive  on the issue 
of im pro priety of conduct. The fact, for example, that the 
defen dan t chose to appear in plain clothes could not, in itself, 
be said to be indi cat ive of devi ousnes s - and, moreover, was 
not a matter within his c o u n s e l ' s c o n t r o l . The fact that he 
was ad dressed as "Mr." was not, it might reaso nably be argued, 
any more suspect in intent than the ambiguous "Do you live 
at.....?" put by counsel in T o m b l i n q ; and (on the view that 
counsel had no duty g r at ui tously to divulge the fact of his 
client's demotion), it may even, perhaps, be q u e s tio ne d whether 
he had a duty to disabuse his opponent and the judge of their 
a ss ump tio n that he still held his former rank. Finally, the 
remarks by defendan t's counsel in his opening speech, which 
Holroyd Pearce L.J. also criticised, referred to all the 
police witnesses and not only to his client and, in any case, 
were not, as regards degree of Responsi bility* nece s s a r i l y  
ina pprop ri at e even to the lower rank of sergeant.
These c o ns id eratio ns  may suggest that it may not have been any 
of these factors, taken individually, but their cum u l a t i v e  
effect, that may have been the decidi ng influ ence in the 
court's j u d g m e n t .
A major differenc e between the two cases was, of course, the 
relative m ateria li ty of the info rm ation of which the lower 
court had, in each case, been deprived. As was pointe d out
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in the judgments, the fact, in T o m b l i n q , that the witness 
Meikle was in prison for a motoring offence was, in the words 
of Wilmer L.J. in M e e k , "only of incidental signific an ce" to 
the case, whereas, in Meek the informa tion in que stion related 
to the cha racter of the de fendant in a case in which the 
character of the parties "was of peculiarly vital signific ance". 
Clearly, the s ignif ic ance to the issue before the court of the 
no n - d is closed inform ation must be a major factor in deciding 
whether or not the circ um s t a n c e s  warrant a new trial. What is 
not so clear is the extent to which the issue of p r o f e s s i o n a l  
misc on du ct per se was seen in both cases as being c ontin ge nt 
upon this question of mat eriality.
In T o m b l i n q , Lord Denning, although he con sid ered the 
"discre dit able"  fact that the witness was in prison to be 
irrelevant, nev ert he less expressed the view that if the 
particular  form in which the question as to his place of 
residence had been put, had been adopted by counsel in order 
"knowingly to mislead", then that "would be improper". This 
seems to be saying that in regard to que stions c o n c e r n i n g  
p ro fe ssiona ol  misco nduct in the context of delibe ra te 
misl ea di ng of the court, the m a t e r ia lity of the ma tt er on which 
the court has been mis lead is itself irrelevant.
On the other hand, in M e e k , Holroyd Pearce L.J. linke d his 
cr iti cism of the "suggestio falsi" conduct to s i t u a t i o n s  where 
"it is a material matter" and Wilmer L.J. con s i d e r e d  that 
because, in that case, the matter in question was of vital 
signif i c a n c e , /
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si gni ficance, "failure to disclose the de fendant 's record 
amounted in effect to pr esenting the whole case on a false 
basis." Such remarks might be seen as suggestin g that the 
dividing line between deliberate, but permissible, no n-disclosur e 
and deliberate, non -p ermis si ble, "misleading" is dete rmined not 
only by the point at which su ppressio veri becomes suqq estio 
f a l s i , but also by the m a t e ri al ity of the subject matter.
However, the remarks, in this context, of Lord Denn ing in 
Tomblinq and of the judges in Meek may not, necess arily, be 
mu tua lly inconsistent. What would seem to emerge from their 
remarks is that where counsel goes beyond the ex erc ise of his 
le git imate right not to reveal in for mation p r e j u dicial  to his 
client and seeks, actively, to suggest a falsehood, he acts 
im pro perly irresp ec tive of the mate ri ality of the p a r t i c u l a r  
falsehood; but in situ ations where the i nf ormatio n in question 
is of vital significance, even mere failure to disclo se  may - 
in certain sit uations such as those in Meek - be per c e i v e d  by 
the courts as amounting, ipso f a c t o , to misleading. In Meek, 
it was, perhaps, defe ndant' s counsel's misf ortun e to be caught 
up in a situation in which - given the form of the verbal 
exchanges, not only between him and his client but among all 
the parties involved, inclu ding the judge - it was difficult, 
if not impossible, however carefully contriv ed his questions, 
to exercise his right, in deference to his duty to his client, 
to avoid disclosure of his client's demotion wi th out  also 
expos ing  himself to the ac cu satio n of mislea di ng the court.
I n /
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In summary, this ex pl oration  of the cir cums tance s and 
c on t r a s t i n g  decisions in these two cases would seem to invite 
the following conclusions:
(1) Counsel has'the right - in civil and (as defence counsel) 
in criminal cases - to exclude from evidence i n f o r matio n 
which he considers to be pr ejudicial to his client.
(2) He must not, however, actually contrive, directly or by 
implication, to suggest a falsehood, that is, " knowin gl y 
mislead" .
(3) It is p r o f e s sio na lly improper to so mislead the court 
irrespec ti ve of the m a t e r iality  of the matter in question.
(4) Where the info rma tion in question is of vital s i g n i f i c a n c e  
to the issue before the court, there may arise ce rta in
si tu ations in which no n - d i s c l o s u r e  may be seen as
amounting to misleading.
3.3.3 - "With holding" and "Conce aling" - the Moral Issues
In the light of the above analysis of Tomblinq and Meek, two 
questions arise and will now be considered.
First, can the judgments in either of these cases be seen to
reflect re co gnitio n of the alleged ethical distinctio n,  re f e r r e d  
to supra [167], between "wi thh oldin g"  and "c o n c e a l i n g " ?  Second, 
whether or not they can, does the line which app ears to have
been drawn in these cases bet ween proper and improper
p r ofes si onal conduct have any validity in moral terms?
As for the first of these questions, in neither case is there
any explicit use of these terms as denoting, res pective ly ,
permissi ble
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permissib le  and n o n - p e r m i s s i b l e  conduct by counsel. In the 
judgments as cited, "withholding " is not used at all. "Conceal" 
is used once - admitt edly in a critical context - in the course 
of the remarks of Holroyd Pearce L.J. regarding the decisi on of 
counsel for the defen dant in Meek "to conceal the facts" [168]. 
But this, in itself, is not con clusi ve as to whether the courts 
recognise d these terms as de finitive of the d is ti nction  between 
proper and improper profess io nal conduct. In order to deter mine 
whether such a dis tinc ti on may be inferred from the judgme nts 
cited, we must look beyond literal usage and conside r the 
concepts which these terms may be said to convey.
"Withhold" has, of course, other con not ation s with which we are 
not here concerned: such as to disall ow or restrain. We are
here using it in the sense of keeping back or not rev eal in g 
certain inform ati on in co mmu n i c a t i n g  with another party. In 
this context, it may be said that in one sense, in normal 
usage, the words "withholdin g" and "concealing" have dif fe rent 
shades of meaning - reflecting, res pectively, passive and active 
conduct. But this may be a too simplis tic disti nction; for 
the concept of w it hholdin g may not be entirely passive, nor 
that of co nc ealing entirely active. Withholding, for example, 
does not have the same nuance as, say, a mere failure to 
mention. This latter expressio n can normally be said to be 
wholly passive. It does not, necessarily, have any moti vat ion. 
It may be oc ca sioned by mere inadvertanee, absent mind edn ess, 
or a belief that the thing not ment ioned is not r e l evant to the 
matter in hand. W ithho ld ing information, on the other hand, 
implies /
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implies a deliberat e decision to keep it.back. If I withhold 
information from someone, it implies that I do so because, for 
whatever reason, I do not wish that person to have that 
information. I achieve this objective by silence - but it is 
a mo tiv ated silence. To "conceal", by contrast, may be used 
to indicate active conduct - inf erring not only a desire to 
keep back inform ation from someone, but an attempt by some 
active means - suggestion, distortion, even actual lying - to 
prevent the informat ion from reaching that someone. But the 
concept of conceal ing  does not, necessarily, have these active 
con not ations: for to remain del iber ately silent about
something is also to "conceal" it. In this sense, to wit hh old 
is also to conceal. The common factor in both is the desire 
to "hide" or "keep secret".
This concl usion as to the essential identity of these con cep ts
would seem to find support, by impl ication at least, in the
views of Sissela Bok in her book, "Secrets" [169] which, as
she says in her Introduction, she wrote as a sequel to her
book on "lying" [170] and as a conti nu ation of:
"the explora tion of concre te moral issues begun in my book
'Lying'  The central theme of the two books - lying and
secrecy - intertwine and overlap. Lies are part of the 
arsenal used to guard and invade s e c r e c y ......."
In dealing with the def init io n of "secrecy", she w r i te s:
"  anything can be kept secret so long as it is kept
intenti on ally hidden, set apart in the mind of its keeper
as requiri ng c o n c e a l m e n t .......To keep a secret from s o m e o n e , '
then, is to block inf or ma tion about it or evi dence of it
from reaching that p e r s o n ..... and to do so i n t e n t i o n a l l y  to
prevent him from learnin g it. The word 'secrecy' refers to 
the resultant c o n c e a l m e n t .... A c c o r d i n g l y , I shall take 
c on ce alment or hiding, to be the defining trait of secrecy.. 
 "[171]
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In support of this view, she quotes the definition of secrecy 
in Dr. Johnson's D ictio na ry as including "something st ud iousl y 
hidden" [172]
It would seem to follow, therefore, that since, to d el iberat el y 
withhold inform ation is to hide it - and, indeed, to " s t u d i o u s l y 1 
hide it - it must, in Bok's view, be the same as int en tional 
concealm ent - the common element in both being the desire to 
"keep secret".
Bok also, it may be noted, includes silence - the defi ni tive 
feature of "withho lding" - as one of the aspects of secrecy 
and also, therefore, of inte ntion al  "conce alment" [173].
On this view, the concept s of wi thholdi ng  and c o n c ea ling 
would not seem to be app ro pr iate for descri bing the criteria  
of perm issib le  and n o n - p e r m i s s i b l e  professioa l conduct as 
re fle cted in the judgments in Meek and T o m b l i n q . The more 
accurate di stincti on would appear to be between pas siv e and 
active conduct - or, in terms of the exp res si ons used by 
Holroyd Pearce L.J. in M e e k , between sup press io veri alone 
and suppress io veri allied to su qqest io (or, more r e p r e h e n s i b l y , 
e x p r e s s i o ) f a l s i . Put another way, it may be said that, in the 
law's perc eptio n of hono urable professio na l conduct in this 
context, what matters is not the supp re ssion of truth per s e , 
but the means adopted to achieve it.
The Moral Issue - However, the dist in ction between p e r m i s s i b l e  
and no n- pe r m i s s i b l e  conduct by counsel, in w h a te ve r way it may 
be defined pre cisely in legal terms, invites the qu e s t i o n  posed 
supra [174]: is it sensible and des irable to d i s t i n g u i s h  betweei
active /
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active and passive conduct if both result in the court getting 
a false impression ? Can a line be d r a w n -  in moral terms - 
between suppre ssio veri and suqqestio or expressio f a l s i ? Can 
the latter be des cribed as del ibera te ly mi sleadin g while the 
former cannot? If an advocate wishes to keep a court in 
ignorance of a fact which is relevant - and, possibly, crucial - 
to the cause which it is trying, does it matter moral ly whether 
this is achieved by mere silence or by some active means - even 
a lie?
In the light of our disc us sion regarding the general concept of 
deception, the answer would appear to be that it does not matter; 
that all that does matter is the intent to deceive - to make 
someone (in this context, the court) believe what the advocate 
himself knows not to be true; and that, therefore, the 
particular  form which the de cep tio n may take is irre l e v a n t  in 
moral terms.
But if this view is taken, it would seem to put such as Lord 
Denning in a di ff icult y for while, as has already been said, 
he claims that the advocate 's highest allegia nce is to the 
"cause of truth and justice" [173], he also concedes, as we 
have seen in T o m b l i n q , the ad vo cat e's right to put in or omit 
evidenc e according to his perce pt ion of his clien t' s a d v a n t a g e  - 
a right which, in the same sentence, he d i s t i n g u i s h e s  from 
knowin gly  misleading. It may be argued in Lord D e n n i n g ' s  
defence that later in the same passage he makes the point that 
what the pl ain tiff's counsel in Tomblinq did not d i s c l o s e  was, 
in any event, irrelevant. But, in moral principle, that point 
in itself would also seem to be irr ele vant for, as we have 
d i s c u s s e d , /
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discussed, what mat ters in dec eption is the intent and 
perc ep tion of the deceiver. The court may have co nsider ed  the 
non-di s c l o s e d  fact irrelevant, but if the advocate hi ms elf  had 
also so considered it, would he have been at pains to with hold 
i t ?
By an intere sting coincidence, a similar point which seems to
run counter to Lord Denni ng 's reasoning on this issue was made
by Holroyd Pearce L.J. in M e e k . In that case, it was,
apparentl y argued by counsel for the defendant that the
concealme nt  of the fact of his client's demotion in police
rank did not have any "substant ial result" because the greater
part of the defence depende d on other witnesses than the
defendant. This rea sonin g was repu diated by the judge:
"  since the de fendant and his advisers thought fit to
take so serious a step, they must, in the light of their 
own intimate knowle dge of their case, have re ga rded the 
concealm en t as being of o v e r w he lm ing impor tance to their 
s u c c e s s  . . " [ 1 7 6 ]
But this argument admits of at least one q u a l i f i c a t i o n  which 
can, perhaps, more validly be cited in Lord De n n i n g ' s  defence. 
There may be some situ at ions in which an advocate may decide 
to withhold a fact from the court, not because he be l i e v e s  
that it is relevant to his client's case but because, n o t w i t h ­
standi ng its irrelevance, he thinks it may, ne vert h e l e s s ,  
prejudice a judge or jury against his client - and T o m blinq  
may well be a case in point.
However, such an argume nt for moral justi f i c a t i o n  for n o n ­
disc lo su re would apply only in the pa rticular s i t u a t i o n  cited 
and /
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and does not invalid ate  the conclusion  to which our discussion 
seems to point: that the di st inction which, in c ir cumsta nc es
such as those of Tomblinq and M e e k , the law appears to draw 
between permissi ble and non- pe r m i s s i b l e  conduct by counsel - 
a di st inction motivated, presumably, by co nsid e r a t i o n s  of 
justice and ethical pr opriety - is difficult to reconci le with 
basic moral principle.
This may be seen as in dicative of the ethical i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  
of the adv ersarial system. For reasons which have earlier been 
mentioned, and will later be developed, such i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  
are not ne cessari ly to be taken as conde mning the system but 
they do give rise to the intrinsic  dif ficu lties of the ethical 
issues we have been disc ussing and with which judges have to 
grapple in attempt ing to determine and j u s t i f y t h e  limits of 
per mi ss ible conduct by advocates.
These di ffi culti es - not only for judges but more so, probably, 
for advocates - are not made easier by imposing upon the 
advocate a paramount duty to "truth and justice" while, at 
the same time, conceding  his right in pursuit of his duty to 
do his best for his client, to urge, not the truth, but only 
the "semblance" of it [177].
3.5.6' - Summary
In the light of this dis cussi on  of the subject of n o n ­
di sclosure  of fact, the following main points would seem to 
emerge:
(1) In terms of pro fessio na l e t h i c s , t h e  law, in s i t u a t i o n s
such as those in Tomblinq and M e e k , rec ogn is es a
d ist inction  between passive and active conduct by 
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counsel - between the w i t h h olding  of truth which is 
seen as generally p erm is sible in the interests of the 
client, and sug ge sting  or expressing a known false hood 
which is seen as a delibe rate misleading  of the court 
and, therefore, not permissible.
(2) Such a disti nction seems difficult to rec oncile with 
basic moral principle  because both types of conduct 
have the same e n d -  dec eption - and only differ as 
t o m e a n s .
(3) The resultant i n cons is tency between perceived 
pr ofe ss ional stand ard s of ethical conduct and moral 
prin cip le is ind icative of the ethical tensions in 
the advers arial system and gives rise to problems  
such as those enc ou ntered  by judges and ad vo cates in 
the cases of Tomblinq and M e e k .
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3.6 - Cross-Examination Tactics
3.6.1 - Nature and Purpose
No t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the strict ures ex pressed against "suqq es tio f a l s i " 
in M e e k , active concealment of known truth and false sugge stion 
can take many forms which may be seen as acc ept able - or, at any 
rate, frequently employed - tactics in advocacy within the 
adversarial system. Pre -emin en t among such tactics are the 
techniques of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n .
Jerome Frank, in the course of his criticism of what he pe rc eived 
as the abuses of the ad ve rsarial system, remarked on the ten dency  
of some of those who indulge i n " d e p l o r a b l e  exc essive praise" of 
the courts to quote Cicero - that "fascinating Roman" who "kept 
his noble pri ncipl es in one pocket and his actual lawyer's 
practices in another" [178], This comment on Cicero may find 
support in one of his observations: "When you have no basis for
an argument, abuse the pla intiff" [179]. To some, this cynical 
exhortati on may seem offensive. To others - and not only lawyers' 
critics - it may be accepted as a not too u n r e a sonab le  summ i n g - u p  
of some aspects of the normal strate gy and techni ques of cross- 
examination.
The term "cro ss -examin at ion" is the name given to that stage in 
a trial process when an advocate is afforded and takes the 
opportu ni ty to challenge the testi mon y of a witness who has given 
evidenc e for the other side. On the assumptio n that the p r e ­
eminent objective of the ad ve rsarial trial process is, indeed, 
to elicit truth, the purpose and tactics of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  
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would seem clear enough: to elicit from the witness facts which
counsel or his client may believe that the witness, in his main 
examination, has, either d e liber at ely or otherwise, omitted, 
evaded, m i s r e p res en ted or distort ed - and, perhaps, to bring out 
new facts which were not put to the witness in his main 
ex am in ati on but which, in the cr os s-e x a m i n e r ' s  perception, are 
relevant to the case. Such, one would suppose, would be the 
purpose, at any rate, of a non -partis an  inq uisitor such as a 
judge.
But, as has been said, in the ad versa rial process, the function of 
elici tin g evidence is not that of the judge but of the c on te nding 
advocates whose objec tiv e is to win the verdict of the judge or 
jury. Their pro fess ional  function* indeed, their p r o f e s s i o n a l  
obligation, is to do so - not by all means, fair or foul - b u t  by 
the exercise of their forensic skills and i n t e r rogatio n t e c h nique s 
in a manner according with the rules of evidence and pr ocedur e 
and within the limits of p erm is sible ethical conduct so far as 
such can be ascert ained from the p r on ounceme nt s of p r o f e s s i o n a l  
bodies and other authorities.
It is the purpose of this part of our inquiry to discuss these 
limits, their adequacy as useful guides, the extent to which 
they may or may not be observed in practice - and the extent to 
which pr ofessional precept and practi ce may be judged to be in 
accord with ethical principle.
3.6.2 - Criti cism of C r o s s - E x a m i n a t i o n  Techniques
Whatever the ethical gui delines  and to whatever extent they may or 
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may not be observed, it is probab ly true that there are few 
features of the ad vo cat e's function which attract greater 
ho sti li ty and cynicism than his perceived treatment of adverse 
witnesses. In this context, the image of the lawyer in the eyes 
of many may not be all that far removed from that of Dickens' 
Sergean t Buzfuz in "Pickwick Papers". Another novelist, Trollope, 
as quoted by Frank, is more directly scathing:
"One would naturally imagine that an undisturbed thread of clear 
evidenc e would be best obtained from a man whose pos it io n was 
made easy and whose mind was not harassed; but this is not the 
fact; to turn a wit ness to good account, he must be ba dgered 
this way and that till he is nearly mad; he must be made a 
la ughi n g - s t o c k  for the court; his very truths must be turned 
into falsehoods, so that he may be falsely shamed; he must 
be accused of all manner of villainy, threatened with all 
manner of punishment; he must be made to feel that he has no 
friend near him, that the world is all against him; he must be 
co nf ound ed  till he forget his right hand from his left, till 
his mind be turned into chaos, and his heart into water; and 
then let him give his evidence. What will fall from his lips 
when in this wretched collapse must be of special value, for the 
best talents of practise d forensic heroes are daily used to 
bring it about; and no member of the Humane Society i n t e r f e r e s  
to protect the wretch. Some sorts of torture are, as it were, 
tacitly allowed even among humane people. Eels are sk in ned  
alive, and witne sses are sacrificed, and no one's blood curd les 
at the sight, no soft heart is sickened at the cru el ty ." [180]
While conce din g that Tr ollope's stricture s are som ewhat "overd ra wn"
Frank hi mse lf expresses candid critic is m of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n
tactics [181]. It will be recall ed from our earlier d i s c u s s i o n
that he did not attack the pri ncipl e of the a d v e rsaria l sy st em as
such but con sidered that we had allowed the "fighting" sp irit in
that system to become excessive. The most obvious ex am pl e of
this, he writes, is in the handling of witnesses:
"Suppose a trial were fundame nt ally a truth-inqui ry. Then, 
r ec og nising  the inherent f a l l i bi lities  of witnesses, we wou ld 
do all we could to remove the causes of their errors when 
testifying. Re cogni sing also the imp ortan ce of witnesses' 
dem eanour as clues to their reliability, we would do our best 
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to make sure that they testify in circum stances  most condu cive 
to a revealing obs erv at ion of that demeanour by the trial judge 
or jury. In our con te nt ious trial practice, we do almost the 
exact opposite." [181]
Frank, as a widely e xp erience d senior judge, was, of course, well 
ac qu ainted with the wiles and stra tegems of court lawyers but 
what he forcefully brings out is not only the dubious and 
ag gr essive tactics often employed to intimidate and confuse 
wi tne sses but the fact that such tactics, far from being condemned, 
are often encouraged and, indeed, advocated, by those regarde d as- 
reputable textbook authors:
"What is the role of the lawyers in bringing the ev idence before 
the trial court? As you may learn by reading any one of a 
dozen or more handbooks on how to try a law-suit, an ex pe r i e n c e d  
lawyer uses all sorts of stra tegems to minimise the effect on 
the judge or jury of testi mon y d i sa dvantag eo us to his client, 
even when the lawyer has no doubt of the accuracy and honesty of 
that testimony. The lawyer considers  it his duty to create a 
false impression, if he can, of any witness who gives such 
testimony. If such a witness happens to be timid, f righte ne d 
by the unf amil iarity of c o u r t- room ways, the lawyer, in his 
cross-e xam inati on, plays on that weakness, in order to confuse 
the wit ness and make it appear that he is co ncealing s i g n i f i c a n t  
facts. Longenecker, in his book 'Hints on the Trial of a L a w ­
suit' (a book endorsed by the great Wigmore), in writi ng of the 
'truthful, h o n e s t , o v e r - c a u t i o u s ' witness, tells how 'a skilful 
advocate by a rapid c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  may ruin the te s t i m o n y  of 
such a witness'. The author does not even hint any d i s a p p r o v a l  
of that accomplishment. L o n g e n e c k e r 's and other simila r books 
recommend that a lawyer try to prod an irritable but honest 
'adverse' witness into disp laying his undesira ble c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
in their most unp leasant form, in order to discredit him with 
the judge or j u r y ......." [ 1 8 2 ]
It will be noted that in this pas sage Frank refers to the "honest 
adverse" witness. The situa tion which arises when a lawyer knows 
that the witness he is c r o s s - e x a m i n i n g  is telling the truth raises 
particular issues which will later be dealt with, but, for the 
moment, we are dealing with aggressi ve c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  as such.
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Frank proceeds to give specific examples of st ra tegems which are 
designed, not to elicit, but to conceal the truth - stra tagems 
recommend ed by textbook writers and with which any observer of 
trial pr oc eedings will be familiar: as, for example, cutting
short an adverse witness in order to deny him the o p p o r tunit y 
of explai ning an apparent inconsistency:
"'When', writes Tracy, cou nse ling trial lawyers, in a much 
praised book, 'by your cro ss-ex am ination , you have caught 
the witness in an inconsistency, the next question that will 
immediat ely come to your lips is, Now, let's hear you explain,...
..Don't ask it, for he may explain and, if he does, your point
will have been lost....' Tracy adds, 'Be careful in your 
questions on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  not to open a door that you 
have every reason to wish kept closed'. That is, don't let 
in any reliable evidence, hurtful to your side, which would 
help the trial court to arrive at the truth." [183]
He also quotes Sir William Eggleston:
"The most painful thing for an experien ced p r a c t i t i o n e r . . .  is
to hear a junior counsel lab or iousl y bring out in cross- 
examinat io n of a witness all the truth which the co unsel  who 
called him could not bring out and which it was the jun io r's 
duty as an advocate to conceal." [184]
Frank concludes this section of his book as follows:
"These, and other like techniques, you will find u n a s h a m e d l y  
described in the many manuals on trial tactics wri tt en by 
and for eminently reput abl e trial lawyers. The pu rp ose  of 
these tactics - often eff ective - is to prevent the trial 
judge or jury from correctly eva luati ng  the t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  
of wi tne sses and to shut out evidence the trial court ought 
to receive in order to app roxim at e the truth.
In short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning the fight,
not at aiding the court to discover the facts. He does not
want the trial court to reach a sound educated guess, if it
is likely to be contrary to his client's interests. Our
present trial method is thus the equival ent of t h r owin g pepper
in the eyes of a surgeon when he is perf orming an o p e r a t i o n ."[185.
3.6.3 - The Orthodox Prof essiona l Attitude
Frank's severe criticism of the nature and purpose of cross- 
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examination, as commonly p r a c t i s e d , will doubtless be approved 
by many outwith the legal profession. His views may also, 
indeed, be shared, pr iva tel y at least, by many within the 
profession. Given, however, that they would appear to reject 
the whole concept of such a major feature of the adve rs arial 
system, they are unlikely, in their more extreme form at any 
rate, to be favourably received by more co nventional p r o f e ssional  
opinion. We must here consider, however, how p r o f e ssi on al 
orthod oxy  itself views cross -e xaminat io n; what is the p e r s pective  
of prof essio na l organ isations,  the courts, or other au t h o r i t a t i v e  
bodies?
As for pro fess ional  organ isa tions, it may be observe d that 
although Frank cites the views of "eminently reputable" trial 
lawyers, he does not refer to any guidance on the subj ect by any 
such organisati ons. This, perhaps, is not surp ri sing for, 
no twit h s t a n d i n g  the central importa nce to the a d v e rsaria l system 
of the cros s - e x a m i n a t i o n  process and the cr iticism and host il ity 
which it frequently attracts, one has to look hard for any advice 
in pro fess io nal edicts or guides in regard to its use or abuse.
On the question of intimation of witnesses, it would appear^ that, 
in America, evidence rules place an obligat ion on trial judges 
to protect witnesses against hara ssment  or undue e m b a r r a s s m e n t  [18< 
Within the United Kingdom, the English Bar Code, as we have noted 
[187], contains a provision against insulting w i t n es ses and the 
Scottish Advocates' Guide provides:
"In the examina tion of witnesses, and pa rticuarl y in the cross- 
exam in at ion of ho stile witnesses, an advocate must r e m ember 
that the law places him in a p ri vi leged positi on which he should 
not abuse - for example, by b u l l y ing.o r insulting b e h a v i o u r  or 
by making offensive or personal remarks." [188]
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However, apart from these two references, the pro fess ional 
codes, within the United Kingdom at any rate, appear to be 
gener all y silent about the ethics of cross- e x a m i n a t i o n  tactics; 
in particular, there does not appear to be any positiv e advice 
as to the importance of putting timid or frightened witness es  at 
their ease in order to facilitate coherent testimony.
In defence of the advocate, it is probably true that in ti m i d a t i o n  
or bullying of witnesses  - at least in anything like the extreme 
form depicted by Trollope - is, in the United King dom at any rate, 
probably the exception rather than the rule. Apart from the 
o f fens iv en ess of such conduct, the astute cr o s s - e x a m i n e r  may 
often find it less effective than the polite, low-key, or even 
os tensibly  flattering approach. It may also be added that, 
faced with a perverse, evasive, and, in the c r o s s - e x a m i n e r ' s  
perception, untruthful witness, a measure of i n t i m i d a t i o n  may, 
on occasion, be justified.
On the hypo thesis that the purpose of ex am ination and cross- 
exa mi na tion i s , i n  theory at least, to elicit truthf ul tes timony, 
of even greater significance, perhaps, is the apparent absence 
of pro fe ss ional guide- lines on the ethics of those tactics, 
c ri tic ise d by Frank, which seem clearly designed to fr ustrat e 
it. Some clues, however, as to the attitude of p r o f e s s i o n a l  
au th orit ie s to some of these tactics may be found in other 
sources. While the sources here cited refer to the s i t u a t i o n  
in Scotland, the attitudes they reflect may pr oba bly be taken as 
ind ica tive of the general official approach in a d v e r s a r i a l  
countries.
In 1978 the Scottish Law Comm is sion req uested Sh er if f I.D. MacPhaiJ 
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to write a research paper with a view to c o n s i deratio n by the
Co mmission  of possible changes to the law of eviden ce in Scotland.
In 1987 Sheriff MacPhail publish ed a revised version of his Paper
which inc orpo rated the actual changes made to the law fol lowing
the p ub li catio n of his original Paper by the C om mi ssion in 1979 -
and the Sheriff's comments thereon. Of particul ar inte rest for
our purposes is the section in the Revised Paper headed: "Where
Apparent In co nsistency in Witn ess's Evidence". In his original
Paper Sheriff MacPhail had quoted from Professor Walker:
"Opinions have differed as to the proper course for the cross- 
examiner when there is an apparent in co nsistency in the eviden ce 
of the witness. Is he entitl ed to leave the i n c o n s i s t e n c y  and 
found on it, or must he give the wit ness an o p p o rtunit y to 
explain it?"
He then added his own comment: "A rule to the effect that he
must do the latter may be helpful."
In his Revised Paper he gives the result of the C o m m i s s i o n ' s  
c o n s i d er ation  of his suggestion:
"The Commiss ion con sider ed that the c r o s s - exa mi ner should  be 
able to do either at his option, but that there should be no 
fixed rule; and observed that that seemed to be in accord 
with present practice, (memo No. 46, para G20)" [189]
Sheriff MacPhail makes no comment on this rejec tion of what 
would seem to have been a helpful su gg estio n and a useful 
co nt r i b u t i o n  to t r uth-fi nd ing - if, indeed, that is the p e r c e i v e d  
object ive  of cro ss -examinati on. The Commis si on's o b s e r v a t i o n  
that "that seemed to accord with present practice" is pu z z l i n g  
if intended as a reason for the rejection. It was, p r e s um ably, 
because present practice observed no fixed rule, and the S h e r i f f  
thought there should be a rule, that he made the sugg es tion.
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Of interest also, in affording an insight as to the attitude of 
the legal establi sh ment towards these issues, is the section of 
the Sheriff's Paper headed "Final General Question". Frank, in 
his discourse on cross -e xaminat io n, notes the comments of a judge 
to the effect that:
"....the want of que stions (to a witness in cros s- e x a m i n a t i o n ) . . .
...calculated to excite those re collections  which might clear 
up every d i f f i c u l t y . . . . . . . . m a y  give rise to important errors
and omi ssions." [190]
Sheriff MacPhail raises a similar point:
"The Commissi on of.Just ice which produced the Report entitle d 
'False Witness' [191] co nsidered the question 'whether at the 
con clu sion of every wi tness's evidence, the judge or ma g i s t r a t e  
should formally ask him whether he had any further i n f o r mati on  
which he thought might help the court. At that stage the 
witness would have a better idea of what was relevant and would 
be more able to say what he wanted to say without in te rruption.
He would be asked whether he wished to correct, exp lain or add 
anything to what he had already said.' The Committee  rej ec ted 
the idea, expressing the view that it was 'impracticable' and 
that to 'invite a witness to say something without s p e c if yi ng 
the exact nature of the in fo rmation required would be to invite 
the irr elevant and inadmissable.' "
The She riff adds the following comments:
"The proposal that a witness should be so i nt errogat ed  raises 
the important question whether the adversary system has the 
effect of producing for the court's consid erati on  all the 
relevant evidence which is within the witness' knowledge. In 
theory, all such evidence is elicit ed by means of thorough 
pre-trial preparation, and by examinatio n and c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  
in court. But in practice, it may be argued, advo ca tes may be 
ina deq uate ly  briefed and badly prepared and litigants and 
accused persons may be unrepresented; if a witness, having 
been badly or incomplet el y examined, could be i n t e r r o g a t e d  in 
the manner proposed, he would be able to assist the court and 
to perform his duty to the best of his ability as he saw it..
.." [192]
Again, the reasons advanced for the rejection of this s u g g e s t i o n  
seem to lack conviction. It would not, one would have thought, 
be beyond the wit of the judge, before putting the final question, 
to /
137.
to guide and warn the witness on the matter of relevancy and 
admissibi lit y. But, in any event, in view of the obvious 
advan tag es of the course su gge ste d - to the court, at any rate - 
would the risk not be worth taking?
Some comment may also be app ro pr iate on the additio nal reasons 
advanced by Sheriff MacPhail for the suggestion, namely, that a 
witness may have been "badly or incomple tely examined" due to the 
fact that the advocate may have been "i nadequa tely briefed and 
badly prepared". In some cases, no doubt, this may be true;- but,' 
in the light of our discussi on as to the tactics often employe d 
by c r o s s - ex am in ers to suppress rather than elicit i n c o n ven ie nt 
truthful testimony, the reasons so advanced omit, and may possibly  
be said to discree tly  cloak, more cogent reasons: that, far from
being badly prepared, the c r o s s - ex aminer might have been very well 
prepared and exercised his partisan adversarial skills accordin gly.
Both in regard to this point and the proposal that a wi tness should 
be given the right to explain an apparent inconsiste ncy, it would 
seem dif ficult to resist the inference that the real reason for 
rejec tio n is the She riff's comment reg arding the "final general 
question" suggestion, namely, that this proposal would be 
co nsidered  as "an ano molous inf ringem en t of the adve r s a r i a l  
princip le"  [193].
In this context, he quotes a passage from the case Thom son v 
Glasgow Corporati on in which Lord Justic e- Clerk Tho mson makes 
the point that the judge, in our trial system:
" ........ is at the mercy of co nt endin g sides whose whole object is
not to discover the truth but to get his j u d g m e n t .........a
li tigation  is in essence a trial of skill between op posi ng  
parties conducted under rec ognis ed rules, and the prize is the 
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judge's decision. We have rejected inq uisitor ial methods and 
prefer to regard our judges as entirely independent. Like 
referees at boxing contests, they see that the rules are kept 
and count the points." [194]
Sp ecifically, as regards cross-exami na tion, this realistic 
approach seems cons istent with another quote by Sheriff MacPhail 
from L o r d 1 Avonside in a more recent case:
" .........c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  is just what it means. It consists
in ques tio ning an adverse witness in an effort to break down 
his evidence, to weaken or pr ejudice  his evidence, or to 
elicit stateme nts  damaging to him and aiding the case of the 
cr oss-e xa mi ner."  [193]
The context in which Lord Avonside made these remarks was an 
appeal against convict ion for murder on the ground that the trial 
judge had improperly admitted evidence of a conf es sion which had 
been imprope rly  obtained by the police who had, inter a l i a , 
subj ect ed the accused to "pr olonged c r o s s - e xamin at ion". The 
defence founded on dicta by Lord Cooper in Chalmer s v H.M.
Advoc ate  to the effect that a co nf essio n obtained by "what 
amounts to cr os s - e x a m i n a t i o n "  by police of a suspect would be 
inadmissible. The Court re jec ted the appeal and took the view 
that the interrog at ion to which the accused was sub j e c t e d  by the 
police did not amount to "cr oss-e xa minatio n" . It was t h e r ef or e 
Lord Avonsi de's purpose in making these remarks, to d i s t i n g u i s h  
between such int erro gation by the police and the pro ces s of 
cr os s - e x a m i n a t i o n  in court. In so doing, he t e n d e d , p e r h a p s , 
to co ncentr ate upon the harsher features of court cr os s-e x a m i n a t i c  
Nev ert heless, the remarks are repr od uced by Sher iff MacPhai l, 
without comment, and under the heading "Nature of Cross- 
exa minat io n"  - and appa rentl y therefore, as an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  
de finitio n of cr os s - e x a m i n a t i o n  and its purpose. As such, it may 
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be seen as a candid i l l u s trati on  of the ad ve r s a r i a l - m i n d e d  
approach which is co ns ist ent with the equally candid remarks 
of Lord Thomson. There is no mention h e r e 1 of the el ic itation 
of truth; only the e licita ti on of "statements damaging to him 
(the witness) and aiding the case of the cro ss-exa miner ".  All 
that matters, apparently, is that the witness is "adverse"; 
therefore, his evidence must be broken down, we akened or 
prejudiced. Whether he is pe rce ived as honest or dishonest, or 
whether his testimony is accurate or inaccurate is, it would 
seem, irrelevant.
3.6.4 - Dis credit in g True Testimony
These comments upon what appears to be the con ven tional, 
pr ofe ssional, approach to c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  invite the question: 
what is the perceived position of the c r o s s - e x a m i n i n g  adv oca te 
when the witness is known by the advocate to be honest and his 
testimony known to be acc urate?
It will be recalled that F r a n k ’s strictures against ce rt ain cross- 
ex aminat ion tactics and those who use and recommend them, inc luded 
s i t u a t i o n s " w h e n  the lawyer has no doubts of the accurac y and 
honesty" of the witne ss's testimony. [196] As has been said, 
this situat ion gives rise to pa rticular problems and here some 
pro fessi on al  bodies have something to say.
The American Bar As so ciation  (in the 1974 edition of its
"Standards") spe cifi cally  addressed this question:
"A lawyer's belief that the witness is telling the truth does 
not ne cessarily  preclude appr opria te  c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  in all 
c ir cu mstanc es  but may affect the method and scope of cross-  
examination. He should not misuse the power of cross-ex aminati oi 
or impeac hme nt by emp loying it to discredit or un d e r m i n e  a 
witness if he knows the witness is test ifyin g t r u t h f u l l y ."[197 ]
The /
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The British Bar Codes do not appear to address the question so
directly but they do deal with a similar situation - the cross-
ex am inat io n of pr os ecution wi tne sses in cases where an accused
has admitted his factual guilt to his counsel. Thus, the English
Bar Code, after pro scribing, in such situations, the set ting up
by defence counsel of an "af firma tive" case, states:
"A more difficult question is within what limits, in the case 
supposed, may an advocate attack the evidence for the 
prosecu ti on either by c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  or in his speech to 
the tribunal charged with the decision of the facts. No 
clearer rule can be laid down than this, that he is en titled 
to test the evidence given by each individual witness, and to 
argue that the evidence taken as a whole is in su f f i c i e n t  to 
amount to proof that the accused is guilty of the offence 
charged. Further than this he ought not to go." [198]
Dealing with the same s itu at ions - confessions of factual guilt - 
the Scottish Advocates' Guide says that, while the defence 
advocate "may not put to the witness any question sug gesting, 
or tending to suggest, that the accused did not commit the act... 
...", he may "test the evidence for the p rose cu tion by cross- 
examination". [199]
The wider impli cations of conf ession of guilt si t u a t i o n s  are 
later discu sse d [200], but, on the specific question  of cross- 
exam in at ion ethics, it may here be said that such p r o n o u n c e m e n t s ,  
while no doubt genuine attempts to deal with a d i f f icul t and 
delicat e subject, hint at an e q u i voca ti on and ambivalence which 
seem to be c h ar ac terist ic  of some professio na l ruling s on the 
matter of ethics in advocacy. They leave scope for doubt. In
view of the fact that the American statement, for example, 
explicitl y excludes attempts to discredit a truthful witness, 
one /
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one may wonder what, precisely, is meant by "appropriate cross- 
e xa minatio n" which it does not exclude in every circums tance.
If this latter phrase is merely intended to mean any attack on 
those parts of the te stimony which are not known to be true, it 
would seem reasonable to assume that it would have said so.
The implication, therefore, may be that it may mean some thing 
else; what that som ething else may be, the advocate is left to 
int erpret for himself.
Similarly, in the English and Scottish Bar statements, one is 
left to ponder the imp lica tions of the advocat e's right to "test" 
the evidence. While not. explicitl y stated, the context in which, 
in both rulings, the word "test" is used, seems to invite the 
im plicat ion that the pro se cution evidence which the advoc at e is 
entit led  to test is evidence which, by reason of his client 's  
co nf essi on  of factual guilt, he knows to be true. If so, 
"testing" would seem to be superfluous.
Another source of advice on this question seems c o m m e n d a b l y  
unequivocal. A Scottish book on ethics for so licitor s states 
s i m p l y :
"Do not suggest to a witness in c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  that he is 
lying, if you know from your own client that the witness is 
telling the truth" [201]
W h i l e . r e f r e s h i n g l y  direct, the scope of this e x h o r t a t i o n  is, 
perhaps, somewhat narrow - at least, if inte rpret ed  in the 
letter rather than, (as is no doubt, intended), in the spirit. 
There are clearly other ways of d iscre di ting true te st imony 
than sugg est ing directly to the witness that he is lying. An 
Advocate, for example, although knowing that what a wi tness says 
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he saw or heard is correct, might attempt to cast doubt, not on
his honesty, but on the sound ness of his sight or hearing. He
may also play on the witness' pe rsonality  weaknesses. Frank,
for example, quotes the Americ an lawyer, Henry Taft:
"  a clever cross-exami ner, dealing with an honest but
eg otistic witness, will 'deftly tempt the witness to indulge 
in his propensity for exaggerat ion, so as to make him hang 
himself' "[202]
Or make the witness out to be a rogue; again Trollope, as
quoted by Frank:
"Nothing would flurry this (the witness he was cros s - e x a m i n i n g ) ,  
force her to utter a word of which she herself did not know 
the meaning. The more he might persevere in such an attempt, 
the more dogged and steady she would become. He t h e r efore  soon 
gave that u p  and resolv ed that, as he could not shake her,
he would shake the conf idence the jury might place in her. He 
could not make a fool of her, and therefore he would make her
out a r o g u e ........As for himself, he knew well enough that she
had spoken nothing but the truth. But h e .......... so ma nage d
that the truth might be made to look like falsehood, - or at 
any rate to have a doubtful air." [203]
In summary on this issue, it may perhaps be said that the cautious
and somewhat uncertain tone of some of the official p r o f e s s i o n a l
precept s are indicative of the ethical tensions wi thin the
ad versar ial system - in this case, the tension be tween an
a c k n o w le dgmen t of the ethical una c c e p t a b i l i t y  of d e l i b e r a t e l y
d is cr editin g testimony known to be true, and r e c o g n i t i o n  of the
reality, in practice, of the a dve rs arial approach: that the
primary purpose of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  is to break down or cast
doubt upon testimony, any testimony, which is adve rse  to the
inte rests of the c r o s s - e x a m i n e r ' s  case.
3.6.3 - Cr os s - E x a m i n a t i o n  and C o n f i d ent ia lity
The issue we have been disc us sing - the discrediting, in cr oss- 
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exa mination, of a witness known to the cross-exam in er to be both 
honest and accurate - may, in certain situations, involve, in a 
p a r t ic ul arly acute way, a conflic t between the ad vo cat e's duty to 
honour the confid ences of his client and his duty to the court 
and to t r u t h .
The moral implicati ons of p rofessi on al c o n f i d en tialit y in regard 
to the general question of lying and dec eption have already been 
discussed; here we are con ce rn ed with the specific probl em s 
which it poses in relation to d iscred it ing truthful testimony.
All pro fessi on al  manuals on legal ethics emp hasise the duty upon 
a lawyer to hold in stricte st confidence, in fo rmation c o n f i d e d  to 
him by his client. Spe cifically, in a court situation, the 
advocate, as we have also discussed, has not only the right, but 
is under a pr ofe ssi onal obligation, not to disclose to the court 
in fo rmat io n prejudicial to his client. But in the cont ext of the 
ethics of dis credi ti ng true testimony, this o b l i gati on  poses the 
question: does it exclude only positive  or explicit dis c l o s u r e
of such con fid entia l info rmation  or does it oblige the advoc at e
to eschew any conduct based upon it which would p r e j udice the
client? For example, would an advocate be betraying  his 
obl ig atio n of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  if he refuses to cha ll enge true 
te stimony when he knows it to be true only because of i n f o r m a t i o n
dis cl osed  to him by his client?
In his dis cus sion of this issue [204], Fre edm an's answer, at 
any rate, would seem to be in the affi rmativ e - p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
a si tuation  where the advocate knows, or sincerely believes, his 
client to be innocent and where the testimony in question, although 
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accurate, is c i rcum st antial and likely to result in an unjust 
outcome. He believes that failure by defence counsel in such 
c i rc umstan ce s to challenge damagi ng testimony, however, true, 
would under min e the whole basis of la wy er-client co n f i d e n t i a l i t y  
which is essential for an effective  defence of accused persons 
under our adversarial system.
Freedman, however, a c k n o wle dg es the distressing i m p l i c a t i o n s  of 
this view if applied ge ner all y and rigorously. He cites, by way 
of example, a rape case where the accused has co nfided  his actual 
guilt but insists upon a defence which involves at t a c k i n g  the 
true tes timony and character of the innocent victim. In such 
situations, he expre sses the "strong personal view" that a 
lawyer should be able to decline to accept the defe nce brief 
on grounds of conscience. It is to be noted, however, that his 
defence of the advocate's right, even in such c i r c u mstance s,  to 
attack the true testimony is based upon the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  
p ri nciple alone and not on the alleged right, (here qu oting Chief 
Justice Burger) of defence counsel to use "all the l e g i t i m a t e  
tools available  to test the truth of the p r o s e c u t i o n ' s  case". 
Indeed, he strongly attacks what he con siders to be the legal 
e s ta blishm en t view that:
" C r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ....... is good, and therefore any lawyer, under
any c ir cumst an ces and regardle ss of the co nsequence s, can 
proper ly impeach a witness through c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  "[205 ]
Nevert hel ess, this di sc lai mer notwith st an ding, it is dif f i c u l t  
to accept that the privile ge  of confi den tiali ty, however, sacred 
in the professio nal perception, can justify conduct such as that 
env is ag ed in the rape case example or in similar s itua ti ons. As 
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we conclud ed in our dis cu ss ion of c o nfiden ti ality as a 
j u s t i fica ti on  for lying, this privilege must have its limits, 
and it is likely that most advocates, in the c i r c u m st ances 
hypoth esi zed, would consid er those limits to have been reached.
While Fr eedman's  views on this - a n d , i n d e e d ,  on other ethical 
issues - can probably not be regarde d as typical of the approach 
of most legal c omme nt ators and would also seem, os t e n s i b l y  at 
any rate, to be in conflict with the general tenor of the 
p ro fe ssiona l guid elines quoted, they may be said to refl ect an 
unc er ta inty about, and bring into open debate, problem s which 
the profe ss io nal gu id eli nes fail to confront and which their 
guarded precepts do little to resolve.
3.6.6 - Co nclusions  on C r o s s - E x a m i n a t i o n
In regard to c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  in general, and its pe r c e i v e d  
r e l a ti on ship to truth-finding, it would be wrong to o v e rstat e 
the critical arguments. It is doubt less true that in many 
cases cr o s s - e x a m i n i n g  counsel do genui nely try to elicit  truth, 
as the c r oss-e xa miner perceives  it, from a hostile witness; 
also, as has been said, when such a witness is not only adverse, 
but perverse and untruthful, a measure of ag gressi on  and even 
of i ntimi da ti on may well be ju sti fie d in the i n t er es ts of truth.
However, in the light of our discussion, it would seem dif f i c u l t  
to chall enge the perc eption that cros s- e x a m i n e r s  g e n e r a l l y  pursue 
truth only when it suits their clients' inter ests so to do; that 
what they only pursue are sta teme nt s or admissions, wh e t h e r  or 
not true, which suit those interests; and that truth, when 
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adverse to those interests, is a legitim ate target for challenge. 
Moreover, such a perc eptio n would seem, in the light of what has 
been said, to be support ed by some eminent authorities.
Summary - The main con cl us ions which would seem to emerge 
from this discussion may be summar is ed as follows:
(1) If the primary purpose of the adversarial trial process
is to find out the truth, the purpose of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  
should be to elicit the truth - as the cros s - e x a m i n e r  
honestly perceives it - from the witness.
(2) In practice, c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  is, in the main, pe rc eived 
and used as a device - some times an inti mi datory device - 
to advance the c r o s s - e x a m i n e r ' s  case by "breaking down", 
ri di culing or otherwise weak en ing an adverse witness' 
testimony - i r r e s p e c t i v e  of its (known) accuracy.
(3) This "ad versarial" view of the purpose of c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  
is often encoura ged by textbo ok writers. To some extent at 
least, it also seems to be reflected  in the at ti tude of the 
legal establishment, some of the guidelines of which - on 
the question of d i s c r ed iting true tes timony - seem equivo ca l 
a n d i n a d e q u a t e .
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3.7 - Perjury
3.7.1 - The Judicial Oath
Histor ica lly, perjury is the wilful utterance of,, false evidenc e 
while on oath. When a witness in judicial proc eedin gs  takes the 
oath he is making a solemn appeal to God in witness of the truth 
of the evidence he is about to give. To proceed in such a 
situation to give knowingly false evidence is, in religious 
and moral terms, a serious form of blasphemy. For this reason, 
perjury has been t r ad it ionall y regarded as "more abhorr ed  than 
other lying" [206]. This tradition of abhorrence is ref l e c t e d  
in the ancient stricture s against perjury: by the law of Moses,
"if a false witness rise up against any m a n .........then shall
ye do unto him as he had thought to have done unto his br other" 
[207]. The second century Roman writer, Auius Gellius, mentio ns  
in his writings  that persons who had been found guilty of perjur y 
were thrown from the Tarpeian Rock [208].
Although, in modern times, wit ne sses who, for religious or 
other reasons, do not wish to invoke the name of God, are 
pe rm it ted to make a form o f s o l e m n  affi rm ation of truth in lieu 
of the tradit ional oath, they are still guilty of pe rj ur y sh ould 
they proceed to give knowingly  false evidence and the moral 
taboo against perjury retains its relig ious a s s o c i a t i o n s  and 
origins. This taboo, however, was, in earlier times, based 
not only on moral repugnance but also on the fear of divin e 
wrath and, for that reason, was probably  a more eff e c t i v e  means 
of achieving  truthful testimony than it is to-day. Frank 
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c on sid ere d the juristic oath to be a late form of the pr imitive 
"ordeal". As used in primitive times, it was:
".....a self-curse, c o n d i tionall y made. The oat h-tak er  says in 
effect, 'If I do not tell the truth, may destr uct ion or torments 
be visited upon me'. The oath is an ordeal in words instead 
of acts. Super- natural power vouches or refuses to vouch for 
the o a t h - t a k e r . ..."[209]
Since, on the strength of the oath, it was con si dered that the
Deity would vouch - or refuse to vouch - for the t r u t h f u l n e s s  of
the witness, it followed that the swearing of the oath was, per
s e , evidence of the t ruthfu ln ess of the testimony:
"For it was presumed that no man, having taken an oath, would 
dare swear falsely and thus risk supe rnatu ral vengeance.... "[210
To what extent, in this more sce ptical age, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of
moral re pu gna nce or fear of divine wrath may be i n s t r u m e n t a l  in
pr omo ting truthful tes timony is a matter of conjecture. That it
should be so, would at any rate appear to be the law's expectatioi
In the words of Lord Justic e - G e n e r a l  McNeil in 1863:
"The obligati on on a witness to tell the truth, the whole truth , 
and nothing but the truth is an oblig ation imposed by the law 
irre sp ec tive of any oath. The a d mi nister in g of an oath is a 
means resorted to by the law to insure the ful filment of the 
obligation to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothin g but 
the t r u t h . "[211]
We may question whether, even in the app arently more rel i g i o u s  
conscious climate of 1863, the sweari ng of a judicial oath was, 
in itself, suf ficient to "insure" that a witness would speak the 
truth; though a s .a means of disco u r a g i n g  perjury, it was possibly 
more effec tiv e then than in the pr oba bly less G o d - f e a r i n g  so cie ty  
of today. Nevertheless, it may be true that even today there are 
many - and not only those who subscribe to a particu la r sy stem of 
faith or worship - for whom the inv ocat io n of "Almigh ty God" as 
a witness to their honesty, has a re verentia l and, indeed, awesome, 
s ig ni ficanc e which may be a more ef fec tive incentive to telli ng  
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the truth than a mere "dec lar ation " - however "solemnly" expressec 
Sheriff MacPhail, in discussing, in a Scottish context, the 
arguments for and against replaci ng the oath with a "form of 
declara tio n", seems to support this view:
"Depressing though it is to hear the oath so frequently dishonoure 
especially  in criminal cases, it may well be that there are still 
many witn esses in the Scottish courts to whom the oath, 
a dm in istere d with d el iberati on  by the judge, serves to bring 
home most strongly the solem nity of their obligatio n to tell the
truth and to give their evidence with care." [212]
It may be noted here that the Sheriff's reference to the 
depressing  fact of the frequent dishon ou ring of the oath is 
relevant to the discussion, infra, regarding the effect upon its 
truth - v o u c h i n g  value of the practice of allowing accused persons 
to testify on their own behalf.
3.7.2 - The Profession al Pro scri pt ion of Perjury
Morals apart, perjury is a flagrant perversion of just ice - or, 
at any rate, is perceived i n tr insical ly  as such by all ort ho dox 
legal opinion - and is the refore a serious criminal offence; as 
is also the aiding or abetting of perjury by another.
It follows that neither the law nor the canons of co ndu ct  of legal 
p ro fe ssiona l bodies can co untenance any j u s t i fic at ion either for 
perjury by a witness or for the wilful procure ment of it by a
lawyer in any circu mstances. In this context, the terms of the
English Bar Code may be taken as gene rally r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the 
view of a l l p r o f e s s i o n a l  bodies in ad ve rsarial countries. In 
dealing with the situation in which an accused person has c o n fe sse 
factual guilt to his lawyer, it states:
"  An /
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"....An advocate may not assert that which he knows to be a lie.
He may not connive at, much less attempt to substantiate, a 
fraud." And it would be ab solutely wrong for him to "....call 
any evidence which he must know to be f a l s e  "[213]
However, in this - as in other issues pertain ing to legal ethics - 
the question arises: to what extent are such un equivoc al
pr osc r i p t i o n s  refle cte d in either the views or actual practice 
of court lawyers? In the opinion of some legal writers at least, 
these h i g h - p r i n c i p l e d  ex ho r t a t i o n s  against perjury are far from 
being una ni mou sly  accepted by p racti si ng lawyers. Thus Hazard:
"An advocate has a duty not to present false evidence, but he 
also has a duty not to conduct hims elf  so as to pr ej udice his 
client. In civil cases, it is gener ally accepted that the 
advocate should never present false evidence and that he has 
a duty to see that his client produces evidence l e g i t i m a t e l y  
deman ded  by the other side, even if the evidence is very 
damaging. In criminal cases, it is recognise d that the 
p ro sec uto r has a duty as minister of justice to prevent the 
use of fabricated evidence against an accused. The un settled  
question is whether a lawyer de fending a criminal may pro pe rly 
put his client on the stand even when s a t i s f i e d 'that the 
test imo ny will be perjured. The rules as they stand clea rly  
prohibit the lawyer from doing so. However, most cr imi nal 
defence lawyers feel this is wrong and many of them actually  
believe the rule is otherwise; they think the a d v o c a t e ' s  duty 
to his client implies that in a criminal case he should conduct 
the defendant in his testi mony even when counsel knows the 
defendant is lying." [214]
Hazard was, of course, writing primarily  in an A m e ri pa n context, 
but it may be ques tio ned whether there is any reason to supp ose 
that the views he att ribut es to American criminal defen ce  lawyers 
are not also held, to some degree at least, by their c o u n t e r p a r t s  
in other ad ver sarial countries.
In relation to the passage quoted, Hazard includes, as one of his 
sources, a review of Monroe Fr ee dma n's "Lawyers' Ethics in an 
Ad versary System" In one respect, however, they appear to 
differ. Hazard distingu is hes between civil cases, where he seems 
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to consider the unequivoca l p roscri pt ion of perjury to be non- 
con troversial within the legal prof essio n as a whole, and 
criminal cases where - as regards the defence function - the 
questi on is "unsettled". However, while, as will be discussed, 
it is true that the main doubts and difficulties  in this context 
arise in criminal proceedings, Freedma n believes that most 
lawyers - even in civil cases - would have little h e s i tat io n in 
certain circum stances  in encouraging, and even actually assisting 
perjury by their clients [213]
With regard to this pa rticular ob servation of Freedman, it may 
be ap propri ate to note here that this may be seen as typical of 
his candid approach to many of the difficult and delica te issues 
involve d in the ethics of advocacy. Although he m a y b e  regarde d 
as uno rthodox by more convention al  authorities, as a Dean and 
Pr ofessor of Law, and one often cited by others,' his views, even 
if one may not always agree with him, must command respect. For 
this reason and because of his will ingness  to confront problems 
which the more cautious tend to evade, he is frequentl y cited in 
this inquiry.
On the particu lar issue here discussed, it may also be obs er ved 
that Fre edm an's views, however, unorthodox in the c o n v e n t i o n a l  
e s ta blishm en t perception, appear to have strong supp ort at 
p ra ct itione r level in America. Wolfram, for example, notes that 
the Asso ci ation of Trial Lawyers of America, in the course of a 
"frontal assault" on the pr ovision s of The American Bar 
A s s o c ia tion's  "Draft Model Rules of Prof essional Conduct"
(issued in 1980), demanded  rec ogni ti on of a lawyer's right to 
"p articipat e in pres enting a client's  perjured tes ti mony in both 
civil/
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civil and criminal trials if ne cessary to avoid impairing a 
client confidence". [216]
3.7.3 - En cou raging Perjury
Another example of Freedma n's approach - and of his w il lingne ss  
to admit error - is his d is cu ssion of potential perjur ious 
situation s in which lawyers may become involved when advising 
c l i e n t s .
While, by definition, the crime of perjury can only be com mi tt ed
during the course of judicial proceedings, situ ations in which
perjury may be procured or enco uraged  by a lawyer may arise at an
earlier stage. A lawyer, when advising a client may - unwittingl;
or otherwi se - put the idea of perjury into his mind. Fre ed ma n
poses the problem thus [217]: a lawyer is asked for advice by a
client charged with a capital offence and says:
"If the facts are as you have stated them, you have no legal 
defence and you will probably be electrocuted. On the other 
hand, if you acted in a blind rage, there is a p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
saving your life. Think it over and we will talk about it 
t o - m o r r o w ....... "
We may assume from this example that the lawyer has been app ri sed 
by the client of facts which indicate a p r emedi ta ted crime. The 
questi on arising can be stated thus: how far may a lawyer
l eg it imatel y go in advising as to the law when, from the 
informat io n given by his client, such advice may en c o u r a g e  or 
suggest perjury by the client?
In this context, it is, as will be seen, important to d i s t i n g u i s h  
the dis parate meanings of "advise" - whether it means me re ly to 
inform the client as to what the law is on the matter at issue - 
or to suggest or recom mend a pa rticul ar  course of action which is 
at variance with the facts as reveale d by the client and may 
amount in effect to the fabricati on of a fraudulent case.
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The del ica cy of the problem which may arise in these situat io ns is 
npt.ly illunt rnl od in Ir eedmnn 'n  example. Tor the lawyer to explain 
the s igni fi ca nce of the dist inctio n in the criminal law between a
p rrinncl i I n I od n r l  mid nun rniiini i I I nd i inpu I n I vn 1 y " i n  n b l i n d  i ' i i ( |o "  
may be regarded as a leg itimate exercise of his pro fe ssiona l 
function - albeit that in so doing he may, uninte ntional ly , have 
im planted the idea of perjury in the client's mind; but the 
in junction  to "think it over" could be cons trued  as an implied 
in vitation  to the client to revise his true version of the facts.
The d is ti nctio n between merely informing  and - in the sense of
r e c o mm en ding positive action - a d v i s i n g , is brought out in two other
h yp ot h e t i c a l  cases which Fr eedman cites by way of further analysis:
"Assume that your client, on trial for his life in a firs t - d e g r e e  
murder case, has killed another man with a pen knife  but insists 
that the killing was in self-d efens e. You ask him: 'Do you
regul arl y carry the penknife  in your pocket. Do you carry it 
freque ntl y or infrequently, or did you take it with you only on 
that part icular  occasion?' He replies: 'Why do you ask me a
question like that?' It is entirely ap pr opriate to infor m him 
that his carryin g the knife only on that occasion, or i n f r e q u e n t l y  
might support an inference of premedi tation, while, if he carr ied 
the knife invariably, or frequently, the inference of p r e m e d i t a t i o n  
would be negated. Thus your cli ent's life may depend upon his 
r ec ol lectio n as to whether he carried the knife fr equent ly  or 
infrequently. Despite the p os sibilit y that the client or a third 
party might infer that the lawyer was pr omp tin g the client to lie, 
the lawyer must apprise the defendant of the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of his 
answer. There is no c onceiva bl e ethical requ irement  that the 
lawyer trap the client into a hasty and il l - c o n s i d e r e d  answer 
before telling him the s igni fi cance of the question ."
In support of this view, Freedm an quotes Professi on  John Noonan
of Boalt H a l l :
"A lawyer should not be p a t e r nalisti c toward his client, and cannot
assume that his client will perjure h i m s e l f .........  F ur therm or e,
a lawyer has an obl ig at ion to furnish his client with all the 
legal info rmation relevant to his case; in fulf illin g this duty 
to inform his client, a lawyer would normally not vi olate et hical 
s tan dards."
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One cr it icism of Freedman's  reasonin g might be ventured here.
While it is no doubt true that a lawyer has a duty to furnish his 
client with all legal i nfor ma tion relevant to his case, his 
justi f i c a t i o n  of the lawyer's conduct in this pa rticular example 
may seem somewhat disingenuous. A lawyer would cer ta inly be 
wrong to assume that his client will perjure himself, but in a 
situation where his life is at stake - o r ,  indeed, even in other 
less s e r i o u s . s i t u a t i o n s  - the te mptation to do so is clear. It 
could be said that in the case cited, a lawyer, anxious to extract 
the truth, ought to insist on the client's answe ring his question 
before expl aining  why he had asked it. This could not r e a s on ab ly 
be said to be trapping the client "into a hasty and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d  
answer". Some may well suspect that his failure to do so is 
indi cat ive of the fact that some lawyers, in such situat ions, 
may deem it expedient not to know the truth. This view is 
supported by Wolfram's assert ion that "a lawyer who advises a 
witness about the law or about desired testimony before seek ing 
the witness' own version of events comes dang erous ly  near 
subo rn at ion of perjury." [218]
Freedm an continues his dis cussion  of this topic by of fering a 
further example - this time, in a civil context:
"Assume that a man consults a tax lawyer and says: 'I am fifty
years old. Nobody in my immed iate family has lived past fifty. 
Therefore, I would like to put my affairs in order. S p e c i f i c a l l y  
I und ersta nd that I can avoid substant ial taxes by setting up a 
trust. Can I do it?' The lawyer informs the client that he can 
s uc ce ssfull y avoid the estate taxes only if he lives at least 
three years after est ablishi ng  the trust or, should he die wi thin 
three years, if the trust should be found not to have been 
created in c on te mplatio n of death. The client then might ask 
how to go about sati sfying the Internal Revenue Service or the 
courts that the trust was not in c o n t e m pl at ion of death."
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At this point, says Freedman, the lawyer can either refuse to
answer or he can proceed to advise the steps the client should
take to satisy the Internal Revenue S e r v i c e -  never again tell
anyone he is con cerned about an early death; write letters and
tell friends that he is setting up a trust for reasons that have
nothing to do with co n t e m p l a t i o n  of death, etc. Freedman then
proceeds to disavow an earlier opinion he had expres se d as to
the proper course for the lawyer to take in this situation:
"On the assumpt ion that vir tually every tax attorney in the 
country would answer the client's question (and subs e q u e n t l y  
present in court the letters and the tes timony about the client's 
co nvers ati ons),  I concluded (in an earlier article in (1966) 64 
Mich. L.R. 1469) that it should not be unethical for the lawyer to 
give the advice. Although I did not artic ulate it at the time,
I also had in mind the 'I am a law book' rationale, that is, that 
the att orn ey would be doing no more than in forming the client of 
what is in the appl ica ble statut es and court decisions. After 
c onsid er ab le reflection, I now consider that dec ision to have been 
wrong. The lawyer in the tax case is, purely and simply, the 
active instrum ent in es ta b l i s h i n g  - and, ultimately, p r e s e n t i n g  - 
a fraudulent case...."
He adds that a further co n s i d e r a t i o n  which had infl uence d his
earlier opinion was the fact that the info rmation which the client
sought as to how to satisy the auth orities  as to his bona fides
was info rmati on  which the lawyer himself would have wit hou t advice
were the lawyer in the cli ent's position, and that the client was
entitl ed to such in fo rmation and to make his own decisio n as to
wh ether to act upon it, but:
"The fallacy in that argument is that the lawyer is givin g the 
client more than just 'information about the law', but is ac ti vely 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in - indeed, ini ti ating - a factual defense that 
is ob viously p e r j u r i o u s  "
This h y p o t heti ca l case is another apt i llu st ration of the
d if f i c u l t i e s  which may confront  the co ns c i e n t i o u s  lawyer in such
si tuati on s and the delicacy of the decis ions he has, at times, to
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make - though, if Freedman 's remarks as to the course which
"virtually every tax attorney" would take are valid, c o n s c ie ntious
lawyers in this context would seem to be a rare breed - among tax 
lawyers in the United States at any rate.
In the example given, the inference  would seem to be that the
proper course for the lawyer would be to refuse to answer the 
client's query as to "how to go about satisfying" the authorities. 
This is not at odds with Pro fessor Noonan's quoted state me nt in 
the "penknife" case that a lawyer should not be " p a t e r na listic"  
towards his client and "cannot assume that his client will perjure 
himself"; for" the particular form in which the client is en visaged 
as putting his query conveys the clear implication that he has a 
pe rjurious  intent.
What would seem to emerge from this discuss ion  is that while, in 
principle, there is a clear dis ti nc tion between the l e g i ti ma te 
giving of legal info rmation and n o n - l e gi timate  ad vis ing the 
fa bri cation of a fraudulent case, in practice, in some situa tio ns, 
even the mere giving of informat ion - depending on how this is 
done - may be tantamo unt to - or may be con strued by the client 
as - enc oura gi ng  a per jur ious course of conduct; and that, 
although the lawyer is not entitled to assume that the client will 
make perjurio us use of the information, he must be guided by his 
pe rcept io n of his client 's intentions.
The client is, of course, entitled to advice and i n f o r m a t i o n  on 
all aspects of the law pertinent to the.matter in hand. This 
includes information as to the reasons moti vating que s t i o n s  put 
to him by the lawyer. It might, indeed, be said that the lawyer, 
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without being asked, should in any event - in situations where 
his reasons may not be patently  obvious - explain why he is 
putting a particu lar question; for a lawyer should also not be 
pa t e r na li stic in the sense of treating his client as a child who 
need not know, or is incapab le of understanding, the legal 
s i gnif ic an ce of the question. But this obligation, in the kind 
of sit uat ions we are discussing, must be tempered with 
circumspectio n. As has been said in reference to F r e e d m a n ’s 
"penknife" illustra ti on it is not unreason ab le for the lawyer in 
such c i r c u mst an ces to require the client to answer his questi on 
before expla ining why he asked it; nor can that be said to be 
inc onsis te nt  with his obliga tion to give full i n f o r ma ti on on the 
law. In such situations, the sequence of question and answer is 
important since the c o n s c ie ntious  lawyer will wish to ensure that 
the client's answer to his question will be truthful and not 
tailored to suit the legal sit ua tion as pr eviously ex p l a i n e d  to 
h i m .
With regard to the assertion of Pro fessor Noonan, as quote d by 
Freedman, that a lawyer should not assume that his client will 
perjure himself, the point might also be made that, in s i t u a t i o n s  
where the incentive to perjury clearly exists, his advice as to 
the law should pref erabl y include a caveat and expl a n a t i o n  
regard ing  the crime of perjury and its conse qu ences - incl uding, 
it may be added, not only its c r i m i nal it y but also its p o s si ble 
tactical consequences, in that, the perjury, if exposed, may well 
destroy, or at any rate, weaken, his other, possibly tru thful, 
e v i d e n c e .
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Apart, however, from the p r o s c ript io n of any explicit or implicit 
e n c o u r ag ement  of perjury, the nature of the situations we have 
been dis cuss in g would seem to be such as make it dif ficult to lay 
down any precise rules as to the propriety of p rofess io nal conduct. 
Wh ate ver the doubts and d if ficult ie s of the lawyer in such 
situations, however, from the ethical standpoint, what really 
matters is his intent.
These particu lar problems have, of course, a wider ambit than the 
ethics of advocacy as such. But they are of re levance to our 
theme in at least two respects: first, they ill ustr at e how -
w it ti ngly or unwittin gly - the seeds of perjury may be sown before 
the court process begins; second, if the views of Freedman  as to 
the at tit udes of pr ac tising lawyers are valid, the e n c o u r a g e m e n t  
of, or giving assi sta nce to, pe rj uri ous conduct by clients is, in 
both the civil and criminal f i e l d s -  and legal and p r o f e s s i o n a l  
pr o s c r i p t i o n s  no tw it h s t a n d i n g  - not uncommon among lawyers, in 
America at any rate.
3.7.4 - The Perjurious Client
The main problems, however, which may confront a lawyer in regard 
to perjury by his client arise after a court process has begun.
The principle  question is: what is the proper course for the
advocate when his client insists on giving perju red t e s t i m o n y  - 
or when it comes to his know ledge  during the trial that the client 
has co mmitted perjury?
As regards civil proceedings, a leading case on this issue is 
Myers v. Elman which concerned the swearing of an untrue affidav it  
of /
159.
of docu men ts and in which Viscount Maughan observed:
"I think it useful to obs erve here that there is this plain
dist in ct ion between defenc es which consist - as they did
here - of a denial of allegat io ns and untrue affida vits of 
documents. The defenc es are not on oath and they merely 
put the pl aintiff  to the proof of the allegations  in the
statement of c l a i m ; ......... .On the other hand in many actions
and in particular in such an action as Mrs. Myers had brought, 
based on dis graceful frauds, and on fraudulent cons piracy  of 
the most shameless character, it is essential in the interests 
of justice that the defendan ts should be comp elled to make 
full disclos ure of all the documents bearing on the alleged 
frauds in the form of proper affidavits of documents. If the
de fendant s are guilty of the alleged frauds, it is hardly to
be expected that they will make adequate af fi davits without 
con sider ab le  pressure. However guilty they may be, an 
ho nourabl e solicitor is perfectly justified in acting for 
them and in doing his very best in their interests, with, 
however, this important qualification , that he is not entitled 
to assist them in any way in dis honoura bl e conduct in the 
course of the proceedings. The swearing of an untrue affidavit  
of doc uments is perhaps the most obvious example of conduct 
which his solicitor cannot knowingly permit. He must assist 
and advise his client as to the latter's bounden duty in that 
matter; and if the client should persist in omitti ng relevant 
doc uments from his affidavit, it seems to me plain that the 
so licitor should decline to act for him any further. He cannot 
properly, still less can he consistently-.with his duty to the 
court, prepare and place a perjured affidavit upon the file...
. ."[219]
Later in his judgment, he expre sses the further opinion that where 
the lawyer realises that his client has sworn an untrue affidavit 
and has omitted important documents, he has a duty to advise his 
client that he, the lawyer, must inform the other party of the 
omitted documents and, should the client refuse his assent, 
the lawyer must cease to act for him. [220] While these opinions 
relate to false or inc omplete  documents, no doubt the same 
pr in ciples must be held to apply to verbal testimony.
In the light of these observations, the lawyer's po si tion when 
acting for a perjurious client - in civil p r o c e edings  - would 
seem to be as follows: if the client persists with an i n t ention
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to commit perjury, the lawyer should withdraw; if, during the 
proceedings, it becomes manifest to the lawyer that his client 
has already co mmitted -p erjury,  the lawyer must also withd raw if 
the client refuses to purge his perjury by aut horisi ng  his lawyer 
to inform the other party of the perjury. This latter prin ciple 
is, with one alteration, ens hr ined in the Code of Conduct for the 
Bar of England and Wales:
"If at any time before judgment is del ivered in a civil case, a 
ba rri ster is informed by his lay client that he has committed  
perjury or has otherwise been guilty of fraud upon the Court, 
the barri ster may not so inform the Court without his client's 
consent. He may not, however, take any further part in the 
case unless his client autho ri ses him to inform the Court of the 
perjure d statement or other fraudul ent conduct and he has so 
informed the Court." [2 21]
The al teration is in the injunction, in the Bar rule, to inform the
Court, whereas Viscount Maughan refers to infor ming the other
party. In practice, however, the situation would appear to
require that both the Court and the other party be informed.
It is to be noted that the English Bar rule s p e c i fical ly  applies 
this pa rt icu lar provision  to civil cases, thus appe aring  to infer 
that it is not ap plicable in criminal cases. In the general 
context of perjury in criminal c a s e s -  as distinct from the 
pr ovisi on s applying in the par tic ul ar case where an accu sed 
person has confessed guilt to his counsel [ 2 2 2 ] -  there seems 
to be little or no specific guidance for an advocate acting for 
a perj urious  client - though certain inferences may pe rhaps be 
drawn from the guidance afforde d in co nfession of guilt sit u a t i o n s  
One such inference would appear to be that where - before  trial - 
the client makes it clear that he is determined to give perj ur ed 
testimony, the advocate should wi th draw from the case [223].
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This, however, is not clear and there appears to be no specific 
pr ovision on the point.
Similarly, there does not appear to be any specific rule as to 
the advocate's proper course where such a situation only arises 
during trial - though here again there may be an inference from 
the co nfession of guilt pr ov isi ons that, in such a case, he should 
only wit hd ra w if he can do so without com prom ising his client 's 
case - with the proviso that, failing withdrawal, he can only 
be pe rmi tte d to do all he "honoura bly" can for his client and 
cannot use, aid, or abet the per jury [224].
In situa tions such as those pr ovided for in rule 137 of the 
English Bar Code, quoted above, that is, where the client has 
already committed perjury, the fact that the pr ovisio ns  of that 
rule are explici tly  applied only to civil cases may convey the 
i mpl ication  that, in a similar situa tion in a crimin al case, 
wi thdrawal  by counsel is not man da to ry even where the client 
refuses to purge his perjury. However, whatever doubts there 
may be as to whether, in such situations, counsel for an accused 
person should or should not withdraw, it is clear, in the light 
of the unequivocal p r o s c ript io ns in all canons of p r o f e s s i o n a l  
conduct against the aiding or abetting of perjury, that, in the 
official profe ssional view at any rate, an advocate must not lead 
his client in giving knowi ngly perjur ed testi mony or otherwi se  
make use of it in any way in the conduct of the case.
Predictably, perhaps, Freedm an dissents from the strict 
app licat io n of this official directive. He argues that, in 
ce rtain situations, the advocat e's duty to his client req ui re s 
an a c know le dg ment of the client's right to "tell his story" - 
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even if this involves perjured testimony.^ As an ill ustrati on  
of such a situation, he cites another of his hypot he tical cases: 
a man has been "falsely" accused of robbery. He consults his 
lawyer and - in return for an assurance  of co n f i d e n t i a l i t y  from 
the lawyer - admits the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y  damaging fact that he 
was in the vicinity of the crime about the time of its occurrence. 
On the assumpt ion that this fact - taken with other (false) 
testi mon y against him - might lead to an unjust conviction, he 
tells the lawyer that he proposes  to deny, on oath, that he was 
in the vicinity. Freedman accepts that the lawyer must advise 
that this would be unlawful but, nevertheless, consid er s that he 
has a duty, should the client persist in his intention, to 
"proceed in the normal fashion in present ing the testim on y and 
arguing the case to the j u r y . . . ."
Freedman argues that in these circumsta nces, since the lawyer 
would not be wilfully procuring the perjury but merely, and 
reluctantly, accepting the client's decision, he would not be 
guilty of subornati on of perjury.
He a d d s :
"There is a point of view, which has been ex press ed to me by a 
number of experi enced attorneys, that the criminal defend an t 
has a 'right to tell his story'. What that sug gests  is that 
it is simply too much to expect of a human being, caught up 
in the criminal process and facing loss of liberty and the 
horrors of imprisonment, not to attempt to lie to avoid that 
penalty. For that reason, criminal defendants in most Europea n 
countries do not testify under oath, but simply 'tell their 
stories'. It is also not ew or thy that subseq uent perj ury  
prosecutions against criminal defe ndants in this countr y are 
extremely rare.  ......." [ 2 2 5 ]
In envi saging  a sit uation in which the client is, in fact,
innocent - and known or believed  by his lawyer to be so - Fr ee dma
is, of course, making the stron gest possible moral case both for
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the accused and his lawyer for ignoring the strict proscri pt ion 
of perjury enshrined in the canons of professio na l conduct. The 
pa rticula r example he gives is similar to that earlier discusse d 
[226] in the context of possible  moral arguments for the 
ju s t i f i c a t i o n  of lying - specifi cally, lies to avoid serious 
harm. It may also, perhaps, be seen as an i l l u strati on  of 
another possible moral ju s t i f i c a t i o n  - the lie to undo another 
lie.
It is to be noted, however, that the views here exp re ssed by 
Fr eed man in defence of perjury in certain cir cu m s t a n c e s  do not 
appear to be restricte d to innocent accused situations.
Two part ic ular points which Freedma n makes in his remarks are 
also worthy of special note: the perjuriou s conseq uences, as he
sees it, of allowing d ef en dants in criminal cases to testify under 
oath and the rarity of subseque nt perjury prose cutions.
3.7.5 - The Accused as Witn ess on his Own Behalf
As regards perjury by criminal def end an ts under oath, Hazard 
ex presses similar views to those of Freedman:
"Why should d i s s i mulati on  not be acceptable in court? There 
are many cultures in which it is assumed that parties to legal 
confl ict  lie on their own behalf; no pretense is made that 
they should be expected to do otherwise. The common law 
formerly exhibit ed the same attitude, for it did not allow 
testi mon y from a criminal defen dant or any 'party in interest' 
in civil litigation. The present ethical dilemma in the 
ad ver sa ry system may th ere fore be ult imate ly trace ab le to the 
abo li ti on of the common law rules of witness d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n .
The reform of the common law rules occurr ed in the n i n e t e e n t h  
century. It was based on the p r o p ositio n that few i n j u s t i c e s  
would result if interested persons were allowed to testify. It 
was be lieve d that with c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  and the good sense of 
the jury, truth will out most of the time. Perhaps it is time 
that this premise was re-examined, for it seems eviden t that if 
the stakes involved in a lawsuit are substantial, if the ou tcom e 
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depends on the truth, and if the parties are aut ho ri zed to 
give evidenc e as to what the truth is, the parties will distort 
their su bm issions to the maximum extent p o s s i b l e . . . . .."[227]
On any realis tic view, the pro posi ti on that it is not to be 
exp ect ed that an accused, even under oath, will tell the truth 
if this is likely to result in his convict ion  would appear to 
have comp elling  force. Clearly, however, no civ il ised legal 
system can officia lly c o u n tenance  or condone perjury. It may, 
therefore, be said that the adve r s a r i a l  system, as it pr es ently 
operates, is one which, while of neces sit y co nd emning perjury 
by an accused, and the aiding or abetting of it by his lawyer, 
sa nctions a procedure which, in practice, encourages, or even 
(in the opinion of some) necessitates, both.
It is, of course, true that the accused is not c o m pell ed  to 
testify under oath. He can avoid perjury by d e c l inin g to take 
the stand. But although failure to testify on his own behalf 
cannot be founded upon by the prosecution, it seems clear - as 
we shall later discuss in the context of "guilty accused"  
sit ua ti ons - that such failure cannot but have an ad ve rse effect 
upon the court [228].
In the pa rt icu lar example given by Freedman - that of an 
innocent accused - a c o n s c ientio us  person who has a strong 
aversi on to lying under oath is faced with an i n v i dious cho ice - 
either to admit under oath a da maging fact which, de sp it e his 
innocence, may lead to an unjust conviction, or d e c l i n i n g  to 
take the stand and thus, perhaps give rise to an i n f e r e n c e  which 
may have the same result.
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It would seem clear, therefore, that under the present system,
there are strong incentives for an accused to elect to testify
on his own behalf; that, in many situations - and even, sometimes, 
when the accused is innocent - there will be, in the accused's 
perception, compell ing reasons to perjure himself; and that, 
in situ ations similar to those in the Freedman example, there 
may, in his counsel's perception, be cogent moral co n s i d e r a t i o n s  
which justify his acc ept ance - however relu ctantly - o f  his 
client's decision so to do.
3.7.6 - The Rarity of P ro se cutions  for Perjury - the Implications
The rarity of perjury p r o s ecu ti ons against criminal d e f e nd ants -
a fact which would appear to be as true in the United Kin gdom as
in the United States - also invites the question wh ether the 
ad versari al system itself is in fact b a s e d o n  a genuine 
exp ec ta tion that accused persons will tell the truth under oath - 
even at the cost of s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n  - or whether p er jurious  
conduct by criminal defendant s is, in reality, acc ep te d as a 
fact of life justifying a legal blind eye.
The latter conclusion would seem to find support in views expressec
by Sir Rupert Cross, as quoted by Sheriff MacPhail:
"  I would have no ob jection to the abo lition of the accus ed 's
liab ili ty to be prosecuted  for perjury in giving false ev id ence 
on his own behalf. Such p r os ecution s are rare in England, and 
many Europeans  think that even the poss ibility of p r o c e e d i n g s  
of this nature is an A nglo-S ax on absurd ity." [229]
However, the sug gestion that the law should leg iti mise pe rjury by 
an accused when testifying on his own behalf is, we must surmise, 
unlikely to be cou nten anced - explicitly, at any rate - and was, 
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H.M. Advoc ate v. Cairns [230]
This case high lights the rarity of such p rose cu tions in that it 
appears to be the only instance of such in Scotland since the 
passing of the Criminal Evi dence Act, 1898 [231] which made an 
accused a competent witness in his own defence. Cairns had been 
tried for murder by stabbing one, Malcolmson, in Ba rli nni e Prison, 
Glasgow, but was found non-proven. Subsequently, however, he was 
served with an indictment for perjury in that, at his trial for 
that m u r d e r :
"....you, being sworn as a witness in a criminal cause then 
pr oceed in g in the High Court of Justiciary, did depone that
you did n o t ... . q s s a u 1 1 and stab Alexa nder M a l c o l m s o n ....... the
truth as you well knew being that you d i d ........ assault and
stab said Alexander M a l c o lm so n."
His counsel, by way of a plea in bar of trial for perjury, relied,
inter a l i a , on co ns id e r a t i o n s  of natural justice and argued that:
"When an accused person was i n t e r rogate d on oath about the crime 
which he was alleged to have committed, and pe rj ured h i m self in 
answer, he was not liable to be pun ish ed for perjury" and that 
"the denial of the co mm ission  of an offence by an acc used person 
on oath at his trial was neither a crime at common law nor a 
contravention of an Act of Par liame nt  applicable to Scot l a n d ."[232
The Court rejected these arguments, upholding the p r o s e c u t i o n  
submiss io ns that the decision  whether or not to pr o s e c u t e  for 
perjury in these c i r c u ms ta nces was a matter for the d i s c r e t i o n  of 
the Lord Advocate and that the 1898 Act did not give an accused 
a licence to commit perjury. The Court further c o n s i d e r e d  that 
defence counsel, in support of his argument on nat ural justice, 
had not shown that:
"  there is something so inherentl y inequit able in p r o s e c u t i n g
a person for giving false ev ide nce at his trial d e n ying his guilt 
that the giving of such evidence does not amount to pe rj ur y under 
the law of Scotland." [233]
Also, in the opinion of Lord Wheatley:
"To /
"To give a general immunity to accused persons to commit perjury, 
however blatant, and perhaps even publicly boast of its success 
would only bring the law into disrepute." [234]
The significance of this o b s e r vatio n of Lord Wheatley can perhaps 
be better un de rstoo d in the light of the fact that the prod uctions 
at the perjury trial included a contract between Cairns and 
B ea ve rbrook  Newspapers  and a transcr ipt  of a " t ap e- recorde d 
co nfe ssion" to the murder of Ma lc olmson made by Cairns to a 
r e p r e sent at ive of that newspap er company. [235]
This back gr ound may suggest that the mot iva tion for the perjury 
p r o s e cuti on  in this case owed less to the perjury itsel f than to 
the fact that the accused had, apparently, been so rash as to 
publ ici se and, in Lord W h e a tle y' s words, "boast" about it. This 
being so, it would appear that while the case d e m o n s t r a t e s  that 
the law will not exp lic it ly c ounten an ce perjury even by an 
accused when testi fying on his own behalf, it cannot be construed  
as indicat ive of a general will i n g n e s s  on the part of the legal 
authorit ie s to prosecute  for perjury in such circu ms tances.  On 
the contrary, its extreme rarity and the special c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
applying would seem to support the view that, in normal 
circ ums tances,  such perjury is tolerated - if not tacitl y condone d
- as an inevitable, albeit regrettable, con seque nc e of the
\
s y s t e m . '
Of pa rticular  interest in lathis case is the argument ad v a n c e d  by
\
the defence that perjury by an accused in regard to the crime of 
which he is accused, is not si pun is ha ble crime in law. This 
was, of course, rejected by the Court, but the fact that it was 
deemed worthy of sub mi ssion as a serious legal point may be a 
si gnifi ca nt  /
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signific ant reflection of the law's general tolerance of such 
perjury. Further, in so far as the argument so advanced may be 
taken as indicative of the pre vai li ng ethos among criminal defence 
lawyers - or a significant pro porti on  of them - it may lend 
support to the view that many of them may regard such perjury as 
often jus tified in ethical, if not in strictly legal, terms.
3.7.7 - Value of the Oath Dimi ni shed
If, for the reasons ex pre sse d by the court in C a i r n s , the law is 
unlikely to coun tenance the l eg itimisi ng  of perjury by an accused 
when tes tifying on his own behalf, it would also seem un lik ely to 
co un ten anc e Hazard's su gg estio n that, as in pre-1898 Act days, he 
should not be allowed to testify at all. Apart from the objection 
that such a proposal would be seen as reg res sive and would deny 
the right of an innocent accused to proclaim his in nocence  under 
oath, recent deliber at ion within the legal pro fession, in Britain 
at any rate, far from c o n t e m p l a t i n g  such a reversal, appe ars to 
focus on the contrary p oss ib ility that an accused should be 
compelled to give evidence at his trial. We may note, for example 
the delib er ations of the Thomson Com mittee [236] in Scot la nd on 
this t o p i c .
While Sherif f MacPhail supports the conclusion of the Thomso n 
Committee that an accused should not be so compelled, he 
n e v e rt he less considers that "there is nothing r e p ugnan t about a 
man being condemned out of his own mouth unless there be so m e t h i n g
repugnant about the t r u t h  "[237] While this is no doubt
a valid observation, it is also true that, as has been said, an 
a c c u s e d , /
accused, gene ral ly s p e a k i n g , is unlikely to condemn hi msel f out 
of his own mouth - a fact which accounts for what the Sheriff 
else whe re refers to as the "depressing"  frequency of the 
d is ho nourin g of the oath in criminal causes [238].
To the extent that there is within the legal system itself  a 
tacit ass ump ti on that criminal defendants will and do fr eq uently 
lie under oath - and, moreover, do so with impunity - to that 
extent the tr uth- v o u c h i n g  value of the judicial oath and, therefor 
the benefit to be derived from it as a solemn as se rtion of 
innocence, are diminished.
3.7.8 - Summary and Con cl usion on Perjury
(1) Perjury by a client - and the wilful aiding or abe tt in g 
it by his lawyer - are serious criminal offences which 
are u n equi vo cally forb idden by law and by the canons of 
p ro fe ssiona l conduct.
(2) While perjury itself can, of course, only be co m m i t t e d
during judicial proceedi ngs, its seeds may - w i t t i n g l y  or
u n w i tt in gly - be sown by a lawyer when giving i n f o r m a t i o n  
or advice. Such situ at ions can sometimes pose de li cate 
problem s for the co n s c i e n t i o u s  lawyer.
(3) Apart from the official p r o s c r i p t i o n  against procuring,
aiding or abetting perjury, there seems - in crimina l
cases - to be little positive guidance as to the proper
course of conduct for an advocate whose client is intent 
upon, or has committed, perjury.
(4) No t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the legal and pro fe ssional  s t r i c t u r e s  against 
p e r j u r i o u s  conduct by clients or lawyers, there are 
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in di ca tio ns that such conduct may not be uncommon and 
evidence of a view among practising criminal lawyers - i n  
America at any rate - that it may, in certain situations, 
b e j u s t i f i e d .
(3) These conside rations, coupled with the fact that perjury 
pro se cu tions of criminal defenda nts are rare, may suggest 
a realistic acce ptanc e by the legal system itsel f of the 
ine vi ta bility  of perjury by criminal def end an ts - if not, 
indeed, a tacit c on do nation of it - and possibly, perhaps, 
a similar acceptance that such perjury is, not uncommonly, 
passi vel y assisted, even if not wilfully procured, by their 
lawyers.
(6) This may, in turn, suggest that, although there may be
cogent and com me ndabl e argumen ts for the present practi ce 
of allowing criminal defendants  to testify on their own 
behalf, it may be pe rce ived as exerting pr essure on 
defe nda nts and their lawyers which are tan tamou nt  to the 
e nc ou rageme nt  of per jur ious conduct; as de t r a c t i n g  from 
the sanctity and eviden tial status of the judici al oath; 
and as exa cerbati ng  the ethical problems of the advo cate 
in his role as criminal defence counsel.
In conclusion, it may be added that this di sc uss ion of perjury 
would seem once again to demo nst rate a si gnificant gap in the 
field. of legal ethics between precept and practice and the 
ethical i n co ns istenc ie s of the ad versaria l system of justice.
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3.8 - The Guilty Accused
3.8.1 - Confessio n of Guilt by Accused
The subject we here examine is probably the most obvious example 
of a poten tia l perjurious situa tion for both client and counsel. 
It is also a situation in which a decision as to whether or not 
an accused should take the stand is pa rticularly  crucial for 
both .
Since a person on trial for a criminal offence is, under our 
legal system, assumed to be innocent unless and until he is 
convicted by the court, use of the term "guilty accused" before 
the court's verdict has been given is, in legal terms, 
inappropriate. But in the context in which it is here used, 
it is intended to denote a si tuation in which an accused who 
wishes to plead, or has pled, not guilty, has admitte d in 
confidence  to his counsel that he did, indeed, commit the offence 
charged - or, at any rate, has admitted facts which, in his 
counsel's opinion, clearly estab lis h factual guilt.
It is probably true that the tra di ti onal public cy nicis m towards 
the criminal defence lawyer is, in large measure, i n f l u e n c e d  by 
its re cogni tion of the fact that such situations must, not 
uncommonly, arise; but recog nit ion within the legal p r o f e s s i o n  
itself that they do in fact arise, is aptly d e m o n s t r a t e d  by the 
official professional p r o n o u n c e m e n t s x on the subject. All the 
p r o f e ssio na l codes of conduct in advers arial j u r i s d i c t i o n s  appear 
to provide sp ecifically for conf ession of guilt situa tions; but 
although intended to give guidance as to defence co u n s e l ' s  proper 
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course of conduct in such circumstanc es, the guidance afforded 
does not, as will be seen, resolve his ethical dilemma in such 
cases and, indeed, gives rise to serious problems for counsel in 
a tt emp tin g to reconcile his duty to the court with his duty to 
his c l i e n t .
From the public viewpoint, doubts as to the ethics of defence 
coun sel 's role tend to have a wider ambience than s it uations  in 
which counsel knows that his client is factually guilty. Many 
lay people also find it di fficult  to underst and how a lawyer can 
c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y  defend a person - particul ar ly one charged with 
a serious offence - whom, short of absolute certainty he strongly 
suspect s to be guilty. Within the legal profession, however, 
this par ti cu la r issue is n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l . There is unive rsa l 
pr ofess io na l agreement that mere suspicion of guilt, how ever 
strong, cannot justify a lawyer's  refusing to defend - much less 
requ iri ng him to so refuse. From the ethical standpoint, in this 
situation, public censure appears to be adeq uately coun te red by 
Dr. Joh nson's assertion that "the justice or inju stice of the 
cause is to be decided by the judge" [239], or by the obs e r v a t i o n  
of Baron Bramwell:
"A man's rights are to be dete rmined by the court, not by his 
attor ney  or counsel. It is for want of reme mberin g this that 
foolish people object to lawyers that they will advocate a 
case against their own opinions. A client is en titled  to say 
to his counsel, I want your advocacy, not your judgment; I 
prefer that of the court." [240]
But when the facts actually known to counsel extend beyond mere 
suspicion of actual guilt and amount to c e r t a i n t y , such a r g u me nt s 
appear inapt. It is here that the difficulty arises and it is on 
this issue that debate within the pro fes sion is focused.
One /
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One obvious way of avoiding counsel's problems in the face of a 
con fi de ntial confess ion of guilt, is, of course, for the accused 
to plead guilty. As has been said, however, we are here dealing 
with a situa tio n where the accused, n o t w i t hstandi ng  such a 
confession, wishes to plead not guilty. It is a fun damental 
feature of our legal system that, irrespecti ve of factual guilt, 
an accused person is never required to convict himself; that he 
is always entitled to plead not guilty; that counsel is a legal 
agent - not a keeper of his client's morals. Thus the Code of 
Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales:
"It is the duty of de fen ding counsel to advise his client 
generally about his plea to the charge. It should be made 
clear that whether he pleads 'not guilty' or 'guilty', the 
client has the r e s p o nsib il ity for and complete freedom of 
choice in his plea. For the purpose of giving proper advice, 
counsel is entitled to refer to all aspects of the case and 
where ap pro priate he may advise his client in strong terms that 
he is unlikely to escape conv ic tion and that a plea of guilty 
is gener ally regarded by the Court as a mit igat in g factor." [214]
It may be noted here, however, that the Scottish Facu lty of 
Advocates' Guide is somewhat d iffere nt ly worded on this issue; 
for, while saying that "Counsel may not put pressu re on him (the 
accused) to tender a plea of guilty......", this is qu a l i f i e d  by
the phrase "  so long as he maint ains his i n n o c e n c e " . [ 242]
On the assumpt ion that this latter phrase means a si t u a t i o n  where 
the accused affirms his factual innocence - as distin ct  from 
merely insisting on his right to plead not guilty - the 
implicati on  may be that counsel is justified in ex erti ng  press ur e 
on his client to plead guilty where he has, in fact, adm it ted 
his guilt in confidence.
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However that may be, in the light of what is discu ssed below, it 
is clear from both the English and Scottish Bar Codes that a 
conf es sion of guilt is not, per s e , sufficient war ra nty for 
counsel to insist upon a guilty plea; further, the English Code 
rule, as quoted above, would seem, by implication, to reject the 
view that such a confe ss ion would justify couns el's p r e s s u r i s i n g  
his client to plead guilty - and to assert the pri nc iple that 
the only valid reason for counsel's  advising a guilty plea is 
"that he is unlikely to escape convict ion and that a plea of 
guilty is generally regarded by the Court as a m i t i g a t i n g  factor". 
The appeal is therefore to s e l f - i nt erest and not to morality.
But the main que stions to which this part of our inqu iry are 
addr ess ed are these: If it is the defence a dvo ca te's right -
and indeed his duty - to defend a person charged with a criminal  
offence no t w i t h s t a n d i n g  his c onfid en tial admission of factual 
guilt, is it possible for him to perform that duty a d e q ua tely 
while, at the same time, avo iding  the p r e s e ntatio n of a 
perj ur io us case? And are the res tr ictions  imp osed by the 
p ro fe ssiona l rules in such sit uati on s comp atible with a viable 
defence?
An i l l u s tration  of the doubts and diff icultie s which have 
tr ad i t i o n a l l y  assailed defence advocates on this issue is an 
early case referred to by Lord Birkett in a radio talk in 1961 
[243] - and me nti one d also by others such as W o l fra m and Ri ch ard 
Du Cann [244]. The case con ce rned a Swiss man- se rvant, 
Courvoisier, who stood trial for murder in England in 1840.
His defence counsel was Charles Philips. During the course  of 
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the trial, Courvoi sier admitt ed to his counsel that he had indeed 
comm itt ed the murder but added: "And I now rely on you to do the
best you can to prove that I have not". Philips, it is said, 
sought the advice of Baron Parke who told him that it was his duty 
to continue the defence and to use all fair arguments  arising out 
of the evidence. Philips did in fact continue to defend although 
his client was, in the event, co nvicted and executed. This
example may also be said to be illustr at ive of the a mb iv alence which 
tends to cha ra cteri se  much of the advice given to ad voc ates on this 
and other ethical issues; for there is no way of knowing prec is ely
what is meant by "fair arguments". We are not told what "fair"
arg uments counsel did in fact use in the conduct of the defence; 
in particular, it is not known whether he complied with his 
client's request to attempt to "prove that I have not" - as 
distinct from merely e xer ci sing his client's right to put the 
p ro se cution  to proof. As will be seen, this is, in terms of 
current pro fess ional  guidelines, a crucial distinction.
3.8.2 - Provisions of P r ofessio na l Codes
We shall now look at the pr o n o u n c e m e n t s  of various p r o f e s s i o n a l  
gu idelines  on this issue and discuss to what extent they may be 
said to reflect a unif orm approach.
In regard to one pa rt icular aspect - the si tuation where the 
con fe ss ion of guilt is made by the accused to his co un sel  before 
trial - the attitude of the English Bar would appear to have 
un dergo ne  a change in fairly recent times. The A u s t r a l i a n  
writer, J.V. Barry, in an article in 1941, set out the posi t i o n  
as follows:
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"So far as concerns members of the English Bar and those who take 
their traditi ons  from that Bar, an au thoritativ e ruling on the 
duties of advocates was given by the English Bar Council in 
1913; a ruling approved by Sir Edward Carson and Sir Robert
F i n l a y  ....The Council dis cusses the subject under two
heads, dep ending on the time the confession of guilt is made 
to counsel. When a confes sion of guilt is made before trial, 
the Council states that 'it is most undes irable that an 
advocate to whom the conf ession has been made should und ertake 
the defence, as he would most certa inly be seriously emba rr assed  
in the conduct of the case, and no harm can be done to the 
accused by request ing him to retain another adv ocate.... '"[245]
This would seem to have remained the position until the time o f , 
or very shortly before, the p ublica ti on of the current guide lines 
of the Bar of England and Wales in 1981 which now expre sses the 
po sit ion as follows:
"A barri ster to whom a conf essio n of guilt has been made by his 
client must observe the following rules:
(a ) If the confession is made before the pro ce edings have 
started he may continue  to act only if the plea is to 
be one of guilty, or if the plea is to be one of not 
guilty and he acts in ac cordance with the rules set out 
in Annex 13 which impose very strict li mitations  on the 
conduct of the defence. In the latter case he must 
explain his position to the client and his instruc ti ng 
solicitor.
If the barrister is inst ructed to act ot herwise than in 
con for mity with this rule he should return his brief." [246]
This change is si gnifi cant in that the former 1915 ruling appeared 
to regard a pre-trial conf ession - per se - as a ground for 
wi thdrawa l by counsel from the case, whereas the current rule 
sees with dr awal by counsel as ne cessary only if he is in structe d 
to act oth erwise than in conf or mity with the Annex 13 rules 
(infra). The change would seem to be well advised since, on the 
face of it, the former ruling would appear to negate the right of 
an accused person to put the pros ecutio n to proof - and the right 
and duty of his counsel to assist him in so doing; a right, 
indeed, which that same former ruling goes on to expound. Further 
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the statement in the former ruling that "no harm can be done" to 
an accused by requiring him to retain another advocate, seems 
highly questionable, pa rt i c u l a r l y  if the situati on arose very 
shortly before the trial was due to begin.
Otherwise, however, the current English Code closely follows the 
previous 1915 ruling:
"If the con fes sion is made during the pr oceedings or in such 
c i r c u m st ances  that he cannot withdraw without co mp r o m i s i n g  the 
position of his client, he should continue to act and to do all 
he hon our ably can for him; but his sit uation sim ilarly imposes 
very strict limitation s on the conduct of the defence; and the 
barr ist er may not set up an affi rm ative case i nco ns istent with 
the confession, by, for example, asserti ng or s ugges ti ng that 
some other person com mi tt ed the offence charged or calling 
evidence in support of an alibi." [247]
Annex 13 to the Code expoun ds at some length the prin ci ples to 
which the defence advocate, in con fe ss ion of guilt situations, 
should have regard, but, for our purposes, its essence is 
co ntained in the following extract:
"  the mere fact that a person charged with a crime has in
the c ircu ms ta nces above m e n tio ne d made such a c o n f e s s i o n  to his 
counsel, is no bar to that advoca te appearing or co n t i n u i n g  to 
appear in his defence, nor indeed does such a c o n f e s s i o n  release 
the advocate from his impe rative duty to do all he h o n o urably 
can for his client.
But such a conf ession imposes very strict l imit at ions on the 
conduct of the defence. An advocate 'may not assert that which 
he knows to be a lie. He may not connive at, much less attempt 
to substantiate, a fraud.'
While, therefore, it would be right to take any ob j e c t i o n  to 
the compete ncy of the Court, to the form of the indictment, to 
the admis si bility of any evidence, or to the s u f f i c i e n c y  of the 
eviden ce admitted, it would be abso lutely  wrong to sugges t that 
some other person has com mi tted the offence charged, or to call 
any evidence which he must know to be false having regard to the 
conf ession, such, for instance, as evidence in support of an alibi 
which is intended to show that the accused could not have done or 
in fact had not done the act; that is to say, an adv oc a t e  must 
not (whether by calling the accused or otherwise) set up an 
a ffirm at iv e case incon si st ent with the con fes si on made to him."
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As regards solicitor s in England, the Law Society has a rule in 
broadly similar terms:
"Where, prior to the c o m m en ce ment or during the course of 
proceedings, a client admits to his solicitor that he is guilty 
of the charge, the sol icitor must decline to act in the 
p rocee di ng s if the client insists on giving evidence in the 
witness box in denial of guilt or requires the making of a 
sta tement asserting his innocence. The advocate who acts for 
a client who has admitt ed his guilt but has pleaded not guilty 
(as he is so entitled), is under a duty to put the pros ec ution 
to proof of its case and may submit that there is insufficie nt  
evidence to justify a conviction. Further, the adv oca te may 
advance any defence open to the client, other than pro tes ting 
his inn ocence or suggesting, expressly or by imp lication, that 
someone other than the client commi tted the offence." [248]
In Scotland, the F a c u 1 1y of Advocates' Guide deals with the
subject under two heads relating, respectively, to "Duties in
Relation to the Client" and "The Duty to the Court and Duties
Con nected with the Court and Similar Proceedings". Under the
former heading, the rule is expressed  as follows:
"Where an accused person makes a confe ssion to counsel and 
counsel is satisfied that in law such con fession  amounts to 
guilt, counsel must explain to the accused (if he is not ' pl eading 
guilty) that the conduct of his defence will be limited by that 
co nfessio n as set out in para graph s 9.2.2.5 and 9.2.2.6 below. 
Counsel must emphasise to the accused that no s u b s tant iv e defence 
amo unting to innocence or a sugg estio n of innocence, will be 
put forward on his behalf and that, if he is not sa ti sfied with 
this, he should seek other a d v i c e ....... " [249]
(The Faculty adds a rider here to the effect that counsel should
consider the advisabil it y of obt ai ning c on firmati on  in wri ting
from the accused that he has been so advised.)
Under the general heading of "Duty to the Court", pa ra graph 
9.2.2.5 states:
". ...where an accused has adm itted that he has c o m m it ted the act 
with which he is charged (whether or not that ad missio n is an 
explicit admission of guilt in law), an advocate may not conduc t 
the defence on a basis i nco ns istent with that admission. Thus, 
he may not put to a witness any question suggesting, or tending 
to suggest, that the accused did not commit the act. /\ f o r t i o r i , 
he may not seek to set up a special defence of alibi or 
inc rim in ation. "
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The succ ee ding paragraph, 9.2.2.6, lists the lines of defence 
permitted  to counsel in this s i t u a t i o n -  these being broadly in 
accord with the English rule: obje ctions to jurisdiction,
competency, relevancy and suf ficie nc y of evidence, but in 
somewhat greater detail.
Finally, to complete this review of the relevant rules of 
profess io nal bodies in Britain, we have the brief i n j u nc ti on to 
Scottis h solicitors:
"If a client con fesses his guilt to you, in a serious case, you 
can and should continue to act to put the p r o s e cut io n to proof 
of its case but you must decline to act if the client require s 
the case to be conducted so as to assert his inno ce nce." [250]
C om pa rison of Pro visio ns - Although variously expressed, these 
rules and guideline s would, in British j u r i s d ic tions at any rate, 
appear to reflect a broadly similar approach to s i t u a t i o n s  where 
the accused, whether before or during trial, has a d m it ted factual 
guilt to his counsel. Certain diff er ences  can, ho wever be 
detect ed and, while they do not affect basic princ ipl es, they 
may be worth noting.
The English Bar Code, for example, makes the point (Annex 13) 
that its provis ions apply only where "....the accuse d has made 
a clear conf ession that he did ’commit the offence c h a r g e d ' . . . . "  
and not where:
"... st at ements are made by the accused which point i r r e s i s t a b l y  
to the conc lusio n that the accused is guilty but do not amount 
to a clear conf ession. "
To this is added the comment:
". . . . S tat em ents of this kind must hamper the defence, but the 
questions arising on them are not dealt with here. They can 
only be answered after careful consi d e r a t i o n  of the actual 
circum s t a n c e s  of the pa rticula r case."
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None of the other guideline s cited appear to make this explicit 
d i s t incti on  - and, indeed, it will be noted that the Scottish 
Bar rules are stated as being applic able to any conf ession  which 
"amounts to guilt" (rule 8.2.3.) and to any admission "whether 
or not that admission is an explicit admission of guilt in law 
(rule 9.2.2.5).
On another point - the propriety, in such situations, of "testing" 
the p r o s e cutio n evidence, (a subject earlier di sc ussed in 
co nnection  with c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  tactics [251])- it will be 
noted that while both the English and Scottish Bar rules allow 
the "testing" of p rosecu ti on witne ss es as a proper defence 
tactic not w i t h s t a n d i n g  the acc us ed's confessi on of guilt to his 
counsel, the English rule a c k n o wledg es  - as the Scott ish rule 
does not - the "difficult que stion" as to:
"....within what limits, in the case supposed, may an advoc at e 
attack the evidence for the p r o s ecution  either by cross- 
e xa mi nation  or in his speech to the t r i b u n a l  "[252]
On n more niqnifirniil mnltor, however, - that of wit h d r a w a l  by 
counsel from the case - there would seem to be an elem ent of 
doubt and some di fficulty  of interpr etation, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
regard to the English Bar rules. The other codes and guides 
appear to be clear that where an accused who has c o n f e s s e d  
his guilt to his counsel, refuses to accept the r e s t r i c t e d  
defence which counsel advises him is a neces sar y c o n s e q u e n c e  
of his confession, counsel should withdraw. The E n gl is h Bar 
Code, however, - pa rt i c u a r l y  rule 149 (b) - is not so clear and 
would seem to be capable of bearing the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  that 
counsel should only wi t h d r a w  if the con fe ss ion is made before  
trial - and, in circ u m s t a n c e s  in which withdr awal can be ef f e c t e d  
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without comprom is ing the client's position. However, the 
reality of the situation would seem to compel with drawal if the 
client rejects his counsel's advice on such a crucial matter.
Paradoxic all y, perhaps, the somewhat peculiar wording of the 
English Bar rules in this context may give rise to another 
doubt - but this time in the reverse situation where the confessed 
accused is prepared to accept the restr ictions on his defence; 
the question here being whether his counsel, in that situation, 
has a professi on al duty - or merely the option - to continue to 
act. On this point, the briefly worded injunction to the 
Scottish solicitors in Webster, is the most clear:
"...you can and should (my emphasis) continue to act....". The 
Scottish Advocates' rules are not so specific but in the light 
of the general profession al  obli gation  upon an advoc at e to render 
assistance, when requested, to a criminal d e f e n d a n t -  and, in 
particular, his obligati on to re cognise the right, even of a de 
facto guilty accused, to plead not guilty - they are pro ba bly 
capable, in the absence of contra ry provision, of bear ing the 
in t e r p ret at ion that in such sit ua ti ons the advoca te has a duty 
to continue to act. Likewise, the English Law Society rule, as 
quoted, may probably be so inte rpret ed  - parti c u l a r l y  in view 
of its emphasis on the accused's en ti tlement to plead not guilty.
The su gg estio n of possible doubt as to the English Bar po sit io n 
on this point relates to pr e-t ria l confe ssi ons and may, in some 
measure, be due to a not very successful  tra nsit io n in phraseology 
from the former 1915 ruling [253]. The words "he may co nt in ue 
to act only if" in the current rule 149(a), as read with the 
initial /
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initial wording of rule 149(b) [254], may be capable of
susta ini ng the inference that, in the case of pre-trial
confessions, counsel is pr o f e s s i o n a l l y  free to withdr aw  because
of the co nfession per se - if he can do so without "comp romis in g"
his client's position. However, Annex 13 of the English Bar Code,
to which rule 149(a) is s p e c if ic ally related, does say that:
"  the mere fact that a person charged with a crime h a s ........
made such a c o n f e s s i o n  " does not "  release the advocate
from his imperat ive duty to do all he honourably can do for his 
client" [255]
It would probably be safe to assume, therefore, that despite the 
possible doubt mentioned, the position'-of English B a r r i s t e r s  on 
this point is the same as that for other counsel within the 
British jur isdict io n - namely, that, no t w i t h s t a n d i n g  any 
co nf essi on  of factual guilt, whether before or during trial, 
and provid ed the client is willing to accept the c o n s e q u e n t i a l  
res trict io ns  upon the conduct of his defence, his coun sel has 
not only the right, but the duty, to continue to act.
Summary of Pro visions - In the light of this analys is and 
c om par iso n of the relevant pr ov ision s of the codes and guid e l i n e s  
of pro fe ss ional  bodies in Britain, there would appear to be a 
c on sensus as to the basic princi ples to be applied in s i t u a t i o n s  
where an accused has admitted factual guilt to his counsel. These 
may be summar ised as follows:
(1) The fact that an accused has, whether before or du rin g 
trial, con fessed factual guilt to his counsel, is, in 
itself, no bar to couns el's con ti nuing  to un d e r t a k e  the 
defence.
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(2) Further, it would seem that counsel, in such situations, 
and subject to the restric ti ons menti oned below, has not 
only a right but a duty to continue the defence.
(3) In view of such a confession, however, defence counsel 
cannot properly set up an affirmative case which is 
inconsiste nt  with it; that is to say, he is pr o f e s s i o n a l l y  
pr oh ibited from co nd uctin g the defence in such a manner
as to amount to an asserti on of his c l i e n t ’s innocence.
_A f o r t i o r i , he must not set up any special defence of 
alibi or incrimination.
(4) Subject to these res tri ctions, counsel must do the best 
for his client to prevent his conviction - by ex er c i s i n g  
his client's right to put the pro secutio n to proof; by 
c hal lenging  the j ur is dictio n of the court or the competency, 
rele van cy or suff iciency  of the pr os ecution evidence; by 
testing the evidence of pro secut io n witnesses  or by other 
a ppropriat e means.
(5) Should the accused refuse to accept the r e s t r i c t i o n s  on his 
defence arising from his confession, counsel should withdraw
3.8.3 - Problems Arising
The rest rictio ns  imposed by the profes si onal codes on the conduct 
of the defence in such situati ons pose serious pr ob lems for both 
client and counsel. It may be noted at the outset that these 
r e s t ri ct ions extend beyond a mere embargo on perj ury  by the 
client by his taking the stand to protest his innocen ce.  Even 
if the accused volu nt arily  refrains from so doing, or his 
c o u n s e l /
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counsel dissuades him, the conduct of the defence is not thereby 
n ec es sarily  validated; for defence counsel is also pr ohibited 
by the pro fess ional  rules from a s s e r t i n g -  or even, in the 
Scottish Bar version, "suggest ing " - his client's innocence in 
any other way - whether in the course of exami ning or cross- 
examining wit nesses or in his speech or sta tements  to the court.
The proble ms arising from these profession al  rules may be broadly 
identifie d as of two kinds: first, those caused by the with dr awal
of defence counsel in s ituati on s where the accused refuses to 
accept the re st ricted defence; second, those caused by the 
r es tr icted defence itself.
Wi th dr awal by Counsel - Apart from the disruption likely to be 
caused in the pre pa ra tion and p r e s e ntati on  of the defence, 
with dr aw al by counsel in the ci rcu m s t a n c e s  referred to gives 
rise to a variety of problems  - between lawyer and client, 
between lawyers inter se and, where the with dr awal occurs durin g 
trial, between the defence lawyer and the court.
One par ticu la r difficulty concer ns the r elatio ns hip be twe en  the 
i n s t r ucti ng  solicitor and counsel in those cases where both are 
involved. If the conf essio n of guilt is made to the de fence 
solicitor outwith the presence of counsel, p r o f e s s i o n a l  p r o p r i e t y  
would seem to require that he should reveal it to counsel; 
otherwise, they would be placed in an invidious po s i t i o n  in 
relatio n to each other in that the solic itor would be privy to 
crucial knowledge  not posses se d by counsel. But if, in the light 
of the con fe ss ion revealed to him - and the accus ed 's r e f u s a l  to 
accept the limited defence required by the rules - cou nse l 
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withdraws, the solicit or is then faced with the problems of 
retai nin g another - and of deciding what to tell him. Again, 
pro fessi on al  propriety would seem to require that he should tell 
the new counsel the reason for the first cou nsel's withdrawal.
But then, of course, the second counsel would be in the same 
position as the first and - assuming that the accused was still 
not prepared, to accept the limited defence - he would also need 
to withdraw.
It may be sug gested that in such situations the proper course 
would be for both the inst ru cting solicitor and the original 
counsel to withdraw, but, clearly, this would not resolve the 
dilemma since, unless the accused is to remain p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  
defenceless, he would need to obtain other lawyers. Should he 
repeat his confess ion to them, the original problem would recur. 
Another ethical question which may arise here is whether, in such 
situations, the sol icitor or counsel who wit hdraw should advise 
the accused not to repeat his co nf ess ion to his new lawyers.
Common sense might seem to suggest this course though some may 
question its propriety since it means, in effect, advi si ng 
the accused not to tell his new lawyers the whole truth and, 
moreover, is contrary to the princi pl e that complet e c a n dour by 
the client in divulging the full facts is ess ential for an 
eff ective defence. However, the same objective could pr ob a b l y  
be achieved by their simply expl ainin g to the accused, in plain 
terms, their prof essional positi on arising from his c o n f e s s i o n  and 
his refusal to accept the limited defence required by the rules.
In any event, it seems likely that the accused himself, having 
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paid the price of his candour, will draw the necessa ry co nclus ions 
and decide to keep silent as to his factual guilt next time 
round. In that event, his new counsel will be able to provide 
a full, unrestricted, defence with a clear p ro fessio na l co ns cienc e 
- though he will be doing so in ignorance of all the per tinent 
facts. It will also mean that he w i l l —  albeit inn ocen tl y - be 
pre se nt ing the fraudulent defence, including, probably, the use 
of perjur ed testimony, which the withdraw al of the first counsel 
was des igned to prevent.
Where counsel withd raws during the trial, another pro ble m of 
serious import for the accused is the effect of the w i t h draw al  
upon the court. On the subject of wit hdr awal by counsel during 
trial, the English Bar Code does not appear to have any specific 
pr ovi sion as to the procedu re which should apply, but the 
Scottish Bar Guide provides:
"Where he (counsel) feels obliged to withdraw in the course  of 
a trial or other hearing, he must formally move the judge (or 
chairman) for leave to wit hd raw from acting and protect the 
interests of the client by moving for an a djo ur nment so that 
the client can get other advice. He is under no o b l i g a t i o n  to 
explain in detail to the court or tribunal his rea sons for 
withdrawi ng,  since to do so may prejudice  the client, and he 
should not yield to pressu re to do so. [256]"
Notwit h s t a n d i n g  the concern here exp ressed about p r e j u d i c i n g  the
to
client, it is difficult to see how, in sit uatio ns such as we are 
discussing, wit hdraw al can be effected without p r e j u d i c i n g  the 
accused in the eyes of the court. The wording of the rule 
quoted seems to infer that, although a detailed e x p l a n a t i o n  for 
the withdrawal is not obligatory, some reason would be e x p e c t e d  
to be offered. In any event, for defence counsel to take such 
a radical step during the trial would clearly indicate to the 
court that all was not well with the defence case. In w h a t e v e r  
manner /
manner the reason for withdr aw al was cloaked, and whatever  verbal 
formula was devised, it seems likely that the court might well 
suspect the true reason and cannot but be adversely influenced  
against the accused.
The Restric ted Defence - It is, of course, open to the accused 
to avoid the problems arising from the withdr awal of his counsel 
by agreei ng to accept and comply with what the English Bar Code 
calls "very strict limitation s"  [257] imposed upon his counsel 
by the pro fess ional  rules. it will be clear from what has been 
said that he will have a strong incentive so to do; but if he 
is capable of a pp reciati ng  the full implicat ions of what is 
someti mes  called the "frozen" defence [258], he may possi bl y 
consider the problems att endant upon withdra wal by his counsel 
to be the lesser of the evils.
As has been said, the strict limita tions imposed by the 
prof essio na l rules in these sit ua tions  extend beyond the 
p r oscr ip ti on of perjury by the accused - or the s u b o r n a t i o n  of 
that perjury by his counsel. Certainly, in terms of these rules, 
the accused is deprived of the right to take the stand to protest 
his innoce nce under oath. They also, as one would expect, 
pr osc ribe the fabrication of a false alibi or the i n c r i m i n a t i o n  
of another party. But the li mitations  imposed are more radical 
than these specific r e st riction s for they strike at the heart 
of the whole conduct of the defence by p r o s c ribi ng  any attempt 
to assert - or even, as has been said, in the words of the 
Scottish Bar provision, to "suggest" - the a c c u s e d ’s innocen ce. 
Thus, defence counsel cannot, whet her  in the course of e x a m i n i n g  
defence witne sse s or c r o s s - e x a m i n i n g  pro secut io n witness es, put 
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quest ion s in a manner tending to suggest his client's innocence; 
nor is he allowed, in his speech or other statemen ts to the court, 
to assert or suggest his innocence. Apart from the p r e s e n t a t i o n  
of a special defence such as insanity or, possibly, (if not 
i nc on sisten t with the accused's confession), sel f-d efence, counsel 
would seem in effect to be re st ricted to a line of defence aimed 
at merely frustrating the p r o s e cu tor's attempt to di sc harge his 
legal onus of proof - by challenging the suf ficie nc y of his 
eviden ce to discharge that onus or by technical attack s on 
competency, relevan cy or juris diction.
Apart from the question as to whether any defence advocate - 
p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  obliged, as he is, zealo usl y to protect his client - 
can r e a l i st ically  be expected to conduct such an insi pi dly negati ve 
defence, the question may, perhaps, be reasonably put whether it 
is in fact feasible to draw the dividi ng line which the 
p r ofes si on al rules require betwee n an implied asse rt ion of 
in nocence and an assault upon the p ro secutio n evidence. The 
English Bar rules, as we have noted [259], ac kn o w l e d g e  this 
difficulty in the context of "testing" the pro s e c u t i o n  ev idenc e - 
a tactic which, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the confessi on of guilt, both the 
English and Scottish rules allow. It is, of course, true that it 
does not nece ss arily  follow from the accused's factual guilt that 
all the pro se cu tion wit ne sses are telling the truth; and where 
it is known or believ ed by the accused or his counsel that they 
are being untruthful, it is no doubt right that they shoul d be 
challenged. Such a cha lleng e may, for example, be s i g n i f i c a n t  
and nec es sa ry as a basis for a plea of mitigation. There may also 
be m a l e vole nt  witness es who testify falsely against the accused 
out /
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out of v i n d i ct ivenes s and defence counsel clearly has the right 
and duty to expose their un t r u t h f u l n e s s  irr esp ectiv e of his 
client's actual guilt. But, as we have earlier noted [260], 
there seems to be ample evidence that in the advers arial system 
the primary purpose of the c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  of witnese s - even, 
it would appear, of wi tnesses  whose testimony may be known to 
the c r o s s - exa mi ner to be truthful - is recogni sed - and, indeed, 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e l y  reco gnise d - as being to break down, ridicule or 
destroy the cred ibility of the testimony. in the sit ua ti ons
we are d i s c u s s i n g , this princ iple is applied, it invites the 
questi on as to whether it is i n tr insica ll y con si st ent with a 
strict con fo rm ity with the pro fessio na l precepts; for, as has 
been said, these precepts forbit putting questions to a witness 
in such a manner as merely to suggest t h eaccus ed 's innocence.
It may, therefore, be arguable whether a general attack upon the 
cr ed i b i l i t y  of the p ro se cution  evidence can be s u s t ai ne d without 
such an inference.
At any rate, a scrupulou s defence c o u n s e l , intent upon strict 
con fo rm ity with the rules, must steer a perilous course bet ween 
his perc ei ve d duty to the court and his pr ofession and his duty 
to his client; for in attemp ti ng to avoid even a s u g g e s t i o n  of 
h i s - cl ie nt's innocence in c r o ss -e xamina ti on, he must also ensure 
that, by so doing, he is not seen to be tacitly or imp l i c i t l y  
a dm itting his guilt.
The fe asibi lity of the p r o f e ssiona l rules in this co nt ext  may 
also be que stiona bl e as regards another aspect: where the
co nf essi on  of guilt is made to counsel at a late stage, in the 
trial - or, indeed, at any point after defence cou nsel has 
co mmitted hims elf to a defence along orthodox lines on the basis
of his client's innocence. Alt ho ug h the English rules arepexpl-ic- 
itly stated as applying where the con fess io n is made during, as
well as before, the trial, both they - and the Scottish rules - 
appear n ever th eless to be framed on the assumption that it has 
been made before counsel has begun to "set up" his defence and 
offer no guidance as to how he is supposed to deal with a 
si tuation where, prior to the confession, he has, in good faith, 
been c ondu ct in g an af fi rmative defence. it is diff icult  to see 
how counsel in such circu m s t a n c e s  could, without seriou s and 
u n acce pt ab le prejudice to his client, change course to the extent 
of radically altering his defence strategy and adoptin g a 
"frozen" defence; nor can one deduce from the rules whether 
or to what extent he is expected  to attempt to do so. In the 
absence of clear provision, one can but surmise that the most 
counsel can "honourably" do in such situations is to attempt to 
modify his pre senta ti on in line with the restricte d defe nce 
rules - but only, presumably, to the extent that it may be 
possibl e so to do without d e s t roy in g any c re di bility  in his 
client's case. The extent to which this may be po ssible  will 
depend mainly upon how late in the pr oceedings  the c o n f e s s i o n  
is made; clearly, the later the stage, the more d i f f icult  it 
will be; and, indeed, if made at a very late stage, the point 
may have been reached where any modif i c a t i o n  of the de fenc e line 
will have ceased to be p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  practicable.
However, this par tic ular problem apart, if we assume that the 
defence advocate, in deference to the pro fe ssiona l rules, 
decides to embark upon the r es tricted  defence, we must now 
conside r the im plications for the accused as regards the effect 
which the adoption of this line of defence may have upon the 
trial c o u r t .
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the accused's legal right to ma intain  sil ence 
and /
l / ( .
and the right of him and his counsel to elect to offer no 
evidenc e af firmative  of his innocence - whether by taking the 
stand or otherwise - the effect of this upon the court cannot 
but be adverse to the acc used and seriously impair his prospect 
of acquittal. Sheriff Stone deals with this matter in his "Proof 
of Fact in Criminal Trials" [261]:
"The law, in both Scotland and England, is clearly to the effect 
that an accused is entitle d to defend hims elf  without lea ding 
any evidence. A pros ecutor  may not, by statute, comment on 
an acc use d' s failure to lead evidence, and a judge may comment 
on that only in e xcept io nal and app rop ri ate c i rcu ms tances,  and 
with r e s t r a i n t  "
But he adds:
"The point with which we are concerned  is one about how the 
mind normal ly works in rea ching  a conclusion. The only 
p r o p o s i t i o n  which is suggeste d is a modera te one, namely  that 
failure to answer the p r o s ecutio n case by affirming  an 
a l t e rn at ive version of the facts, does involve a risk .. .."
In the light of the auth oriti es  which he cites in this context, 
the risk involved in relying upon an entirely ne ga tive defence 
is substantial. Thus, the Lord J u s t i ce-C le rk in a Sc ottis h 
case in 1972:
"The silent defender does take a risk and if he fails to 
ch allenge evidence given by witne ss es for the Crown by 
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  or, in addition, by leading s u b s t a n t i v e  
evidence in support of his challenge, he cannot co mp l a i n  if 
the court not merely accept that unc hall en ged evidence, but 
also, in the light of all the circums tances, draw from it 
the most unfa vo urable  and adverse influence s to the defenc e 
that it is capable of supporting. [262]
And from an English case in the same year, Lord Diplock, on the
con seq uences, in a civil case, of calling no defence evidence:
"this is a legitimate tactical move under our a d v e r s a r i a l  sy st em  
of litigation; but a defendant who adopts it cannot co mp lain 
if the courts draw from the facts which have been d i s c l o s e d  all 
re asonable  inferences as to what are the facts which the 
def endant has chosen to withho ld." [263]
A l t h o u g h  /
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Altho ugh  expressed in judicial terms, what the judgesin these 
cases appear to be saying is that, in the absence of any 
aff ir ma tive evidence or as sertion of innocence, the court is 
likely to assume the worst as regards the def endant and, 
there for e in a criminal context, his guilt.
It may also be noted that their comments appear to be addressed 
to a sit uation in which the defence, for tactical reasons, has 
freely elected to adopt this negative defence; whereas, we 
are dealing with a situa tion in which an accused person, because 
of his candour in rev ealing his factual guilt in co nf i d e n c e  to. 
his counsel, has this rest ri cted defence imposed upon him as a 
condi tio n of retaining the services of counsel.
It may, of course, be said that if the accused is, in fact, 
guilty, he should plead guilty and cannot complain if he is 
p re vented from asserting his innocence during his trial. In 
ethical terms, this would seem to be a cogent pro posi tion. But 
we are here dealing with this issue within the fra mewo rk  of a 
system of criminal justice of which a corner stone is claimed 
to be the presumpt ion of innocence and the right of an accused 
- even of a factually guilty accused - to plead not guilty and 
to have a pro fessio na lly assist ed defence in support of that 
plea.
It may again be objected that the professi on al rules we are 
dis cu ss ing do not infringe these principles; that, notwithstandini 
the severe curbs on his defence, the accused is still en tit l e d  to 
put the pr os ecution to the proof and is still presume d innocent  
unless and until the p ro se cution discharge the onus of proof and 
secure a convict ion by the court. Strictly speaking, this is 
true /
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true but, in the light of what we have discussed regarding the 
effect upon the.court if the p r of es sional rules are rigorously  
applied, it may appear to some to be rather dis ing en uous in that 
a defence which has such a slender prospect of success and p r e ­
disposes the court to an inference of guilt, e ff ec tively negates 
the principle  of the p resum pt ion of innocence and makes virtu ally 
m ea ni ngless  the right, even of a confessed accused, to have a 
pr o f e s s i o n a l l y  assisted and adequate defence.
Although his cri ticism of the official pro fess ional  stance on this 
issue is not expressed in precisely  these terms, F r e e dm an 's views 
in the context of the American Bar Associat ion rules which were 
current when he was writing - would seem to point to a similar 
conclusion:
"E xpe ri en ced trial atto rneys have often noted that jurors assume 
that the defendant's lawyer knows the truth about the case, and 
that the jury will frequently judge the def endant by drawing 
in fer ences from the atto rney's conduct in the case. There is, 
of course, only one inf erence that can be drawn if the defenda nt  
own attorney turns his or her back on the defe ndant at the most 
critical point in the trial, and then, in closing argument, sums 
up the case with no reference to the fact that the def en dant has 
given ex culpato ry testim ony."  [264]
In the context of the current British codes, this pass age  require 
explanation. The ABA rules to which Freedm an was ref e r r i n g  were, 
in relation to confess ion of guilt situations, somewha t less 
rigorous than the present British rules. Although  d e n o u n c i n g  
perjury by the accused by his taking the stand to assert his 
in nocence - and advising the with drawal of counsel (but only wher 
the conf ession was made before trial and where w i t h d r a w a l  was 
" f e a s i b l e " ) -  if the client insisted upon taking the stand, they 
were, app are ntly prepared to coun te nance the a c q u i e s c e n c e  - albei 
reluc tan t - of his counsel in so doing, but advised that:
"Before /
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"Before the defendant takes the stand in these circum stances, 
the lawyer should make a record of the fact that the def endant 
is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some 
a pprop ri at e manner without reveal ing the fact to the court.
The lawyer must confine his exam in ation to i de nt ifying the 
witness as the defendant and per mi tting  him to make his 
s ta tement to the trier or triers of the facts: the lawyer
may not engage in direct e xa mi nation of the de fen dant as a 
wi tness in the conv en tional manner and may not later argue 
the d ef en da nt's known false version of the facts to the jury 
as worthy of belief and he may not recite or rely upon the 
false tes timony in his closing argument." [265]
The advice given in this par ti cular version of the former ABA 
rules clearly does not resolve all the problems we have discussed. 
As Fr eed man points out, the s ign if icance of defence coun sel's  
unusual conduct in failing to examine his client in the 
c on ve ntiona l manner and making no reference to his ex cu l p a t o r y  
testimony, will not be lost upon the court. Ne vertheless , 
given the intrinsic d i f f i c u l t y o f  such situ ations - for which, 
indeed, no entirely s a t i s fa ct ory solution appears po ssible  - 
this par ti cu lar ABA rule may be said, perhaps, to ref lect a more 
flexible comprom ise than do the current British codes between, on 
the one hand, upholding the prof es sional  integrity of coun sel and, 
on the other, protecting, so far as the ci rc u m s t a n c e s  permit, 
his client's interests. In the first places, in not makin g 
wi th draw al  by counsel man da to ry during the trial, it avoids  the 
pr obl ems to which this gives rise. Secondly, it allows the 
ob stinate client who so insists against his cou ns el's advice, to 
"tell his story" - albeit a per ju re d story - in a ma nner which 
does not involve the co -op e r a t i o n  of counsel. Thirdly, its 
p r o s c ript io n against counsel's arguing or relying upon his 
client' s false testimony does not appear - though the point may 
be debat abl e - to be as rigid or c o m p r eh en sive as a blanke t 
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embargo on an aff irma ti ve case. For these reasons, it may 
possib ly be argued that it is more realistic than the current 
British approach.
In the context of realism, and given the pro fessio na l duty of an
advocat e - p arti cu larly a criminal defence advocate - to act as
the zealous champion of his client, we may ask again to what
extent the profes isonal rules we have dis cussed are followed - or,
indeed, genui nely exp ected to be followed - in practice; to what
extent a zealous advocate may indeed be r e a l i st ic ally ex pe ct ed to
conduct a defence which has such little chance of success. We
may gather from Pro fessor Fr ee dman's  remarks in this cont ext  -
and in the context of perjury ge ner ally [266] - that even perjury
is not di sc ou n t e n a n c e d  by p r a c ti si ng criminal lawyers, in Americ a
at any rate, on the basis that an accused person - faced with
the prospect of loss of liberty, or worse - has the right, as has
been said, to "tell his story". We may recall also the ex p r e s s e d
view of the As so ciation of Trial Lawyers of America that off icial
re co gni tio n should be given to a lawyer's right to " p a r t i c i p a t e
in pre se nt ing a client's per ju red t e s t i m o n y .........if nec e s s a r y
to avoid impairing a client conf id ence" [267]; and note also
that Hazard quotes with approval the dictum of Lord Bro ugham,
(in the course of his defence of Queen Caroline), that the
pr ot ecti on  of the client was the advo cat e's "first and only duty",
and, on the specific issue of the c[e facto guilty accused,
just ifi es the conduct of counsel in pursui ng a vigo ro us defence:
" T h e .......case was a p r o s e cution for murder of a man whom his
counsel discovered, during trial, was in fact guilty. Coun sel 
n e v e rt he less played out the defence, putting a key p r o s e c u t i o n  
witness through a gruelling and sugg est ive c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n .
The ensuing professi onal debate conc er ning his conduct e s t a b l i s h e  
the pr inc iple that an advocate is re sponsib le only for p r e s e n t i n g  
the best possible case for his client and not for the t r u t h . "[268
1 96 .
The pri nciple here stated as having been es tabli shed would seem 
clearly to be at odds with the profe ssional rules we have been 
di scussing  and neither this nor the other views ex pr essed as 
in dic ative of pra ctiti on er opinion in America can be taken as 
ne cessa ri ly  reflect ing  such opinion in the United Kingdom; but 
they may invite the question whether they may not more accuratel y 
reflect the common practice and attitudes of not a few criminal 
defence advocates in all adv er sa rial jurisdictions.
In the light of these views and of the general pro blems we have 
been discussing, it may perhaps be said that it is in the 
"confessed" accused situation, more than any other, that the 
formal precep ts of prof es sional canons of conduct render the 
p ro fe ssion vulnerable to the suspici on that such pr ec epts may 
be in the nature 'of p r o f e ssi on al " w i nd ow-dres si ng" - a ritual 
defer enc e to ethical probity designed  to impress a sce pti ca l 
public.
This is not to say that all or most lawyers will w i l l i n g l y  embark 
upon a kno wingly fra udulent and per ju rious  defence. We may 
perhaps reas ona bly surmise that, in practice, e x p e r i e n c e d  
criminal defence lawyers will assuage their prof e s s i o n a l  
con sc ienc e by discreetly evading or disc ou raging an explic it  
admi ssi on of factual' guilt and, in the knowledge that mere 
s us picion of guilt, however strong, Is no bar to their und ertak ir 
a full and vigorous defence, will proceed, with a clear 
conscience, to do that.
We may also note here, as in our dis cu ssion  of pe rjury in genera] 
the signi fi ca nce of the practice within our system of allow i n g  
a defe ndant the option of testif yi ng on his own behalf. The 
problem s arising in the "confessed" accused s i t u at io ns may be 
s e e n /
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seen by some as lending support to the views of those, like 
Hazard [269], who favour a return to the former common law 
p r o h ib it ion of such testimony. This would not solve all the 
proble ms we have di scu sse d but would tend to make less
co nspic uo us  in the eyes of the court the accused's failure to
present an affirm ative case.
3.8.4 - The Legal Concept of Guilt
The si tua tion where an accused has confessed his factual guilt
to his counsel dem on st rates more clearly than any other a 
feature of our criminal law which is of crucial s i g n i f i c a n c e  
to the ethics of the defence advocate' s role: the legal me ani ng 
of the concepts of- guilt and non -guilt as cont ra sted with the 
normal sense in which these terms are used outwith the contex t 
of the criminal law. That this important d is tincti on  in meaning 
is not clearly appreciated, at least, by the lay public, is 
perhaps a major cause of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and c o n f us io n about 
the ethics of advocacy in the criminal courts - a confusion, 
moreover, which may also, to some extent, be evident in the 
t er mi nology used by lawyers themselves.
Legal guilt and factual guilt are not the same; nor is the 
di stinc ti on  a mere lawyer's quibble. Whether or not an accused 
person has, in fact, co mmitted the crime charged, he is not, and 
cannot be, guilty in law unless and until he has been c o n v i c t e d  
by a guilty verdict of the trial court after due legal process. 
Unless and until such a verdict Is returned by the court, he is, 
in the eyes of the law, innocent. This is what is meant by such 
stateme nts  a s :
"The issue in a criminal trial is always whether the accu sed  
is guilty of the offence charged, never whether he is inn ocent ."  
[270]
So /
So far, such stateme nts  may appear to be express ing the obvious, 
but they have important imp lications. It follows, for example, 
that if the accused is convi ct ed by the court after due process, 
he is legally guilty even though he may, in fact, be innocent.
Conversely, a not guilty verdict does not nec es sarily mean that 
the accused has not, in fact, commi tte d the act charged. It 
means that the trial court has adjudged that the charge has not 
been proved by the p ro se cution in the manner requir ed by law; 
or, in the words of Sheriff Stone:
"A verdict acq uitting the accused does not establis h any facts; 
it means only that the pros ec utor has failed to prove his 
case." [271]
More significa ntly, in the context of the "co nfessed" accused' 
situation, it follows that a plea of "not guilty" does not, in 
law, mean - although, in the case of a factually innocent 
accused, it may be intended to mean - "I did not commit the act 
charged" but, rather, "I claim my legal right to require that 
the pr osecu ti on prove guilt ac cording to law".
When, therefore, an accused, has, in fact, co mmitted the off ence 
charged - and has admitted such to his counsel - h e  is not, by 
te ndering a plea of "not guilty", making a false as s e r t i o n  to the 
court - nor, therefore, is his counsel assist ing a f a l se hood in 
un de rtak in g the defence.
Althoug h these dis tinc tions  between factual and legal me a n i n g s  
are no doubt appre ciated by lawyers, they are not, perhaps, so 
readily understood by the public at large. In part icular,  the 
normal and natural as sociatio n in the lay mind betw een "guilt" 
and factual cu lpability tends to confirm the view of the lawyer - 
p ar ti cularl y the criminal defence lawyer - as a "hired gun"; 
one /
one who, in the words of Swift, is prepared to prove "that white 
is black and black is white, according as they are paid." [272]
Moreover, this m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of the advocate's function is, 
perhaps, to some extent, e nc ou raged by somewhat loose te rminology  
by lawyers themselves in a way which tends to blur the distinc ti o 
in questi on - and c o n s e que nt ly also, to blur the issues. As we 
have seen, for example, in our review of the p r o f e ss ional rules 
c on ce rning conf essions  of "guilt" by an accused to his counsel, 
the terms "guilt" and "guilty" appear - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  their 
strict legal meaning - to be used in the rules them se lves in 
their non-legal and factual sense. Another not able example of 
co nfusing te rminology  is seen in the Scottish a l t e rnativ e 
verdicts of "not guilty" and "non-proven". The fault here does 
not lie in the uniquely Scotti sh "no n-proven" verdict. Indeed, 
in the light of what has been said, that is, in strict legal 
terms, a more appro priate verdict than "not guilty"; but in 
the fact that their formal re co gnition  as al te rnative  verdi cts 
infers a dist inction which does not, in law, exist.
More to the point for our present purposes, in view of what has 
been said it may be argued that there is a case for a b a n d o n i n g  
the pleas of "guilty" and "not guilty" in criminal p r o c e e d i n g s  
and replacing  them by terms such as "not cont est ed" and 
"contested". Such a change would more clearly and a c c u r a t e l y  
reflect the legal rea lities and would assist in r e m ov in g or
abating public mi scon c e p t i o n s  both as to the po si tion of the
accused and the function of his counsel. In pa rticu lar, the
s u b s t itut io n of "contested" for "not guilty" would make it
clear /
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clear that the plea tendered by an accused who elects to go to 
trial is not nece ssari ly  an ass ertion of fact b,ut of intention - 
namely, his intention to claim his right to require that the 
p r o s ec ut ion prove the charge accor ding to law.
In the context of the "conf essed" accused situation, it would be 
pa r t i cu la rly helpful in c larifyi ng  the ethical issues which at 
present tend to be obscured, in the public mind at any rate, by 
the "not guilty" plea; for, to "contest" the charge would be 
less easily m i s u n de rstood as a fraudulent assertion of factual 
innocence. It may possibly be objected that such a change 
might be unfair ,to the factually innocent accused since it 
would deny him the right to the unequivoca l asser ti on of 
inn ocence which is conveyed by the normal (as distin ct  from the 
legal) meaning of "not guilty"; but, to "contest" a charge, 
while adm ittedly somewhat less unequivoca l in nuance, does not 
convey any adverse inference.
3.8.5 - Concl usions
In revie win g this discussion, it may be said that no si t u a t i o n  
demonstr at es more vividly the ethical dilemma of de fe nce counsel 
than that in which his client has c o nf id entiall y a d m itte d his 
factual guilt. As has also been said in regard to other 
difficult situations, the dilemma is p articul ar ly acute for the 
c o n s c ient io us advocate who places a high value both on his 
prof es si onal integrity and his dedi ca tion to his client. On 
the one hand, he is p r o f e s s i o n a l l y  bound to be his clie nt 's 
zealous and fearless defender; on the other, he is also bound 
by his prof essio nal rules to offer his client the bleak choice 
of being abandoned or su bm itting to a line of defence which can 
have /
have but little chance of success and, indeed, if the 
pro fessi on al  rules are pu nc t i l i o u s l y  observed, may, in many cases 
make co nviction  virtually inevitable.
It may also, perhaps, be said that this particu lar situation 
appears to reflect an i n c o n sis te ncy in the official pro fe ssiona l 
attitude to the adv ocate's  pe rceived  com mitment to truth. As 
we have discussed, in other situations, the advocate, particularly 
in his role as criminal defence counsel, is accord ed a wide 
latitude in regard to known factual issues relevant to his 
clien t's  case. This is so not w i t h s t a n d i n g  that counsel must, 
in many cases, be aware of c i r c u m st an ces which are strongly 
sug ges tive of the factual guilt of his client, albeit not in 
the form of an explicit confession. In such cases, however, 
and short of assisting his client 's perjury, there is no bar to 
his p re se nting. a vigorous aff irma ti ve defence - and, indeed, he 
is seen as having a duty so to do. Given that the line be tween 
strong suspicion and actual knowled ge of counsel as to his 
client's factual guilt can be a very tenuous one, the rigorou s 
embargo imposed by the p rof es sional rules on any kind of 
aff ir ma tive defence in "confessed" accused situ ation s may seem 
difficult, to justify.
This situation also raises in an acute form the issue of 
p r o f e ssio na l con fidential ity. The accused who reveal s all to 
his counsel by candidly admit ting his factual guilt is doing 
so, presumably, in the expe ctation  that his confi de nce will be 
guar antee d by his counsel's  p rofe ss ional probity and will not 
be betray ed to his prejudice. It may be argued by some, however, 
that /
that the course of action imposed on counsel by the p rofes si onal 
rules amount, in effect, to such a betrayal. It may be counte r- 
argued that the princ iple of 1awyer-c lient con fident ialit y,  
however sacred, cannot justify perjury - a pro pos it ion which 
those such as Bok [273] would certainly support and which seems 
diffi cul t to refute in ethical terms. But, as we have seen, 
the "frozen" defence imposed on counsel flows from the 
con fe ss ion of guilt per se and is not confined to si tu a t i o n s  in 
which the accused insists upon taking the stand to give perjured  
testimony. This being so, it may indeed, perhaps, be p l a usi bl y 
argued that the price which the confessed accused pays for 
reposing complete con fi de nce in his counsel amounts, in effect, 
to a breach of that confidence.
This c o n s i derat io n may give additio nal weight to the doubt earlier 
ex pre ssed as to the extent to which these par tic ular p r o f e ssiona l 
rules are, in practice, p u n c t i l i o u s l y  observed - or, indeed, 
gen uinely expected to be so observed.
Finally, in total perspective, the sit uation we have been 
discussing  may be seen as p a r t i cularl y illustrati ve  of the 
uneasy compromise within the adv er sarial system be tween the 
per ce pt ion of the advocate as a vehicle for the purs uit  of truth 
and his role as the prote ctor and champion of his client; a 
compromise  which at times casts the advocate in the u n e n v i a b l e  
role of one who, in the words of Hazard:
"  is supposed to be both the champi on of his client and a
gate kee per having a duty to prevent his client from c o n t a m i n a t i n g  
the courtr oom ."
"In principle", he adds, "these re spons i b i l i t i e s  are com pat ib le.
The duty to the court simply limits the way in which a lawyer 
can champi on his client's cause. In practice, however, the 
duties have come to be in perhaps u n c o n trollab le  c o n f l i c t . "  [274
3.8.6 - Summary /
3 . 8 . Gf - Summary
(1) The rules and pr ecept s of legal pro fe ssiona l bodies in 
Brit ain  (as su mmaris ed  on pages 173/183 -supra) regarding 
the proper course of conduct for defence counsel to whom 
an accused has co nf essed factual guilt, create serious 
pro ble ms for both counsel and client.
(2) These problems may arise either from man da to ry with drawa l 
by counsel, where the rules so require, or from the 
r es tr icted defence which they impose as a con di tion of 
c ou nsel's cont in uing to act.
(3) The li mitations  upon the defence imposed by the rules in 
this sit uation are of a nature and severity which raise 
ques tio ns as to -
(a)
(b)
(c)
(A) The
(a)
(b). /
whether it can properly be described  as a viable 
defence which is co ns istent  with the princ ip le of 
the p re su mption of innocence and with the ac c u s e d ' s  
right to eff ectiv e p r o f e ssi on al assi stance  in support 
of his not guilty plea.
whether the kind of defence imposed is logical ly  
feasible .
whether, in view of its entirely negativ e nature, 
there can be any rea listic expecta ti on that the 
rules imposing it are, in practice, followed.
"confessed" accused si tuatio n - 
highlights  the s i g n if icance  in ethical terms of 
the technical concepts of guilt and no n - g u i l t  in 
criminal law terminology;
2U4 .
(b) appears to involve a degree of i n c o n s i s t e n c y  in 
the official p r o f es sional  perceptio n of the 
advocate's position  in relation to issues of fact
(c) raises important issues regarding the san ct ity of 
l a w y e r - c l i e n t c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y ;
(d) illus trate s in a p art ic ularly acute form the 
ethical problems with which the advocat e has to 
cope.
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PART FOUR 
THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
Sections
4.1 Comp arison  of the Roles of Prosecu tor and Defence Counsel
4.2 The Decision to Pro secute
4.3 The Prosecutor and Questi ons of Fact
4.4 Conc lu sions and Summary
4.1 Comp ari son of the Roles of Prosecu tor and Defe nce Counsel
The advers arial trial has been variably descr ibed as a fight, a 
game, and a sporting contest. Common to all these a c t i vi ties 
is the urge to win.
In our review of the role of the advocate as cr iminal defence 
counsel, it seems apparent that, to whatever extent his 
mo ti va tion may be perceiv ed as temper ed by the purs uit  of truth, 
his pred ominant obj ective is to win the "fight" or "game" for 
his client. It will also be apparent  that, in pu rsu in g this 
objective, he takes - and, indeed, is given by the system 
itself - fairly wide latitude in regard to que stions of fact: 
by way of the n o n-discl os ure of adverse facts, the sele ct ive 
p r esen ta tion of favourable facts, and the general m a n i p u l a t i o n  
of evidence in the manner he deems most be neficial to his client.
In exa mining the role of his protagonis t, the prosecutor , we 
must ask the question as to the extent to which these feat ures 
of the defence counsel's function may also be p e r ce ived as 
applying /
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a ppl ying to him. Is the primary objective of the pro sec utor 
also to win the "fight" or "game" by securing a co nv iction?
Are the rules of the game the same for both adve rsari es ?
Before pro ceedi ng to explore these questions, we may note that 
the "game" aspect of the ad versarial trial is not peculiar to 
that system. In so far as there are rules gover ning the process - 
and an umpire or referee, in the form of the judge, to ensure the 
rules are followed - there is clearly an element of the "game" 
also in the inqui sitor ia l or, indeed, any other civ il ised 
system. What d i stin gu ishes the adversarial trial most clearly 
is the strong co mp etitive element in the forensic contest between 
the co nt endin g advocates. For this reason, the spo rti ng contest 
analogy is perhaps the most apt. In referring to this analogy, 
Frank quotes Damon Runyan:
"A big murder t r i a l .........posse ss es some of the ele me nts of a
sporti ng event. I find the same popular interest in a
murder trial that I f i n d ....... on the eve of a big football
game, or a pugilis tic encounter, or a baseball series. There 
is the same conversa ti onal s pec ul ation on the pr ob able result,
only more of i t .........The trial is a sort of game, the players
on the one side the attorn eys for the defense, and on the 
other side the attorneys  for the State. The defenda nt  figures 
in it merely as the p r i z e . . . . . . A n d  the players must be men
w e l l - s c h o o l e d  in their play. They must be crafty m e n  .
The game of murder trial is played according to very strict 
rules, with stern umpires, called judges, to prevent any
dev ia ti ons from these r u l e s  " The players "are s u p po sed
to be engaged in a sort of common cause, which is to de t e r m i n e  
the guilt or innocence of the d e fe ndant. .. ." [275]
On the questi on of "popular interest", it may also be re m a r k e d
that, in a trial as in a sporting event, the rel at iv e skills
and rep ut ati ons  of the contend in g adv ocates may be im p o r t a n t
in gredie nts in the e n t e r ta in ment value; the more equ ally
matched their reputed skills in advocacy, the great er the
public interest - in major trials, at least.
More /
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More importantly, this fortuitous factor of relative skills in 
the arts of the "game" may, in our adversarial trial system, be 
som etimes said to have almost as important an effect on the 
outcome as it.has in a sporting  event. On this point, however, 
the analogy cannot be carried too far. In a sporting event, as 
distinct from a law trial, the relative justness or moral merits 
of the con tendi ng sides are not relevant consid erations;  n e v e r ­
theless, in the eyes of some, success in a trial may often seem 
to owe less to virtue than to virtuosity.
Further, the analogy between a sporting event and an a dv er sarial  
trial is, of course, valid only in terms of the c o m p e t i t i v e  
element of both activities. Clearly, there is a vast d iffe re nce 
between them in other respects. But even in the comp e t i t i v e  
context, the analogy breaks down as regards several imp or tant 
aspects. There are crucial d if fe rences  which are of s i g n i f i c a n c e  
to the respective functions of defence counsel and p r o s e c u t i n g  
counsel.
One of these difference s relates to the relative res o u r c e s  of 
the con te nd ing sides. In the sporting world, this may vary - 
in some cases, the resources of each side in terms of ba ck-up 
and financial reserves being rou ghly on a par; in others, less 
so. But, in adversarial criminal trials, a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
dis parity in resources is a constant factor; for, a r r ayed 
against the individual accused and his counsel are the vast 
power and resources of the state pro secutio n b u r e a ucr ac y. These 
include the in ve stigative and tec hnical resou rce s of the po lice 
who, in the adv ersarial system, as Lu stgarten points out, "take 
an /
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an avowedly partisan stance" [276] in the criminal justice 
process on the pros ec ution side.
There are other differences, however, of an even more 
fundamental nature. There is, first, the obvious diff erence 
that counsel, in his role as a Crown prosecutor, is a public 
official - an agent of the Crown and state as r e p r e s e n t i n g  the 
public interest. Defence counsel, on the other hand, although, 
as we have discussed, he is perceived, in a sense, as the holder 
of a quasi-p ub lic office - as an "officer of the law" [277] - 
is not in any sense an agent of the state. His duty is to his 
client within the law. The di stincti on  here between "the law" 
and "the state" is, of course, of crucial c o n s t itutio na l 
im po rtance - and not only in a criminal process context.
This dis ti nc tion in status between defence counsel and the 
prosecutor gives rise to imp ortant distincti on s in function. It 
is a function of the state, as rep rese nting  the public interest, 
to ensure that cri minals are brought to justice. In a c h i evi ng  
this objective, it must also, however, seek - again, in the 
public interest - to ensure so far as possible that the criminal 
process so operates as to minimise the po ssibility of un just ly  
convictin g the innocent. It is, therefore, the duty of the 
Crown prosecu tor to seek to ensure that only the guilty are 
punished. For theee reasons, he has been describ ed as a 
"minister of justice" [278]; and is seen, in theory at least, 
as an advocate whose p r of es sional  function, unlike that of his 
defence colleague, involves no duality of duties but only an 
un eq ui voc al /
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u ne qu ivocal  commitm ent  to truth and justice.
The con se quent ia l and con tra st ing features of the p r o s e cu to r's 
role may be identif ied under two heads: first, those relating
to the c o ns iderat io ns which should guide him when deciding 
whether to und ertake a pro secution; second, his obl igation s 
in relatio n to que stions of fact when conducting a prosecution.
Z 'l U  .
4.2 - The Decision to Prosecute
4.2.1 - Honest Belief in Guilt
In regard to the cr ite ria to be applied when decidi ng whether 
to under tak e a case, a notable illustrati on of the d istin ct ion 
t r ad itiona ll y drawn between pros ecution  and defence counsel is 
the case of Oscar Wilde. As is well known, Wilde emb arked on 
an ill -a dvise d pro secut io n of the Marquess of Q u e e n s b e r r y  for 
criminal libel and lost. However, in the light of the eviden ce 
which came out in the case, he was very soon the reaf te r hi mse lf 
pr o s e c u t e d  by the Crown and con victed for the (then) crime of 
sodomy. Wilde's p rose cu tion of Quee ns berry  was based on the 
latter's all egati on that Wilde was a sodomist. M o n t g o m e r e y  
Hyde, in "The Trials of Oscar W i l d e " , recounts that Wilde's 
counsel, Sir Edward Clarke, requested, as a cond ition of his 
un de rtak in g the brief in Wil de's pr osecution  of Queen sb er ry, 
an ass urance of Wilde's innoc enc e of Q u e e n s b e r r y ' s allegation. 
Since Clarke accepted the brief, we may assume that this 
assurance was given to him. In c l ar ificati on  of this incident, 
Mo n t g om er ey Hyde comments:
"It should perhaps be pointed out here that since his client 
was tech ni cally the pro se cu tor in this case, Clarke was 
justi fie d in putting this questi on to him. Of course, had 
Wilde been facing a criminal charge himself at this stage, 
Clarke would obviously not have done so, it being con tr ary 
to pro fess ional  etiq uet te and the traditions of the Bar for 
counsel ,to make his client's dec la ration of his in n o c e n c e  a 
condition of defending him." [279]
In the context of M ontgome re y Hyde's remarks c o n c e r n i n g  this 
incident, it seems clear that Sir Edward Clarke's attitud e in 
the /
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the matter of his u ndertak in g to act as pro se cu ting counsel on 
behalf of Wilde was not peculia r to him but r e p r e sente d the 
general pro fess ional attitu de to pros ec ution briefs: that such
briefs should not be ac cep ted unless counsel is satisfie d as 
to the probable guilt of the accused. By contrast, as defence 
counsel, the advocate has no oblig ation to satisfy hi ms elf as to 
his cl ien t's factual innocence; and, indeed, as we have seen, 
may pr ope rly undertake a defence brief even when he knows his 
client to be factually guilty.
The incident related by Mont g o m e r e y  Hyde reflects what would 
appear to be a recogn ised pr inc iple that a pr os ecutor - whethe r 
i n a  private prosecution, as in Wilde's case against Qu eensberry,  
or in a pr os ecution by the Crown - must have an "honest belief" 
in the accused's guilt. The nature of this o b l i gation  was 
di scu ssed by the English Court of Appeal in Da ll ison v C a f f e r y . 
[280] Here, the conduct under scrutiny was not that of 
pr o s ecutin g counsel but that of a det ective constable, Caffery, 
who had arrested Dallison on a charge of larceny and i n i t ia te d 
a p rosecu ti on against him in name of the police. However, this 
does not affect the princ iple at issue. Dalliso n was r e m i t t e d  
for trial by the m a g i s trates but when the case came up for 
trial at the quarter sessions, counsel for the p r o s e c u t i o n  
offered no evidence against the accused and said he t h ought  it 
was a case of mistaken identity. Dal lison was a c c o r d i n g l y  
acquitted. Thereafter, he sued Caffery for false i m p r i s o n m e n t ,  
alleging, inter a l i a , that the in fo rmation upon which D e t e c t i v e  
Con stable Caffery had ini tiated the pros ecution  against  him 
could /
could not be the foundation of "honest belief" in his guilt nor 
did it cons titute reasonable and probable cause. At the trial 
on this issue, the judge dismissed  the case against Caffery and 
his decision was the reafter  vi nd icate d by the Court of Appeal.
This case is of particul ar interest in regard to the question we 
are now discussing: first, it highli ghts two c on trasti ng  aspects
of the honest belief pr inc iple - the fact that counsel for the 
prosecution, at the opening of the quarter sessions trial, clearly 
did not have an honest belief in the guilt of Dallison and 
th erefore declined to proceed; and the fact that, this n o t w i t h ­
standing, the Court of Appeal held that Caffery did have an 
honest belief in Dall ison's guilt when he initiated the 
prosecution. Second, the fact that counsel for the pr os e c u t i o n  
and De tec tiv e Constable Caffery each came to a different 
concl usi on on the basis of the same i n f o r m a t i o n , i l l u s tr ates 
the sub je ct ivity  of the principle  of honest belief in guilt - 
as distinct from the objecti ve test as to whether there was a 
reasona ble  foundation for that belief; a d isti nc tion st ressed  
by Lord Diplock:
"One word about the requirem ent that the arrestor or p r o s ecutor 
should act honestly as well as reasonably. In this context it 
means no more than that he hi ms elf at the time be lieved that
there was reasona ble and probable c a u s e  for the arrest or
for the prosecution, as the case may be. The test whethe r 
there was reasonable and probable cause for the arrest or 
pro se cu tion is an objective one, namely, whether a r e a s on ab le 
man, assumed to know the law and possess ed of the i n f o r m a t i o n  
which in fact was possessed  by the defendant, would beli eve 
that there was reasona ble and probable c a u s e .......... "[281]
In the event, it was held that Caffery sat isfied both tests, that 
is, both that he did honestly believe that there was reas o n a b l e  
and probable cause for p ros ec uting and that that be lie f had a 
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reasonable foundation.
4.2.2 - Evident ial  Suf ficie nc y - Code for Crown Prosecutor s
The princ iple of honest belief by the prosecutor would also appear 
to be reflected, by imp li cation  at any rate, in the Code for 
Crown Pr osecut ors issued by the Director of Public Pro secuti on s 
in England and Wales pursuant to the Prosec uti on of Offences Act 
1983. This Act, which e stabl is hed the Crown P ro se cution  Service 
in those countries, provides by Section 10:
"(1) The Director shall issue a Code for Crown P rosecu to rs 
giving guidance on general prin ciple s to be applied by 
them -
(a) in de te rmining in any case -
(1) whether p r o c eeding s for an offence should be 
instituted or, where proceeding s have been 
instituted, whether they should be con ti nu ed;"
The Code is, therefore, desc ribed as "a public decl a r a t i o n  of the 
pr inciples  upon which the Crown Pro se cution Service will exercise 
its functions." [282]
The princ iple of "honest belief" is not, however, e x p r es se d
exp lic itly in the Code in those terms, but though it may be seen
as being implicitly a ckn ow ledged in what it has to say r e g a rding 
evident ial  suffic iency criteria, the wording could, perhaps, be 
sus ce pt ible to misinter pr etation :
"When con si derin g the inst it ution  or con tinu ation of criminal 
p ro ce edings  the first question to be determ ined is the 
su ff icie nc y of the evidence. A pros ec ution should not be 
started or continued unless the Crown Prosecutor is sat i s f i e d  
that there is admissible, subs tanti al  and reliable ev ide nc e 
that a criminal offence known to the law has been c o m mit te d 
by an iden tif iable person. The Crown Pr osecutio n Service  does 
not support the pro positio n that a bare prima facie case is 
enough, but rather will apply the test of whether there is a
realis tic  prospect of a c o n v i c t i o n ........... "[283]
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The statemen t that the pr os ecutor must be satisfied as to the 
suf ficie nc y and re liability  of the evidence as indicative  of the 
fact that "a criminal offence known to the law has been committed 
by an iden tifia bl e person" may probably be seen as a c k n o w l e d g i n g  
the honest belief principle in that the prosecutor must pers onall y 
be sa tisfied in the light of all the evidence known to him that 
the offence charged has been comm itted by the accused. But the 
other test mentioned: "whether there is a rea listic prospec t of
a conviction", is a different cr iterion for it does not n e c e s sa ri ly 
involve a personal belief in guilt but rather is a pr ofe s s i o n a l  
assessm ent  of7 the likely impact upon the court of the pros e c u t i o n  
evidence. Clearly, there will be situations in which the 
prosecutor, although possib ly h arbou ri ng doubts as to the accused's 
factual guilt, may, nev ert heless, cal culate that, by the adroit 
p r e s en ta tion of the pros ecuti on  evidence, he has a rea li stic 
prospect of securing a conviction.
In D a l l i s o n , for example, the p ros ec uting counsel who dec li ned to 
proceed with the pr os ecution at the quarter sessions, might 
possibly have taken the view that, notwi th s t a n d i n g  his own possible 
doubts as to the acc used's factual guilt, the evid ence was such 
as to afford a realistic prospect of conv ictio n - the view, 
presumably, taken by De tec tive Co nstable Caffery on the same 
evidence. Had the p rosecut in g counsel proceeded with the case 
in that situation, he would, in the light of the honest be li e f  
criterion, have acted unethically. To his credit, he did not do 
so. However, had he done so, and given the finely b a l anced issues 
of fact in dispute in that case, he might well have succeeded.
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This d e m o n st ra tes the danger of not clearly dist in g u i s h i n g  between
the two evidential s u f f i ci ency criteria - a dist inction  explicitly
r ec og nised in the American Bar A s s o c iation 's  1974 Standards
relati ng to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of criminal justice:
"The pros ec utor is not oblige d to present all charges which the 
ev ide nce might support. The pr os ecuto r may in some cir cu m s t a n c e s  
and for good cause c on sistent  with the public interest decline 
to prosecute, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  that evidence may exist which 
would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which 
the prosecu tor may prope rl y consider in exer cising  his 
dis cr et ion are :
(1) the pro secuto r' s reas on able doubt that the acc used is in 
fact guilty ;
................. "[ 284]
However, while this distin ct ion is not clearly drawn in the Code
for Crown Prosecutors, when taken in context [285] what it appears
to be saying is that, in decidin g whether or not to in stitute
a prosecut ion, (and apart from "public interest" c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
with which the Code also deals [286]), there are in fact two
tests which the pro sec utor should apply: first, wh ethe r the
av ail able evidence is such as to satisfy him that the ac cu sed is
factually guilty - the honest belief criterion; second, on the
as su mpti on  that he is so satisfied, whether, having regar d to the
legal r equir em en ts relating to evi den tial co mp etenc y and
admi ssi bility,  the evidence is such as to afford a "r ea listic
prosp ect " of conv ic tion by the court.
On this in te rpreta ti on of the Code's provisions, the e v i d e n t i a l  
s u f f i ci ency criteria which the pro se cu tor is enj oi ne d to apply, have 
therefore, two dif ferent connot ati ons: factual s u f f i c i e n c y  relating
to probabl e guilt and technical suff iciency  relating to e v i d e n t i a l  
legal requirements. In this regard, therefore, his p o s i t i o n  is 
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clearly dif ferent from that of defence counsel. The advocate,, 
when acting for the defence, has no obligation to weigh the
evidence in order to satisfy hi ms elf as to the inno cence  of his
client before un dertaking  his defence. His duty, in the words 
of the English Bar Code, is:
"  to endeavour to protect his client from being con vi cted
except by a competent tribunal and upon legal evidence
s uf fic ien t to support a co nvict i o n . . . . "  [2 87]
For the defence advocate, therefore, it is the "legal evidence"
alone with which he is concerned; for him, the a s s e ssment  of
e vi den tia l sufficienc y means only its implicati ons as affe cting
his client 's prospect of acquittal; not as a pointer to his
factual guilt or innocence.
It may, however, be said that the terms of the Code for Crown 
P ro se cutors  as regards the principle  of "honest belief" as 
applied to the advocate as prosecutor, are perhaps so mewhat 
am bi vale nt  - albeit, no doubt, uni n t e n t i o n a l l y  - in b r i nging out 
the im po rta nce of the d istin ct ion as noted between the factual 
and legal suf fi ciency of eviden ce as a criterion for i n s t i t u t i n g  
a p r o s e c u t i o n .
A similar cri ticism could, perhaps, be applied to She e h a n ' s  
state men t t h a t :
"The purpose of the pre-trial inquiries  by the p r o s e c u t o r  is to 
estab lis h whether or not there is suffici ent evidence, which if
believed by the court (my emphasis), would entitle the court to
c o n v i c t  " [ 2 8 8 ]
On the face of it, this might be taken as implying that the 
pr os ecutor need only have regard to the legal s u f f i c i e n c y  of the 
evidence as the criterion for prosecuting. Taken in context, 
this, presumably, was not his intenti on for he was not de alin g 
with the ethics of the p r o s ec utor's  function as such. N e v e r t h e ­
less, the ter minology may again be suscepti bl e to m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
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in that it tends to obscure the important dis ti nctio n between 
evidence which the pros ecuto r himself believes to be suf fi ci ently 
credible to warrant a pr os e c u t i o n  and, possibly, more suspect 
eviden ce which he n e v e r thel es s believes may suffice to obtain a 
conviction; and may, therefore, encourage the as sumption that 
only one test - namely, the legal sufficiency test - need be 
a p p l i e d .
The dis tin ct ion between these two tests - and the need for both 
to be applied by the pro se cu tor before deciding whethe r or not to 
prosec ute  - are factors which, clearly, are of crucial im portance 
for the admi ni st ratio n of criminal justice and, as has been said, 
are indicative of the crucial difference in this context between 
the profess io na l roles of pros ec uting and defence counsel.
4.2.3 - The Prosecutor and Cre di bility of P ros ec ution Evidence
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the im po rta nce of these issues, it is perhaps 
worthy of note that they do not appear to be clearly ad dr essed 
within the legal pr of ess ion in the United Kingdom; nor do the 
di st inct iv e ob ligations  of the advocate as pro sec ut or - as 
compar ed with those of defence counsel - appear to be given the 
pr om inen ce  and re co gnition which their s igni fi cance would seem 
to warrant. Indeed, in so far as such matters are to uc he d upon 
at all, the effect may be said to obscure rather than cl ar ify 
these crucial distinctions.
The English Bar Code, it is true, includes a brief se ction 
relatin g to "Duties When Pros ec uting a Person Accused of a 
Crime [289]" and advises that:
"It is not the duty of pro se cu ting counsel to obtain a c o n v i c t i o n  
by all means at his command but rather to lay before the jury 
fairly and impart ially  the whole of the facts which co m p r i s e  the 
case for the p r o s e c u t i o n ......." [290]
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However, while this statement stresses the principle of the 
i mp ar tialit y of the pro sec ut or in relation to the pr ese n t a t i o n  of 
fact - as contrasted with the clearly partisan role of the defence 
advocate - the context in which it is made would seem to suggest 
that it is referring to the situation  during a trial and cannot 
be read as necessar ily defining the principle that pr os e c u t i n g  
counsel must persona lly  believe in the probable factual guilt of 
the accused as a p rereq ui site for the prosec ution pro ceedings.
The Scottish Faculty Guide does not appear at any point to refer 
s pecif ic al ly to the advocate in the role of p r o s ec uting counsel -
the ref er en ce s throughout being to "advocate" or "counsel" without
/
d istin ct io n as to function. In the one paragraph where the 
opposing sides in criminal p r o c e edi ng s are mentioned, the 
p ro se cution  is referred to i m pers on ally as "the Crown" [291]. 
However, this Guide contains one statement which, in so far as it 
may be taken as applying to counsel in either role, may be of 
rele van ce to the matter under discussion:
".....it -is for the court, not for counsel, to assess the 
c redib il it y and relia bility of witnesses. .... "[292]
The general context in which, in this Guide, the term "a dv ocate "
or "counsel" is used suggests that, in the main, they are
r ef ere nce s to advocates in civil pr oc eedings or the de fence
advocate in criminal cases, and the partic ular st atemen t here
quoted may possibly be con strued as so applying. But pe rha ps  not;
for a similar statement of princ iple as to assessing the c r e d i b i l i t  
of evidence is made by Sheriff Stone in terms which s p e c i f i c a l l y  
apply it to both pr osecuti on and defence counsel:
"Where the evidence in the po ssession of a pr osecutor am oun ts  to a 
prima facie case against the accused, or the eviden ce in po s s e s s i o  
of the accused's advocate amounts to a prima facie defence to the 
charge, neither advocate has any pro fe ss ional duty to form a view 
about the credi bil ity of the evidence or the t r u t h f u l n e s s  of their
wit ne ss es." [293]
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It is, of course, true that, for the purpose of arriving at a 
verdict, it is the function of the court, and the court alone, to 
judge the cred ib ility  of evidence and that it is clearly the court 
and not the prosecuto r who must judge guilt or innocence; however, 
in so far as it is per ceived to be the pro secu tor's duty to satisfy 
himself as to the factual s u f f ici en cy of the evidence, in its 
totality, to justify the p ro secuti on  proceedings, it would seem 
to follow that he must also "form a view" conc erning the 
cr ed ibil it y of the evidence or the tru thfu lness of his w i t n ess es  - 
not only, it may be added, as a crite rio n for the inst i t u t i o n  of 
the prose cu ti on in the first place, but also as j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for 
cont inuin g with the proceedings; for if, at any rate, the Code 
for Crown Prose cutors in England and Wales is to be taken as a 
guide, it seems clear that if, at any stage during the p r o c e e d i n g s , 
it becomes clear to the p ro secutor  that the p r o s ec ut ion evi den ce 
is not in fact sufficient ly  "admissible, su bstanti al and reliable" 
as in di cat ive of factual guilt, his proper course is to term inate 
the pros ecutio n [294].
It may also be noted in passing that Sheriff Stone's appar ent 
view as to the sufficiency of a "prima facie case against the 
accused" appears to be at odds with that Code's exp li cit re j e c t i o n  
of the prop osi tion that "a bare prima facie case is enough" [295]. 
However, it is probably true to say that neither S h e riff Stone's 
remarks nor the statement quoted from the Scottish Fa cu lty Guide 
can be const rue d as c on scious ly  dissenti ng from the p r i n c i p l e  
that the advocate, when acting as prosecutor, must p e r s o n a l l y  be 
satisfied that the avail able evidence is ind icat iv e of pro ba ble 
guilt; for these st atements were not ad dressed to this issue but 
rather / /
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rather were made in the context of the advocate's duties in 
relation to the actual p resen ta tion of the evidence to the court 
during the trial proceedings.
Ne vertheless, as has been said in regard to other somewhat 
amb iva lent stat eme nts as to the pro secu tor's  function, they are 
vul ner able to m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and could, perhaps, be explo ited 
by those who may take a more cynical view of that function. This 
danger is all the more evident in a system based upon a dv ersari al  
c o n f r o nt ation  and in which the will to win and, possibly, 
c o n s i d er ation s of profess io nal prestige and ambition are no doubt 
as strong for the prosecut or as for the defence advocate - a 
danger explici tly recognis ed in the American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  
1974 S t a n d a r d s :
"In making the decision to prosecute, the pro secutor should give 
no weight to the personal or pol itical advantages or d i s a d v a n t a g e s  
which might be involved or a desire to enhance his record of 
convi cti ons" [296]
So far as political adv antag es  are concerned, this pa r t i c u l a r  
factor is doubtless more relevant in America where p r o s e c u t o r s  
are political appointees, but in other respects there seems no 
reason to suppose that the tem pta ti on to a pr osecutor to be 
somet ime s moti vat ed by co n s i d e r a t i o n s  of personal or p r o f e s s i o n a l  
ad vantage through enhancing his record of convictions, is any 
less evident in the United Kingdom.
4.2.4 - The Scottish Pe rspective
In the context of the crite ria - as applied in pra ct ic e by 
pro se cu tors when deciding whether to prosecute - the p o s i t i o n  in 
Scotland, as reflected in a recent survey [297] by Moody and 
Tombs, is par tic ular ly  revealing. Being largely based on 
int erv iews with individual prosec ut ors (procurators fiscal) 
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thro ugh out Scotland, it reveals their own per cep ti ons of their 
function in a country in which, unlike England, a Crown pros ec ution 
service has been long est ablished; where attitudes and pra ctices 
have evolved over centuries; where there is no c o m p r ehen si ve 
st atutory code and p rose cu tors have been left, in the main, to 
adopt their own p h ilo so phies as to their obj ective and how to 
achieve it.
Pro se cu tors in Scotland see them selves as "upholders" of the 
criminal law, their major concern as being to "safeguar d the 
public interest" and regard puni shment of crim inals  as necessary, 
not only to deter, but as r e t r ibutio n for a wrong done [298]. 
However, the advers arial spirit is also evident. A c o r o ll ar y of 
the will to win which the system enc ourages  is the di sposition, 
among pro se cu tors as among ad voc ates generally, to view the 
outcome of a court case, not only in terms of the triu mph of 
justice or injustice, but in terms of pro fessional  prestige; and 
thus, in the case of prose cutors,  to see a con vi ct ion as success 
and an acquittal as failure. Thus, Moody and Tombs on the 
view poi nt of Scottish prosecutors:
"The image of the fiscal as an impa rti al pr os ecuto r is h a l lowed 
by tr adi tion but may not always be reflect ed in fiscals' 
prac tic al aspirations. Some fiscals are quick to point out 
that they are not: 'in the business of securing c o n v i cti on s';
'it would give the wrong impr ess ion if I said I saw m y s e l f  as 
there to secure convict io ns at all costs because that is cl early 
not so'. Others, however, admit that they e x p e rience a sense 
of failure when an accused person is acquitted: 'the guy walks
free and you know pe rfe ctly well that he has done it and that's 
just a p p a l l i n g '. "[299]
While the sense of failure here exp re ss ed is att r i b u t e d  to 
f ru st ration and indignat ion at the acquittal of one whom the 
pro se cu tor believes to be factually guilty, in some i n s t a n c e s  
it may no doubt also derive from chagrin at h a vi ng lost in the 
forensic /
222 .
forensic contest.
However, for our immediate purpose, the relevant questi on is the 
extent to which, in the light of this Scottish survey, "honest 
belief" in factual guilt is seen by pr osecu tors t hems el ves as a 
ne ces sary pre req uisi te  to prosecution. Given their com me nd able 
sel f-i mage as upholders of the law and guardians of the public 
interest, such a p r e r eq uisite would seem to be a sine qua non 
of their function since, clearly, the conviction of innocent 
people serves the int erests neither of the law nor of the public. 
But, consistent  with the view earlier expressed as to the absence 
of pro fe ssion al  guidance and di scussion on this parti cu lar issue, 
the question of honest belie f is nowhere spe cif ic ally addres se d 
in the.survey; and again, in the general context of the criteria  
for prosecuting, the language used leaves scope for varying 
i nte rpretat ions. Thus, the authors cite [300] as the standar d 
text for these criteria in Scotlan d the six points spe c i f i e d  in 
Renton and Brown - the following of which is relevant for our 
purposes :
"(11) Whether there is sufficient  evidence in support of these 
facts (the facts disclosed in the inf or ma tion before the 
prosecutor) to justify the instit ution of criminal 
pr oceedin gs;" [301]
In the light of what has been said reg arding the two d i f fe rent
co nn ot ations  of the evidential suff ic iency criteria, the w o r din g
here is ambiguous. No dis tinctio n is made between legal and
factual sufficiency. It may be construed as me ani ng one or the
other; or it may be intended to mean both.
However, the general context of disc ussion in this Sco tt ish 
survey in regard to evident ial  su ff iciency seems to sugg est a 
p r e o c c up ation  in the attitude of the pr osecu tors i n t e r v i e w e d  with 
purely /
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purely legal criteria: when dec isions are taken not to proceed
for reasons of evidential insufficiency , it is because the 
evidence is "legally untenable" [302], or on the ground that it 
"cannot be legally sustained" [303].
This imp res sion tends to be s t rengt he ned by other re ve lations which
might appear ex facie i n co ns istent  with "honest belief" in guilt -
and perhaps also to have di sturbing implications:
"A fairly new depute (fiscal) suggested that evidenti al 
req ui re ments might be st retched in certain circumstance s: 'it
may well be a case where there may be just enough e v i d e n c e .....
I will proceed because of the effect it has on the person although 
he may well not in the end .be convicted' "[304]
"Most fiscals would agree that where proc ee dings  have been 
insti tut ed the p r o s e c u t o r 's implicit assumpt ion  in pros e c u t i n g  
is that the accused is guilty of some or all of the charges 
libelle d against him. This makes it difficult for him to 
regard an acquittal as the correct verdict: 'I think if one
has decided to p r o s e c u t e , o n e  has got to adopt a pos it iv e view, 
jhe view that if p rosecut io n is appropriate, then co nv i c t i o n  is 
appropriate.' "[305]
This latter quote is perhaps, for our purpose, the most revealing. 
It may perhaps be seen as the nearest approach in the survey to an 
indi cat ion of a re cognitio n by pros ec utors them se lves of the honest 
belie f princ iple - albeit exp ressed in terms which may appear to 
fall somewhat short of it. An "implicit assump tion" of factual 
guilt may mean no more than the p r osec ut or's pe rc eption  that the 
in f o r ma ti on before him cons titut es  a p r i m a facie case in law 
against the accused. But even accep ting that it may also mean 
belie f in probable factual guilt, the inference in the pa ss age  
quoted seems to be that not all pros ecutor s have such an 
a ss um ption when deciding to pro secute and that even when they do, 
it may not ne cessari ly extend to all the charges libelle d but 
only to "some" of them.
In summary, therefore, we may conclu de that this inqu iry  by
Moody and Tombs into the pr os ecution system in Scotla nd would 
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appear to support the critic is m expre ssed supra regar ding the 
failure in di sc ussions on ev id entia l sufficie ncy to make the 
important dis tinc ti on between the factual and legal su fficiency 
criteri a and to make it clear that both should be applied.
Further, although their survey appears to reflect a gener ally 
c o n s c ient io us  attitude by p rosecu to rs to their function, and its 
rev el at ions cannot generally  be in ter preted as n ecess ar ily 
inc on si stent with the honest belief principle - it may invite 
que stions as to the extent to which pr osecutors are, in practice, 
guided by that pri nciple as well as by purely legal consid eration s.
4.3 - The Prosecutor and Questions of Fact
4.3.1 - Introduction
In the light of what has been said we may conclude that, in
deciding whether to institute or continue prose cut ion proceedings,
it is cons idered to be the p r o s e c u t o r 1 s duty to have regard to
all the evidence ava ilable whether for or against the accused.
He must not be selective or biassed in his assessment. As regards
pre-trial inquiries, Sheehan co nfi rms this:
"The inq uiries made by the p r o s e cu tion are cer tainly both 
impartial and thorough and will cover any evidence in favour 
of the accused as well as that against h i m . ...... ."[306]
But this does not mean that the position of the pro se cutor in this
regard can be equated to that of the examining mag i s t r a t e  in the
French inq uisi toria l system with his comp re hensive  "dossier";
for, as Sheehan points out, the inquiries made by the a d v e r sa ri al
prosecutor:
" ...... by no means give a full pic ture of the case as neit her
the police nor the p rosecu ti on has the right to examine the 
accused who at no time may be que sti on ed unless he v o l u n t a r i l y  
gives evidence at the trial itself. Furthermore, the 
in ve s t i g a t i o n ' b y  the p r o s ec ut ion is secret, the resu lts  not 
even being dis closed to the defence. Likewise, the a c c us ed  is 
not required to state or reveal his defence until the close of
the pros ec ution eviden ce at the trial." [307]
Consistent, therefore, with the ad versari al approach, the 
opposin g sides prepare for combat in secret, co nc e a l i n g  from 
each other their line of attack at ,the trial - much as will 
opp osi ng sides in a football match conceal from each other their 
pro pos ed line-up and tactics.
It follows that the pro sec utor in the adversaria l system, however, 
imp artial and thorough his pr e-t rial investigation s, will not 
nor mal ly have access to the main defence evidence. Never t h e l e s s ,  
i n e v i t a b l y , /
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inevitably, in many cases, his inq uiries will reveal evidence 
which favours or seems to favour the accused - whether as regards 
in fo r m a t i o n  about specific facts or about witness es whose evidence 
favours or tends largely to favour the accused. Where such 
evidenc e is of so fu ndamental a nature as to e ffect iv ely negate, 
in his judgment, the pr ob a b i l i t y  of the accused's factual guilt, 
his proper course, in the light of the pri ncipl es we have discussed 
will be to abandon the prosecut ion.
However, should the p ro ceeding s continue, a number of qu es tions 
arise and will now be add re ssed in regard to the p r o s e c u t o r ' s  
o bl ig ations  as to issues of fact both before and during the trial. 
We may broadly classify these in three categories: first,
ob ligat io ns  as regards disc losure  to the defence of i n f o r m a t i o n  
reveale d by his pre-trial inquiries: second, d i s c lo sure to the
trial court in the p r e s e ntat io n of his evidence during the trial; 
third, his ob li gations in regard to calling, or making known to 
the defence, wit nesses adverse to the pros ecution  case.
4.3.2 - Information Revealed by Pre-T rial Inquiries
For an illust ra tion of the adve rsarial  approach to the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between pros ecutio n and defence in the pre -trial stage - and, 
i nte resting ly, of possible changing attit udes in this c o n n e c t i o n  - 
we may again turn to Scotland and the case of Smith v . H . M .
Ad voc at e [308].
Smith was convi cted of murder by stabbing with a dagger. At 
the locus - a dance hall - the police had found, in a d d it ion to 
the murder weapon, a s h e a t h - k n i f e . They did not report this 
find to the p r o c u r a t o r - f i s c a l  (the local prosecutor), the re ason 
being , /
being, apparently, that they at tached no importance to the sheath- 
knife - there being at that time no suggestion that the victim had 
been armed - nor any indication  by the defence of a plea of self- 
defence. Just a week before the trial, the Crown Office were
informed about the she at h- knife by the fiscal, (he having learned 
about it acc identally), but, for the same reasons, they took no 
action to disclose the existence  of the knife to the defence. 
However, three days before the trial, the defence solic itor 
phoned the police and asked whether another weapon had been 
found at the locus and was then told about the knife. The defence 
then intimated a plea of self-d efenc e.
The accused appealed against his subsequent convicti on - on the 
ground (inter a l i a ) of the p r o s ec ut or's failure to dis cl ose the 
exis ten ce of the s heath -k nife to the defence. The court rejected  
the a p p e a l :
" . . . . w e  a r e  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  t h e r e  was any o b l i g a t i o n  on t h e  
Crown t o  i n f o r m  t h e  d e f e n c e  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  s h e a t h - k n i f e
or to make available any i nfo rm ation concern ing it until they 
knew that se lf- def ence was being pleaded. So far as we can see, 
there was nothing in the case prior to the in timation of the 
special defence to suggest that self-def en ce was a p o s s i b ili ty ... 
By the time the special defence was intimated to the A d v o cate- 
depute, the defence knew about the knife.
Had the defence been timeo usl y lodged, the defence would have 
had a griev ance if they were not told of the exi st ence of the 
knife. However, this si tua tio n never arose. In the event, when 
the special defence was be lat edl y lodged, the defence alre ady  
knew of its existence and cannot the refore take any point on the 
failure of the Crown to tell them about it earlier." [309]
Of pa rticular interest, are Lord Tho mson's o b s e r vation s as to the
general obliga tions upon the p rosecu ti on in regard to i n f o r m a t i o n
un cov ered by its i n ve st igatio ns  - citing the remarks of Lord Clyde
in the well known case of Oscar Slater. Thus Lord Thomson:
"As /
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"As Lord Ju stice - G e n e r a l  Clyde said in Slater v . H.M. Advocate [310. 
'an accused person has no right to demand that the pro se cution 
should - in addition to supplying him with the names and addresses
of all the witnesses who may be called - com mun ic ate to him all
the results, material or immaterial, of the i n ve stigati on s made 
by the Pr oc u r a t o r - f i s c a l  under direc tion of the Crown Office'.
There can be little doubt, however, that the tendency in recent 
years has been for the defence to expect from the Crown, and 
indeed for the Crown to afford, a measure of assi sta nce beyond
what would have been in conte m p l a t i o n  of any previo us gene ra tion
of Scots lawyers. However that may be, the Crown does now adays  
honour the practice of inclu ding witnesses and p roduct io ns beyond 
what is strictly ne ces sar y for its own case.
This practice springs from the Crown's reco gnition that it has 
op p o r tu ni ties for i nvesti ga tion which, are not enjoyed by the 
defence. It is based also on the presu mpt ion of innoc ence and 
the c o n s i de ration  that an accused man is entitled to the benefit 
of the doubt. But the practice has not been pressed so far as 
to mean that the Crown is under any obligation to discover a 
line of defence. If, in a stabbi ng affray, the i nform at ion 
before the Crown showed that both the assailant and victim had 
knives in their hands, it would be the duty of the Crown to 
include in the indictm ent the knife which was in the victim's  
hand and the witne sses who can speak to it. But, if there is 
nothing in the material before the Crown to suggest a possible 
defence of self-defence, it would appear unn ec essary for the 
Crown to include somethi ng in the indictment just because it 
might have a possible bearing on such a defence if t a k e n . It 
is a question of degree." [311]
The si gnificant points reflecte d in these o b s e r va ti ons may be
identified as follows -
1. Unlike the infor mat ion in the French examining m a g i s t r a t e ' s  
dossier - all of which is made available to the defence - the 
informati on gathered by the ad versaria l prose c u t o r ' s  
investig at ions is the excl usive property of the p rose cu tion, 
p re -e minent ly  ori ent ated towards the pro secuti on  case.
2. This notwithsta nding, there appears to be reco g n i t i o n  that 
any facts uncovered by these i n v e s ti ga tions which may be of 
material import for defence purposes, should be d i s c l o s e d  - 
but it is for the prosecu ti on to judge the m a t e r i a l i t y  for 
defence purposes. While , as Lord Thomson says, the ac cus ed
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is to be given the benefit of any doubt, it is only doubt as 
pe rce iv ed by the prosecution.
3. In this context, it may be noted that, in the appeal
proceedings, Smith's counsel also invoked the aid of Lord
Clyde in Slater as authorit y for the prop os ition  that "it 
was the duty of the Crown to disclose to an acc used person 
the results of their i n v e s tiga ti ons so far as m a t e rially 
affe cti ng the question of the acc used's guilt or inn ocenc e" 
[312]; for, following the words quoted by Lord Thomson in 
S m i t h , Lord Clyde in Slater also said:
"No doubt a very different  question would arise, if it could 
be shown that the pr osecut io n had betrayed its duty by 
insisting in a charge in the knowl edg e of the ex istenc e of 
reliable evidence proving the innocence of the person 
accused which it concealed from him." [313]
4. Lord Thomson's statement that the pro sec ut ion is under no
ob ligatio n to "discover a line of defence" - this is also
ind ica tive of the differ en ce between the a dve rs arial and 
inq uis itor ia l system. In S m i t h , the p rosec ut ion was not 
per ce iv ed as having any obli ga tion - in the absence of any 
sel f- de fence plea - to speculate on the possible i m p l i c a t i o n s  
of the finding of the sheath-knife. It may seem re a s o n a b l e  
to surmise, however, that the inqui sitor ia l examini ng  
magistrate, no tw it h s t a n d i n g  the absence of any other 
su ggestio n of sel f-defence, might, ait least, have c o n s i d e r e d  
the possib le impl ications of the presence at the locus of 
another potenti ally lethal weapon.
In summary, we may see this case as a si gn ificant poin ter to 
current pe rceptio ns as to the nature and limits of the 
p r o s e c u t i o n ' s /
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p r o s e cuti on 's  ob ligatio ns to the defence at the pre -trial stage - 
and also, in the light of Lord Tho mson's remarks, as indicative 
of changing attitudes to the pa rt i s a n s h i p  of the p r o s e cutor' s 
function and of a growing re cognit io n of the implicat io ns for 
criminal justice of the co ns picuous  disparity in i n v e s tigat iv e 
resources between pros ec ution and defence.
4.3.3 - Fact Di sc losur e during Trial
On the premise that the pros ec utor is one whose function it i s  to 
ensure, or honestly endeavour to ensure, that only the fa ctu ally 
guilty are c o n v i c t e d , w e  might reasonab ly expect that his 
perceived obliga tions in relation  to the pre sen ta tion of evi de nce 
would require his laying before the court all relevant facts 
known to him - whatever their import for or against his case. At 
any rate, such ex pe ctation would seem to be in accord with 
ethical principle; and indeed such a view seems to be cl early 
reflected in a rule of the New South Wales Bar A s s o c i a t i o n  - cited 
by Disney et al as re iteratin g "the ethical rule g e n e ra ll y 
accepted in England and Australia":
"....Cr own  counsel in a criminal case is a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the 
State and his function is to assist the court in a r r iv ing at 
the truth. It is not his duty to obtain a con vi ction by all 
means but fairly and impa rtial ly  to endeavour to ensur e that the
jury has before it the whole of the relevant f a c t s .......He must
not press for a conv iction beyond putting the case for the 
Crown fully and fi rml y.. ..He must not urge any ar gu ment of law 
that he does not believe to be of substan ce or any a r g ument of 
fact that does not carry weight in his mind." [314]
Co mparing this with the ostensib ly analogous pr ovisio n in
par ag ra ph 159 of the current English Bar rules, (earlier m e n t i o n e d
at 4.2.3 supra), invites reflection:
"It /
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"It is not the duty of p rosecu ti ng counsel to obtain a c on viction  
by all means at his command but rather to lay before the jury 
fairly and imp ar ti ally the whole of the facts which comp rise the 
case for the p r o s e cu ti on and to see that the jury are properly 
instructed in the law appl icable to those facts."
Although similar in phr aseology, an important variation may be
noted: the obl ig ation in the Au st ralian  rule to lay before the
jury "the whole of the relevant facts" is tr ansformed  in the
English version to "the whole of the facts which compri se  the
case for the p r o s e c u t i o n " - not, it would appear, quite the
same thing. The obligation  imposed by the Aus tral ia n Bar rule
would seem to be unequivocal: the prosecu tor must ensure, so
far as he can, that all the facts within his knowl edge and
relevant to the case are made known to the court - irre sp ective,
presumably, as to whether they are favourable or ot herwise  to
his case. The English rule, on the other hand, seems capable of
sustainin g the i n t e r preta ti on that the p ro se cutor's  o b l i g a t i o n
is limited to pr esenting - albeit "fairly and i m p a r ti ally" -
only those facts which support his case.
The English approach on this issue seems to be im p l i c i t l y  
recogni si ng the ad versa rial nature of the trial pro cess - the 
fact that, however fair and impartial he must be in the 
pr es e n t a t i o n  of his case, the pro se cutor is n o t -  again to use 
a football analogy - obliged to put the ball through his own 
goal by assis tin g his adversary.
An i ll us tration  of the d i f f i culties  involved in a t t e m p t i n g  to 
reconcile this pragmatic and a dversar ia l approach with an 
ethical view of the p r o s e cu tor's function may be found in the 
following  passage from Stone - in the context of " E l i c i t i n g  
New Facts":
"In /
"jn principle, prosecu tion e v i d e n c e - i n - c h i e f  should have disclosed 
all mat er ial facts known to the witness and to the prosecutor, 
even though some of them might have favoured the defence. This 
arises from the p r o s e cu tor's duty to present the case fairly. 
However, there are limits to that obligation. A pros ec utor is 
not exp ected  to search for possible  defences and he is not 
required to present the case in such a way that he is conduc ting 
a defence to the charge. Some alleged new facts which the 
defence may put to a p r o s ec ution witness may not be s o , o r  they 
may be unknown to the witness or to the prosecutor. Further, the 
pros ec utor may, reasonably, be of the view that some facts are 
not mater ial or relevant to the issue, and he may omit them from 
his e x a m i n a t i o n - i n - c h i e f  in good faith. However, if he were in 
any doubt about this, it might have been tactical ly a d v a n tage ou s 
to him if he had disclos ed facts in the e x a m i n a t i o n - i n - c h i e f  which 
are brought out for the first time in cr o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . "  [315]
Here, She riff Stone a c k n o wl edges a pri nciple and then pro ce eds to 
specify "limits" to its operation; but the limits he specifi es 
do not appear to be strictly relevant to the principle. As he 
acknowledges, that pr inc ipl e is the obligatio n upon the pro secutor, 
in exami ning his witnesses, to disclose "all material facts" 
known to himself and the witn ess - even facts favourin g the 
defence. Clearly, this means those facts which the prosec ut or 
honestly believes to be material. It does not require the 
prosecutor  to bring out adverse facts which he ho nes tl y bel ie ves 
to be immaterial; much less, does it impose upon him the 
im po ssible task of bringing out facts of which he has no knowledge. 
Again, while the bringing out of a particula r fact f a v o urable  to 
the accused may well assist his defence, the prin ciple in qu es tion 
cannot reas onabl y be inte rpreted  as obliging the p r o s e c u t o r  to 
"search for possible def ences" or to conduct "a defe nce to the 
charge". The "limits", therefore, are illusory and the atte mpt 
to so qualify the princ ipl e tends to have the effect of d i m i n i s h i n  
it in def erence to the reali ties of the adver sar ial co nt est in
which /
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which the prosecutor is engaged.
This impressio n is stren g t h e n e d  by the last sentence in the passage 
which would seem to suggest tactical advantage rather than ethical 
probity as the primary cons id e r a t i o n  when the pro secut or  is in 
doubt as to whether or not to bring out an adverse fact.
However, whatever limits there may or may not be on the prosecutor': 
ob lig ations to endeavour to ensure that all relevant facts known to 
him are reveal ed to the court, it is clear that he is not accord ed 
the latitude permitted to defence counsel in regard to the n o n ­
disc los ure of adverse fact. In a par agraph imme di ately following 
the passage just discussed, Sheriff Stone points the contrast:
"Defence e v i d e n c e - i n - c h i e f , on the other hand, is likely to be 
more con tr olled  and se lec tiv e than pr osecution  evidence. The 
defence would not be obliged to disclose d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  f a c t s . "[31
And, no twit h s t a n d i n g  the somewhat ambival ent  wording of the English
Bar rule 159, discussed supra, we would not expect to find - and
indeed we will not find - in reference to the defence advocate,
any obli ga tion analogous to that imposed upon the p r o s e c u t o r  to
present his case "fairly and impartially"; for the defence approac
is - and is ack no wl edged by the legal au th orities to be - av ow edly
partisan.
As regards the dis closure  or no n- di s c l o s u r e  of adverse facts, the 
di stinc ti on  between the pr os ecuto r and defence counsel is also 
s p ecif ic al ly recognised - albeit in a negative fashion - in the 
p r o f e ss ional advice given to both English and Scottish sol ic itors. 
Thus, the (English) Law Society's Code:
"Except when acting or appeari ng for the prosecution, a s o l i c i t o r  
who knows of facts which, or of a wit ness who, would assist his 
adver sar y is not under any duty to inform his adv er sary or the 
court of this to the prejudice of his own c l i e n t ...."[317 ]
And Webst er's Scottish booklet:
"In /
"In pre se nt in g the facts of a case you have a duty only to refer 
to those favourable unless you are p r o s e c u t i n g ...." [318]
4.3.4 - The Prosecutor and Adverse Witnesses
The inf erence to be drawn from the wording of the Law Socie ty's 
Code, as quoted above, would appear to be that the prosecutor, 
unlike the defence counsel or an advocate in civil cases, has a 
duty to inform the other side or the court about w i t ne sses adverse 
to his case, but it does not attempt to define pre ci se ly the 
pr osecu to r' s ob ligations in this context. When, for example, he 
knows of a witness whose te sti mon y would support the defence, has 
he unfett ered dis cre tion as to whether to call the witne ss hi mself 
or merely pass on par ticular s about the witness to the defence, 
leaving it to them to call the person in question as a defence 
witness? If not, in what circ u m s t a n c e s  is he perceiv ed  as having 
a duty to call the wit ness him self?  Are there any c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
in which he need take no action either to call or pass on the 
witness?
It is these questions that we now address.
We may note at the outset the sign if icance  of the d i s t i n c t i o n  betwe
a p r o s e cuto r' s calling a witness himself or leaving it to the 
defence to do so. As will later be discus sed [319], there may, 
from the pros ec ut or's standpoint, be a tactical a d v a nt age in 
leaving it to the defence to call a witness whose t e s t i m o n y  he 
knows to be favourable to the defence; for such testimony, 
coming from the defence side's own witness and el ic ited in the
course of defence cou ns el's e xa mi nation  of the witness, is
pe rceiv ed  as having less impact upon the court than it would have 
if ext ra ct ed in the course of defence counsel's c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n
of the witness as a prosecution witness.
Further, as will also be later discussed, merely leaving it to the 
defence to call a materi al witness is in itself no guarant ee  that 
the wit ness will, in fact, be called and his testi mony made 
availa ble  to the court.
For guidance on the issues now discussed, we must look mainly to 
the courts. Dallison v. Caffery [320] may again be re ferr ed  to as 
a case in point. In the course of his inquiries into the larceny 
offence with which that case was concerned, Detec ti ve Co nstable  
Caffery, who initiated the pros ec ution of Dallison, i n t e r vi ewed 
three apparently credible and respectable persons who told him
v
they had seen Dallis on on the day of the offence at a place some 
34 miles from where it occurr ed - a n d  at times on that day which 
would have made it' diff icult - though not i m p o s s i b l e -  for him to 
have committed the offence. However, at the initial hearing 
before the magistrates, none of these persons was called as a 
witness nor were the ma gi s t r a t e s  told of their statemen ts. Their 
st at emen ts  had, however, been handed by Caffery to his superior 
officers in the police who had passed them on to the p r o s e c u t i o n  
solicitors. They, in turn, handed them to D a l l i s o n ' s  solicit or  
im mediat ely after the hearing before the mag ist rates . The 
exist enc e of these statem ents - upon which Dallison  foun ded as 
alibi evidence - was, apparently, one of the factors which 
in fluenced  the pr os ecuting counsel to abandon the p r o s e c u t i o n  at 
the opening of the subsequent  quarter sessions trial.
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However, at the hearing by the Court of Appeal in the subsequent
action by Dallison against Caffery for false i mpri so nment and
mali cious  prosecution, the conduct of both Caffery and the
pr os e c u t i o n  solicitor in not making the stateme nts available
to the magis tr ates was vindicated. Thus, Lord Denning:
"I do not see that this should be taken against C a f f e r y . He 
did not conceal these statements. He put them before his
superior officers and also before the solicitor for the
prosecution. It was not his fault that the solic ito r did not 
think it necessary to put them before the magistra tes. Nor 
do I think the sol icitor need have done. The duty of a 
pr osecu ti ng  counsel or solicitor, as I have always u n d e rst oo d 
it, is this: if he knows of a credible witness who can speak
to mat erial facts which tend to show the prisoner to be 
innocent, he must either call that witness hi mself or make 
his state men t available to the defence. It would be highly 
r e p r e h en sible  to conceal from the court the evidence which such 
a witness can give. if the p rosecut in g counsel or so li citor 
knows, not of a credible witness, but a witness whom he does 
not accept as credible, he should tell the defence about him 
so that they can call him if they wish. Here the solicitor,
im mediate ly after the court proceedings, gave the s o l i cit or
for the defence the s t a t e m e n t ........... and thereby did his
d u t y ." [321]
And Lord Diplock - in regard to the con ten tion by D a l l i s o n  that 
all the 'bredible evidence" known to Caffery should have been 
put before the m a g i s t r a t e s :
"This con tenti on seems t o m e  to be based on the e r r o ne ou s 
proposi ti on that it is the duty of a prosecutor to place before 
the court all the evidence known to him, whether or not it is 
probative of the guilt of the accused person. A p r o s e c u t o r  
is under no such duty. His duty is to prosecute, not to defend.
If he happens to have i nfo rm ation from a credible w i t ness  which
is inconsiste nt  with the guilt of the accused, or, a l t h o u g h  not 
inconsi st ent with his guilt, is helpful to the accused, the 
prosecutor  should make such witness ava ilable to the de fen ce 
(see Rex v. Bryant and Dixon). But it is not the p r o s e c u t o r ' s  
duty to resolve a conflict of eviden ce from a p p a r e n t l y  cr edible  
sources: that is the function of the jury at the trial. The
prosecu to r's knowledge that there is such a conflict does not 
of itself constitute lack of reas onabl e and proba bl e cause for 
the prosecution, nor is it i ncons is tent with the p r o s e c u t o r ' s  
honest belief that there is a case against the accused fit to 
go to a j u r y ....... " [322]
While both judges agreed on the main issues, one can, perhaps,
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detect some difference in approach  and emphasis. Lord Dip lock 's  
"his duty is to prosecute, not to defend" tends to stress the 
adversarial nature of the trial process and of the pros e c u t o r ' s  
role within it - recognisi ng by im plicati on the perc eption that 
the pro sec utor is no more obliged than is the defence advocate 
to fight his advers ary's battle in the forensic contest. Further 
his reference  to in formati on from a "credible" witness may 
suggest the inference that where the prosecutor does not think 
the witness is credible, he may not be obliged even to make the 
witness available to the defence. The tone of Lord Den n i n g ' s  
remarks are more circumspect. He explici tly ac kn o w l e d g e s  — as 
Lord Diplock does not - the p r o s e cutor 's  option either to call 
the witness hims elf or to make his statement available  to the 
defence; and also expresses the view that even when the 
prosecutor does not consider the witness to be credible, he 
should, nevertheless, tell the defence about him. Both, however, 
agree that, in the c i r c u ms tances of Dallison at any rate, he was 
not nece ssaril y bound to call credible witnesses to speak to the 
alibi evidence .
However, in Ziems v The P rotho no tary of the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales [323], a prosecu tor was criticised for failing to 
call a witness - even although the witness was called by the 
d e f e n c e .
Shortly after being involved in a brawl in a hotel, durin g which 
he was severely beaten up, Ziems, a barrister, was i n v o l v e d  in 
a car accident. While driving on the wrong side of the road, he 
collid ed with a motor cyclist who died of his injuries. He was 
charged with manslaughter, conv icted  and sentenced to two years 
impr is onment by a court of quarter sessions. Sub sequen tl y, he 
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was also disbarred from pr actice as a barrister by the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales. At his trial for m a n s l a u g h t e r , the 
p ro sec uto r called as witnesses  police and others who testified 
that at the time of the car accident Ziems was under the 
influence of drink; but he did not call a police sergeant who, 
at the previous cor oner's inquiry, had conceded, under 
examination, that Ziems' co nditi on might have been due to the 
blows he had received during the hotel fight and not to drink. 
The police sergeant was, however, called by the def ence and his 
te stimony was given to the court on examinati on as a defence 
w i t n e s s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , at a subsequent hearing by the High Court (of 
Ziems' appeal against disbarment), the court con si dered that 
Ziems, at his trial, had been placed a t a material d i s a d v a n t a g e  
by the Crown's failure to call him. The reasoning for this was 
e xp lained by Fullagar J.:
"....th ere  could be no possib le question that Sergeant Phillis 
was not merely a material witness but a witness of vital 
importance. So far as appears, the only possible object of 
not calling him was to place the appellant under the tactical 
di sa dvan ta ge  which resulted from ina bility to c r o s s - e x a m i n e  
him. Such tactics are p er mi ssible  in civil cases, but in 
criminal cases, in view of what is at stake, they may so me times 
accord ill with the trad it ional notion of the funct ions of a 
p ro sec uto r for the Crown. It is a very relevant fact here 
that, the witness in question was a police witness, and a senior 
member of the force at that.
In fact, as I have said, Sergeant Phillis was called for the 
defence at the trial. His evidence was of great imp o r t a n c e  
from the point of view of the defence, but, as was to be 
expected, it came out less favoura ble to the ap pellant  than 
the evidence of the same witness before the coroner. For on 
this occasion it was in c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  by the Crown that he 
said he had formed the opinion that the appellant was very much 
under the influence of liquor, and the app el lant's counsel 
could not, of course, c r o s s - ex amine him on that very im po rtant 
s t a t e m e n t  " [ 324 ]
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The hearing of this appeal re volve d mainly around the grounds in 
law for dis barring  a barr is ter and, in the event, the court 
replac ed the disbarment of Ziems with suspens ion for the period 
of his imprisonment. However, the views expressed as to the 
p r o s e cut or 's  function - and the cases cited in support of those 
views - are relevant to the question we are now dis cussing.
Thus, Fullagar J. again:
"It is difficult to imagine evidence of greater i m p o rtanc e than 
that of Sergeant Phillis. Yet at the trial he was not called as 
a witness for the Crown. One hesitates, of course, in a case 
in which the Crown is not represented, to comment ad v e r s e l y  on 
this omission. But no sound expla na tion of his not being called 
by the Crown appears either from his c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  (when he 
was called for the defence) or otherwise, and prima facie he 
ought to have been called by the Crown. There is, of course, 
no rule of law that a pro secu to r for the Crown must call every 
witness who has been bound over and is available. On the 
contrary, the discre tion of the prosecutor  has been re c o g n i s e d
in many c a s e s  .Any one or more of a variety of reas ons
may justify a prosecutor in not calling a witness who has given 
evidence for the Crown before the coroner or before the 
magistrat es,  and I would not wish to say anything that might 
unduly limit his discretion. The present case, however, seems 
to me to call for a reminder that the dis cretion  should be 
ex ercised with due regard to tradition al c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of 
f a i r n e s s  " [ 3 2 5 ]
In support he cites Lord Roche in Senev ira tne v The K i n g :
"Witnesses essential to the unfolding of the na r r a t i v e s  on
•which the pr os ecution is based must, of course, be called by
the prosecution, whether in the result the effect of their 
test imo ny is for or against the case for the p r o s e c u t i o n . "  [326]
And Lord Hewart in R. v Dora Harris :
"In criminal cases the p ro secuti on  is bound to call all the 
material witness es before the Court, even though t h e y g i v e  
in consisten t accounts, in order that the whole of the facts 
may be before the jury". [327]
With regard to the remarks of Lord Roche in S e n e v i r a t n e , a point
not brought out by Fullagar J. is that these rema rks were made
in the context of criticisin g the prosec utor - not for failing
to call a witness - but, on the contrary, for ca lling too many.
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Lord Roche's remarks as quoted above were im mediate ly preceded
by the f o l l o w i n g :
"Their Lords hip s do not desire to lay down any rules to fetter 
di sc retion on a matter such as this which is so dependent on 
the par tic ular ci r c u m s t a n c e s  of each case. Still less do they 
desire to di scourage the utmost candour and fairness on the 
part of those cond uc ting prosecution; but at the same time they 
cannot, speaki ng generally, approve of an idea that a prosecutiom 
must call witne sse s i r r e s pe ct ive of c o n s i derati on s of number and 
of reliability, or that a p r o s e cution  ought to di scharge  the 
functions both of p r o s e cut io n and defence. If it does so 
c on fusion is very apt to result, and never is it more likely
to result than if the pros e c u t i o n  calls witn esses and then
procee ds almost a u t o m a t i c a l l y  to discredit them by cross- 
exa minat io n. " [328]
As dis cu ss ed below, these p arti cu lar remarks are relevant  to the
di fficulty  of ide nt if ying the proper balance between the perceived
ob ligatio n upon the prosecu to r to seek to ensure that all material
facts known to him are before the court and the reali ti es of the
ad versar ial system.
In rev iewing these cases, it would seem diffi cul t to reconc ile 
the decision in Dalliso n with the views of the judges in Ziems 
and the other cases cited. Given the cir cu m s t a n c e s  in D a l lison - 
the fact that there,the uncalled witnesses were " c o m ple te ly 
tru stw orth y"  [329] and that, in the light of their statemen ts,
it would have required "spli t-sec on d" timing [330] for Da l l i s o n
to have com mitted the offence - it would seem difficu lt  to argue 
that they were any less vital or ma teria l or any less " e s s en ti al 
to the unfolding of the nar rat iv es" than the police se r g e a n t  in 
Z i e m s . Possibly, the main di fferen ce s between these cases is 
one of c irc um stances  rather than prin ciple - the c i r c u m s t a n c e  
that the judges in Ziems were rather more symp a t h e t i c  to the 
u nf or tunate  barrister than were those in Dal li son to a man "well 
known to the police" [331] with a long list of pr evi ou s 
c o n v i ctio ns  ,/
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con victions, who was suing a police constable.
However that may be, in the light of the cases d i s c u s s e d , the 
following princip les would appear to emerge:
1. Where a prosecu tor  knows of a witness whose ev ide nce is
fav our able to the accused - at any rate, a witn ess whom
he deems credible - he must either call that witness
him sel f or make his stat ements available to the defence.
2. Although his di sc ret ion to take either of these courses 
will not normally be c hall en ged by the courts, there may 
be situation s where, because of the vital and mat er ial 
nature of the evidence, he will be con sidered  ob lig ed to 
call the witness himself.
3. On the issue of credibility, while there is some doubt, it 
would seem, (per Lord Denning), that he should also pass 
on the witness to the def ence even if he does not con si de r 
him or her to be credible.
4. Tactical advantage, in itself, is not a proper reason for
failure by a pr os ecuto r to call a witness.
In p a s s i n g , i t  may be noted that, in his recent b o o k , " L a n d m a r k s
in the Law", Lord Denning refers to the case of Da l l i s o n  and
rei te ra tes his views on the pr os e c u t o r ' s  function:
"There has grown up a great tradition  that counsel for the
p ro se cution  must be frank in his p resenta ti on of the case and, 
above all, he should be fair to the accused. He must not 
stress the case against him. He must only tell the jury the 
facts which he hopes to prove by evidence. He must not say 
anything which he cannot prove. He must call any c r e dible 
wit ness who can give material evidence, no matter w h e ther for 
the pr os ecu tio n or the defence: or at any rate he must give 
his name to the defence so that the defence can call h i m . "[332]
On this issue of adverse testimony  - as indeed, as has been said,
on any matter pe rt ain ing to the p r o s e cu tor's function - the
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British pro fessional  codes have not much to say, but in the 
brief section ref erring to his function, the following statements 
in the English Bar Code would seem to be broadly in line with 
the prin ciples re flected in the cases we have discussed:
"Where pr ose cuting counsel has in his pos sessi on stat ement s 
from persons whom he does not propose to call as witnesses, 
he should regard it as normal practice to show such statem ents 
to the defence. Where, however, the defence already know of 
the existence, identity and wherea bouts of any such person and 
are in a position to call him (as, for example, when a notice 
of alibi has been served, or when such person is marr ied to a
defendant) and in other exc eptio na l c i r c u m s t a n c e s .......... then
p rosec ut in g counsel may, in his discretion, refrain from 
showing the statement to the defence." [333]
While it does not say so, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
st at emen ts  referred to in this parag raph are of a nature which 
do not favour the p ro se cution case and may be of benefit to 
the accused. As in the case of Lord Dip lock's remarks in 
Dallis on - and in contrast to Lord Denning's remarks in that 
case - the wording is non-c o m m i t t a l  as to the alte r n a t i v e  course 
of the prosecut or 's calling the witness himself.
But however that may be, the signif ic ant point is that, on the 
au thority of D a l l i s o n , the law - in England and Wales at any 
rate - would appear to be that, even where the evide nc e in 
question may be ma terial ly  sug ges tive of the acc us ed 's 
innocence, (albeit, not inco nsisten t with the pro s e c u t o r  ' s 
"honest belief" in his probable guilt) [334], the p r o s e c u t o r ' s  
obl igati on s to the a d m i n i str at ion of justice are fully s a t i sfied 
by his merely passing on the info rm ation to the defence.
It may, perhaps, be argued that this may not be fully c o n s isten t 
with the prosecu tor's per ceived ob ligation to seek to ensure that 
all materi al facts are revealed to the court; for, merely 
passing /
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passing the in formati on to the defence may not nec essa ri ly 
achieve that object. Whether through carelessn es s by the 
defence, errors in c o m m u ni ca tion or for some other reason, the 
witness in question may not in fact be called and the materi al 
in format ion may never reach the court. That omission, it may 
be coun ter-argue d, however unfo rtunat e for the accused, is the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of his lawyers, not of the prosecutor. But it 
is within the power of the pr osecutor to avoid the p o s s ib il ity 
of this situati on occurring  - with the possible outcome of an 
unjust co nv ict ion - by his calling the witness himself.
On this view, it may seem re asonabl e to argue that an u ne quivoca l 
obl ig at ion upon the pr osecutor to call all materi al w i t n esses 
known to him - whatever the import of their evidence for or 
against the accused - would be more in accord with his function 
as one whose r e sp on sibili ty  it is to ensure, so far as within 
his power, that only the factually guilty are convict ed.  While 
it may well be that the tes timony of a parti cular witness, 
although favourable to the accused, may not be i n c o n s i s t e n t  with 
the p ro secuto r' s honest belie f - in the light of the to t a l i t y  of 
evide nce  in the case - that the accused is, in fact, guilty, he 
may well be wrong in that belief, and it is the fun cti on of the 
court to assess guilt or innoc ence in the light of all the 
ava ilable evidence.
It may be noted also that such an unequ ivo cal o b l i g a t i o n  upon 
the prosecu tor could not be said to be imposing upon him a duty, 
in the words of Stone, to "search for possible d e f en ces" [333], 
or, in the words of Lord Thomson in S m i t h , to "dis cover a line 
of d e f e n c e " [336]; for there is a clear d i s t inct io n b e t we en  
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taking account of defence fa vourable’ inform ati on which the 
pros ec utor may happen to come across in the course of his 
inquiries and his actively seeking out such information.
But to impose such a duty upon the prosecu tor - however 
justifi ab le  it may seem on ethical principle - would clearly 
run counter to the co mpetit iv e rea lities of the adve rsaria l 
system; to the pri nciple ens hri ne d in that system - a s  
pe rce ived by Lord Diplock in Da lli son - that it is the 
p r o s e cuto r' s function "to prosecute, not to defend" [337].
It w o u l d ,t h e r e f o r e , seem, on any rea listic view, that the 
adversar ial prosecutor cannot be seen as one whose p r i nciple  
function it is to in vestigate the objective truth in 
c o m p r ehen si ve terms. However co mmitted  - in theory, at any 
rate - to the obligat ion to place all material facts known to 
him before the court, his role - although clearly more 
ci r c u m s c r i b e d  as regards issues of fact than that of his 
adversary - is also esse nt ially partisan.
These comments need not n e c e s saril y be seen as c o n d e m n a t o r y  of 
the adve rs arial  system; for that system must be seen and 
judged as a whole and in the light of its purpose to m a i n t a i n  
the difficult  balance between the protect ion of the rights of 
in di vi dua ls faced with criminal p ro se cution  and the p r o t e c t i o n  
of the public against crime. In reco gniti on  of the i m p o r t a n c e  
attache d to the former of these objectives, the system, as we 
have discussed, gives c on siderab le  latitude to the d e fenc e in 
regard to issues of fact. Given this latitude, the i m p o s i t i o n  
upon /
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upon the prosecutor of a far -rea ching  obligation to present 
eviden ce for the defence as well as for the prosecution, would 
not only be inconsis tent with the basic adversari al principle 
but may also be seen as til ting the balance in a trial too far 
in favour of the defence, and thus pre judicial to the public 
interest.
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4.4 - Conclusions and Summary
The following may be iden tified  as the main points which emerge
from this discuss ion of the pros e c u t o r ' s  function:
1. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the analogy between an ad ve rsarial trial
and a forensic "game" or a sporting contest, there is a
crucial dis tinc ti on as to both status and function between 
the opposing sides in a trial - pr ose cution and defence.
2. The function of the prose cutor, as r ep re senting  the Crown
and State, is to seek to ensure that criminals  are brought 
to justice; and, acc ordingly, that only those who ac tuall y 
commit crimes are co nvi cte d according to due pr oc es s of 
law. It follows that he has a r e s p o n sibili ty  also to 
ensure, so far as within his power, that the cri mi nal 
process so operates as to minimise  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
unjust convictions.
3. The con sequent ia l and c o n t r asting  features of his role as
compar ed with that of defence counsel are -
(a) the re qui rement that he must have an honest be li e f
in probable factual guilt and reasonable and pr ob a b l e  
cause for a p r o s e cu tion and
(b) his obligat ion to seek to ensure that all m a t e r i a l  
facts known to him, whether favourable or u n f a v o u r a b l e  
to the prosec ut ion case, are revealed to the court - 
including, in the case of adverse witness es, an 
obligation either to call such wit ne sses h i m s e l f  or 
make them avail able to the defence.
4. /
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4. However, these d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  features, of crucial
impor tan ce for the proper a d minis tr ation of criminal 
justice, tend to be obscured by ambiv alenc e in p r o f e ssio na l 
codes and textbooks; are not given adequate att ent io n in 
the prof essional codes; and, in some respects at least, 
the ethical principles on which they are based may be 
perce ive d as inconsi st ent with, and limited in practi ce 
by, the realities of the adv er saria l system.
Finally, given the' nature and comp etiti ve  spirit of the 
adversarial c o n f r o nt ation in a criminal trial, the p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
and professio na l pressures which it imposes on p r o s e c u t i o n  and 
defence counsel alike - and the fact that, for these reasons, 
the urge to win is no doubt as strong for one as for the other - 
we may again question to what extent some of the h i g h - p r i n c i p l e d  
precepts applied to the 'advocate as prosecu tor are followed in 
practice; and, indeed, to what extent those who formulate  these 
precepts have a rea listic e xp ec tation  that they will, in the 
main, be followed.
Although writing explicitly  in an American context, Frank 
reflects these doubts:
"I said that, in theory, in crimin al suits the gove r n m e n t  seems 
to take greater re s p o n s i b i l i t y  than in civil suits, that 
theoretically, the public pro sec ut or has made a p r e -tr ia l 
investig at ion and that he brings out, at the trial, the evidence 
he has uncovered. Actually, many prosecutors, in fe cted badly 
by the f i g h t i n g s p i r i t , in partisan manner produce only the 
evidence they think will cause con vict ions" [338]
And, again quoting Runyon's analogy with a sporting event:
"A /
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"A p l a y e r . . .  for the State represe nts the people. His
function, as I unde rs tand i t , i s  to endeavour to convict any 
person who has tr ans g r e s s e d  the law.....;..It is in con c e i v a b l e  
that he would wish to convict an innocent person. But it has 
been my observatio n that the player or attorney for the State
is quick to take any ad vantage of the rules .......that put his
side in front, and equally quick to forestall any moves by the 
other side. "[339]
However, in reference to these remarks, and in fairness to 
pr o s e cu ti ng counsel, the point must be made that infect io n "by 
the fighting spirit" and zeal "to take any ad van tage of the 
rules" do not nece ss arily reflect, a n d , i n  the main, will not 
r e f l e c t , b a d  faith or an evil disposition, but are a logical 
c o n s e quen ce  of the system within which they operate.
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5 .1 The Questions Addressed
The purpose of this inquiry has been to explore the ethics of 
advocate's  role in the adversar ial system - p a r t i c u l a r l y  the 
role of the advocate in criminal proceedings; and, more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , that of the defence advocate in such p r o c e e d i n g s .
The main questions addre ssed w e r e p o s e d  early in our inquiry - 
in the context of the historic exchange between Lord B r o u g h a m  and 
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn [340]: is there inherent in the
advocate' s function an ethical conflict between his duty to his 
client and his obliga tions as an officer of the law? Can his 
duty to the law be said to extend to a prior comm i t m e n t  to Lord 
Cockburn's  "eternal and imm utable interests of truth and 
justice" - or, as perceived by Lord Brougham, is it his 
paramount duty to "reckon everythi ng subor dinat e" to the 
interests of his client? Is either of these p r o p o s i t i o n s  valid? 
And, whether or not either may be, can the ad vo cate's role - in 
so far as it may involve the avoid ance or s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of truth - 
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be per ce ived to be inhe rently une thica l?
These questions cannot properly be addressed in isolation in 
terms of abstract principle. They must be examined in the 
context of the nature and perceive d purpose of the legal system 
in which the advocate has to function and of the p r o f e ssi on al 
demands which it imposes upon him. An assessment of the ethics 
of the advocate's role, therefore, necess arily  involv es an 
ex aminati on of the ethical pri ncip le s underlying the ad ve rsaria l 
system itself. His role within that system can be fairly 
app raised only by ref erence to those moral and social values 
which the system itself can be seen, in its actual operation, 
t o r e  fleet.
It has, therefore, been necessary for our purposes to examine 
the ad versaria l process as it operates; the rights which it 
confers and the duties which it imposes upon the advocate, 
pa rticu la rl y in criminal proceedi ngs ; and, most particu la rly, 
the extent to which it may be seen - in practice and not only 
in formal precept - to exalt truth as the cardinal virtue and 
ethical imperative in the ad vocate's professi on al function.
As has been discussed [341], there are two differe nt senses in 
which the word "truth" is commonly used - and so m e t i m e s  confused: 
truth in the epistem ol ogical sense of fact d e t e r m i n a t i o n  - the 
veracity of objective fact; and truth in the ethical sense of 
truthfu ln es s - the sub jec tive concept of speaking and acting 
honestly: the sense in which the word is used as rega rds
witnesses when swearing to tell "the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing /
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nothing but the truth" [342]. In Part Two of our inquiry, we 
dealt with truth primarily in its epistem ol ogical sense - the 
extent to which it may or may not be perceived, in that sense, 
to be the likely product and pr e-e minent objective of the 
adversarial trial process. In Part Three, we addressed the 
concept of truth in its ethical sense - in the context of the 
adv oca te's role in relation to the disclosure, s u p p ress io n or 
ma ni p u l a t i o n  of material fact. In that connection, we discussed 
in general terms the ethical issues involved in the concepts 
of lying and dec eption so far as relevant to the advoca te and 
examin ed in some detail those areas in which such issues appear 
to arise most acutely: the pri nci pl es applica ble to the n o n ­
disclosure  of adverse fact, the tactics employed in cross- 
examina ti on  and the specific problems associated with perj ury and 
"co nfessed" accused situations.
Both these senses of the concept of truth are, therefore, 
relevant for our purpose. They are also, as we shall discuss, 
both closely related and i n t e r d epen de nt in the con text of the 
trial process .
In the light of these discussions, we may now su mmarise  our 
conc lu si ons with regard to the ethical aspects of the 
adv ers arial system.
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5.2 The Ad ve rsarial System - Co nc ludin g Views
5.2.1 - Truth and Other Values
If a trial process is, primarily, a genuine and det er mined search 
for the objective truth as to the material facts at issue, then 
it is against that cr ite rion that the role of all the p ar ticipa nt s 
must be measured. If the trial court is a court of justice - in 
the sense of justice based strictly on truth - and if justice so
pe rce ived is the ultimate cr iterion of decision as to the facts
at issue, then it would seem to be incumbent upon those whose 
function it is to present the facts to aid in ensuring that 
justice is done by the full dis cl osure  and impartial p r e s e n t a t i o n  
o f t h o s e  facts so far as known to them.
The advocate s on either side must, on this view, be seen as part 
of the process of achievi ng justice based on truth and their
proper functions as pr ima ril y directed to that end - however
adverse the con sequ ences for client or cause.
It would seem ne ce ssarily to follow that any trial syste m which 
claims the pursuit of objec tive truth to be its prim ary objec ti ve 
must be one which can be seen to insist upon t r u t h f u l n e s s  as the 
primary and essential p ro fession al  obligation of those ch ar ged  
with the pre se nt ation and eliciting  of the facts at issue.
In this context, we may now summarise the salient features  of 
the advers arial trial process as these have em erged from our 
di scussio n :
(1) The advers ari al trial is e sse nt ially a c o n f r o n t a t i o n  or 
contest between two opposing sides repr es ented by the 
pro sec utor and the defence advocate who are the p a r tis an  
cha mpions of their respective causes.
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(2) The only competent eviden ce on which the court's verdict 
can be based is the ev idenc e presented during the trial 
through the medium of the contendin g advocates by way of 
their examination and c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  of witnesses.
Unlike his co un terpart in the inquisito rial system, the 
judge, on the whole, plays a passive role as a "referee" 
or "umpire". He and the jury are, in regard to the 
disco ver y of material fact, dependent upon the selecti ve 
evidence elicited by the advocates.
(3) The system rec ognises the right - and, indeed, in the case 
of defence counsel, the duty - of counsel to be avowedl y 
partisan in con ducti ng  their cases. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the 
official p ros cr iption against lying or at te mpting to 
"delibera tely mislead" the court, the defence adv ocate is 
pr o f e s sio na lly pr oh ibited from disclos ing to the court 
facts prejudicial to his client, no matter how material.
(4) Pr osecuting counsel, although com mitted - in pr incipl e at 
any rate - t o  i mpart ia lity in pre sen ting his case, and 
required to have an honest belief in its factual basis, 
is ne vertheless also pe rceived as being an a d v e r s a r i a l  
contender for his cause: his duty is to prosecu te, not 
to defend. He is not requir ed or expected to fulfil the 
role of an impartial prese nte r of both sides of the case 
be fore the court.
(5) There appears to be ample eviden ce that a major feature
of the trial process - c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  - while o s t e n s i b l y  
designed to elicit truth, is au t h o r i t a t i v e l y  a c k n o w l e d g e d  
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and commonly used (by both prosecutio n and defence) as a means 
of refuting, breaking down or otherwise weakening the testi mon y 
of an adverse witness, irres pe ct ive of its known trut hfuln es s 
[343].
(6) There appears likewise to be persuas ive evidence that,
n o twit hs ta nding  the un equivocal  pro scri pt ion by the law and 
by all professi onal codes of conduct of perjury - or the 
aiding or abetting of it by lawyers - perjurious conduct in 
criminal proceeding s is tacitly toler ated and, possibly, (in 
effect, albeit not in intention), encoura ged by the system [344].
These facts are not here pre sented as being, in themselves, 
n ec es sar ily co nde mnato ry - but as a realistic perc ept ion of the 
place of obj ective truth within the adv ersarial system of criminal 
justice as it operates in practice. They would seem to point 
irr esi stab ly  to the conclusion that that system - wha te ver its 
merits in total perspe ctive - cannot be perceived as one which 
sees the pursuit of objective truth as its paramount objective.
This cannot be taken as meaning that it disparages truth as an 
element in the a d mini st ration of criminal justice but rather that 
it sees it, perhaps, as only one of a number of values - and, 
possibly, not the most important - to which society should have 
regard in that context.
This, at any rate, is an argument commonly advanced in j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
of the system. These other values, as we have disc us sed [345], 
are perce ived to include the concep ts of individual libe rty and 
dignity and, in particular, ackno wl edge the neces sity to m a i n t a i n  
a proper balance between the power of the state and the rights of 
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an individua l accused of a crime. They are seen as a necessary 
c o u n t e rb alanc e to the risks to those rights which an ove r- zealou s 
pursuit of truth might involve.
5.2.2 - Conflict as an Aid to Truth
These salient features of the adversari al trial process, as 
su mm aris ed  above, would also seem to confirm the doubt earlier 
expr ess ed [346 ] as to the tena bility of the view that ad ve rsarial 
c o n f r on tation  is the most effective method of con ducti ng  an 
inquiry in a criminal trial: that is, that - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the
p a r t i sa nship of the contending  adv ocates - truth is more likely 
to emerge from a balanc ed judgment by a n on- pa rtisan judge or 
jury of co nfl icting theses argued before them. As has been said, 
such a view may have merit in a sit uation where a court is asked 
to adjudicate  on conf li cting i n terpr et ations of agreed facts but 
lacks cr edi bility when the facts themsel ves are not only in 
dispute but are the subject of m a nipul at ion by the pa rtisan and 
con te ndin g advocates in their role as fact presenters.
On the other hand, there may be something  to be said for the view 
that a process, such as the French system, which tends to 
or ientate the court to one thesis - that in the dossier prepar ed  
by the examining magi st rate - a n d  does not subject it to the 
di sciplin e of weighing confli ct ing theses, may carry the risk of 
its being influenced against the accused [347],
However that may be, our disc ussio n would seem to c o nfi rm  the 
view that such j u s t i ficat io n as may be claimed for the 
adv ersar ia l system is not to be found in the a dv ersaria l 
pr inciple as such but rather in the concept of the b a l a n c i n g  of 
truth /
2 3 6 .
truth with those other values mentioned. This invites the question 
which we have earlier discussed [348], and which we shall now 
briefly review, namely, whether these other values can, in fact 
be seen as comp ensati ng  for the relative ly low priority accorded 
to t r u t h -f in ding by the system, in the interests of what Hazard 
suggests may be its real value - "the ideal of individual autonomy" 
[349].
5.2.3 - The Balance of Values
In the light of our dis cussi on co ncerning the nature of the 
adversarial system it is evident that two of its most important 
features are the absence at any stage of the criminal process of 
any in dep endent investigat io n of the facts at issue and the 
dispa rit y in investig at ive resou rces between the pros e c u t i o n  and 
the defence. The extensive i n v e s tiga ti ve facilities availab le  
through the state prosecuti on ma chiner y are clearly, in the great 
majority of cases, vastly superior to those at the disposal of the 
defence. Further, as we have seen, the pro secu tor's i n q uiries are 
generally partisan and orient ated towards the pr os e c u t i o n  case. 
These factors clearly milita te against the accused in a cr imina l 
prosecu ti on  - a fact generally and a u th oritati ve ly a c knowled ge d. 
Thus, for example, Lord Devlin, as cited in a recent int e r v i e w  
reporte d in The Times:
"  the main problem is that the defence resources are not
equal to those of the prosecution; and legal aid is i n a d e q u a t e  
where there are scientific matters to be i nve st igated or di fficult  
quest ion s of l a w ..... Proposals for a public defender sy stem  - as 
suggested by Justice, the legal reform group - deserve a th orough 
a i r i n g ".
And, in the same interview:
"It should be made as easy for the defence to ensure that all the 
eviden ce is available for the trial court as it is for the 
p r o s e cuti on  to ensure that all the evidence of guilt is pre sented.  
[350]
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We may surmise that it is the ne ces sit y in the interests of justice 
to redress the imbalance which would otherwise be caused by such 
factors, that the ad versarial system deems it necessary to afford 
to crimin al defenda nts  and their advoc ate s that degree of latitude 
which we have dis cussed as regards factual issues in the 
p r e s e n t a t i o n  of the defence case; and to build into the system 
those features which we have referred to as reflectin g moral and 
social values - pr e-emin ent among which are the pr es u m p t i o n  of 
inno cen ce and the pri vilege against se lf-incr im ination . That, at 
any rate, may perhaps be seen, by implication, to be part, at least, 
of the rationale underlying the system, even if not ex p l i c i t l y  
a c k n o wl edged as such.
Thus the system can, as has been said, be seen to reflect a balance 
of values - between the pursuit of truth and those other values 
deemed necessary  to safeg uard the rights of indi vid ual accused.
The ma in t a i n i n g  of a fair balance is a continu ous pro ces s and the 
proper subject of debate and vi gil ance in society. As current 
debate about the contr ov ersial right of an accused to sile nce  
demonst rat es, it is a difficult  and complex balance - po ised 
between the twin dangers of unduly favouring the c[e facto guilty  
and putting at risk the innocent accused. As we have d i s c u s s e d  
in Part 2.4, however, the present balance is in fact at t a c k e d  on 
both counts. In particular, we have noted that some of the 
features designed to protect the innocent accused may be p e r c e i v e d  
as having, in certain situations, the opposite effect; and that 
there appears in recent times to be evidence of growing doubts  
about the e f fe ct ivenes s of the system as a whole - at any rate 
as it pr esently operates - as a medium  for d e t e rmining  guilt or 
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innocence in criminal p r o c e ed in gs [351].
However that may be - and while ack nowled gi ng the dangers possibl y 
involved in the zealous pursuit of truth to the neglect of other 
values - it may, as has been said, seem open to question whether 
the system at present gives sufficie nt weight in its bala nc ing of 
values to the objective pursuit of truth. There would seem, on 
the face of it, to be no good reason why, for example, some form 
of pre-trial ind ependent fact inves ti gation could not be intr od uced 
in a manner which would not pr ejudice individual rights; indeed, 
such a reform could be seen to underpin  such rights and values; 
for, as has also been said, where truth is a casualty, it is 
likely to be the innocent who suffer and the guilty who gain [352].
5.2.4 - The Trial Process - Form and Substance
In our earlier discussion about the nature of the a d v e r s a r i a l  trial 
process, comparison  was made, as regards certain aspects, with a 
game or sporting contest. Such a comparison may be open to the
objection that it tends to tr ivialise a serious process but, as was
said, the comparison, in so far as it may be valid, is so only as 
regards its compet itive and rule-g o v e r n i n g  aspects.
As regards other aspects - and p a r t i cular ly  as regards the function 
of the adv ocates - a more apt analogy may be that of a t h e a t r i c a l  
drama; or, more aptly still, perhaps, an historical ritual, 
hallowed by tradition, in which the par ticip an ts p e r for m their 
assigned roles - an impression he ighten ed  visually (in the Br it is h 
courts) by the bewigged and archaic dress of the p r o f e s s i o n a l  
participants.
While such analogies may again run the risk of appear in g to demean 
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or trivialise, they may be seen as indicative of certain facets 
of the trial process which are relevant to this inquiry - as 
indicative, for example, of the fact that the word "role" as 
denoting the advocate 's function as an "actor" in the process is 
p ar ti cularl y appropriate. Indeed, this function - at any rate, in 
the more notable jury trials - may be perceived as having not a 
little in common with the thespian arts: the use of rhetoric and
gesture; feigned outrage and emotion; playing upon the feelings, 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s  - and perhaps, the prejudices - of his main 
audience, the jury.
In its more his trionic form, such conduct by trial lawyers may be
most often assoc iated with fictional Hol lywood trial scenes, but
in real life its place in the arts of the advocate is also
recognised; for his purpose is to create i m p r e s s i o n s . Thus, the
famous advocate, Marshall Hall, as quoted by Richard Du Cann:
"....if an advocate for the defence can legitima tely in his 
advocacy, convey to the jury the impression of his beli ef in 
his client's case, he has gone a long way towards securin g their 
verdict." [353]
And Du Cann himself: "For en sically  sim ulated emotion should be
one of the armaments of the ad vocate." [354]
The advocate, therefore, is indeed playing a part - the part 
assigne d to him by the requ ireme nt s of his pro fessio na l role. In 
so doing, he is required to give e x p r essi on  to views which are not 
necessa ri ly his own - indeed, he is not allowed to ex press views 
as being his own [355] - and must at times urge ar gu ments in which 
he may hims elf not necessa ri ly believe; all in the int e r e s t s  of 
the cause which he has been briefed to champion.
In particular, and more to the point for our purposes, he is often 
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obliged, as is the p r o f e ss io nal actor, to urge, not the truth, 
as he in reality may perceiv e it, but that particular perce ption 
of it which accords with his role.
While such analogies may be more relevant to the defence advocate, 
they may also - no t w i t h s t a n d i n g  his more cir cumscri be d role (in 
theory, at any rate) as regards objective truth - apply in some 
degree to prosec uting counsel as the partisan advocate of his brief
Since the contend ing advocates  are the main actors in the 
ad versar ial trial process, it is their part in the p ro ce edings  
which sets the tone of the whole - giving it. what has been called 
its air of "artificiality " [356]. O s t e n s i b l y , the pro ce dure is 
desig ned  to uncover all the material facts. It appears to be 
dedi cat ed to that end. The e xaminat io n and c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n  of 
the wit ness es  are oste nsibly designed to elicit the true facts.
The imp ression conveyed is that of a process in which the 
p resen te rs  of fact are p r e - e m i n e n t l y  motiv ate d to find out the 
truth. In reality, however, as we have seen, this i mp re ssion is 
accurate only to a limited extent. For the reasons we have 
d i s c u s s e d , the main actors in the drama are not nec e s s a r i l y  
mo ti vate d to search for the ob jective truth - nor are they 
p r o f e s s i o n a l ^  bound to do so. Their function is to elicit and 
argue that percept ion - or profe ss ed perce ption - of the facts 
which favour their resp ect ive causes; or, in the words of Lord 
De nning (quoting Cicero): to urge, not the truth, but "what is
only the se mbl ance of it" [357].
This does not mean that the whole trial process can be seen as a 
charade. Judges, clearly, have a genuine desire to get at the 
truth - so far as their limited powers allow; and, doubtless, 
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there are many ins tances also when an advocate genuinely attempts 
to elicit truth - albeit, (in the case of defence counsel, at any 
rate) , only when the - truth will not prejudice his case. To such 
a degree, therefore, t r u t h - find in g can be said to be an element 
in the process. Nev ertheless, the art if iciali ty  or "truth- 
semblance" character of the p ro ce edings  must be seen as a 
di st in cti ve feature of the ad versarial  trial.
There is, of course, one funda mental and obvious difference 
between a theatre play and a law trial. The trial has as its 
very serious purpose the de te r m i n a t i o n  of the guilt or innoc enc e 
of a person accused of a criminal offence. But there is another 
difference. The enactment of a play does not pretend to be other 
than the fictional re pres e n t a t i o n  that it is; but there are 
those within the legal profes sion who - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the. 
legal realities of the advocate 's function - represent the form 
as being the sub stance and profess the trial process to be, 
indeed, in reality - and not merely partly or o stensib ly  - a 
process wholly dedicated to the discovery of truth [358].
It is probably this relu ctance by many within the p r o f e s s i o n  to 
ac knowle dge reality which is a princ ipal cause of the ethical 
tensions or i n c onsiste nc ies of the adversarial system: the
att ribut io n to the system of ethical imperat ives which it cannot, 
in practice, be seen to uphold; and, in particular, in regard 
to the ethics of the professi on al conduct of advocates, the 
attempt to make disti nc ti ons which, in moral principle, do not 
exist. This in turn gives rise to many of the eth ical pr oble ms  
with which the advocate has to cope; for he has to operate 
within the system as it is and not as some profess it to be.
However,
262 .
However, as we have seen, there are those within the profess ion
who are prepared to ac knowledge the reality of the trial process;
few more so, perhaps, than the Scottish judge, Lord Thomson, as
cited by Sher iff  Macphail. While Lord Thomson's remarks as here
quoted refer to civil proceedi ngs , they are cited by Sheriff
Macph ail  in the context of both civil and criminal pro cee di ngs
and most of what he says would seem to apply to both - and to
con firm much of what has been said in this inquiry:
"Judges sometimes flatter them selves  by thinking that their 
function is the a s c e r tain me nt of truth. This is so only in a 
very limited sense. Our system of administ er ing justice in 
civil affairs proceeds on the footing that each side, working 
at arm's length, selects its own evidence. Each side's sele ct ion 
of its own evidence may, for various reasons, be partial in
every sense of the t e r m ........ It is on the basis of two car ef ully
selecte d versions that the judge is finally called upon to 
adjudicate. He cannot make i n vesti ga tions on his own behalf; 
he cannot call witnesses; his undoubted right to question  
witnesses  who are put in the box has to be exer cised with 
caution. He is at the mercy of con tending  sides whose sole 
object is not to discover the truth but to get his judgment.
That judgment must be based only on what he is allowed to hear.
He may suspect that witne ss es who know the 'truth' have never 
left the witness room for the witness box because neither side 
dares risk them, but the most that he can do is to comment on 
their absence .
A li tigation  is in essence a trial of skill between op po sing 
parties con ducted under reco gn ised rules, and the prize is the 
judge's decision. We have reject ed inq uis itori al  m e t hod s and 
prefer to regard our judges as entirely independent. Like 
referees at boxing contests, they see that the rules are kept 
and count the points." [359]
However, in the context of a criminal trial, it must be re p e a t e d
that the ethics of the process is not to be seen as being entirely
infl uence d by the adv ersar ia l spirit - though that is a potent
factor; nor by a pervers e di sre gard for the value of truth; but
also by the re cogniti on of other values and of the n e c e s s i t y  to
maintai n a proper balance between them.
5.3 The Ethics of the Advocate's Role - Conclusions
5.3.1 - The Advocate and the System
An e xa mi natio n of the ethics of the advocate's role within the 
ad ver sarial system n e c e ssaril y involves, as has' been said, some 
app raisal of the ethics of that system so far as relevant to 
that role. However, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  the views express ed  in 
that context, it has not been our purpose to attempt to assess 
the overall merits of the system itself; for the context in 
which this inquiry has been co nd ucted is clearly not e x h a us ti ve 
of that wider question.
Nor has it been our purpose in ad dr essing the ethics of the 
ad vo cate's role to attempt a critique of the general sta nda rd s 
of pro fes si on al behaviour of advocates  - including those who 
may be i n d i f f e r e n t t o , or, at any rate, not o v e r - t r o u b l e d  by, 
ethical con sider ations. Clearly, all pr of essions have their 
share of such pract iti oners; though the legal p r o f e s s i o n  - 
within the United Kingdom at least - tends to claim, no doubt 
with justifica tio n, a ge nerally high standard of con duc t among 
its members. However, on this point, it may, perhaps, be said 
as regards forensic advocacy, that the adver sarial pre s s u r e s  
which the system exerts and the lack of clear gui da nc e on some 
ethical issues, may give undue scope and appear to give spe ci ous 
p ro fe ssiona l justif ic ation for dubious conduct by the less 
scrupulous. As Bok obs erves  - in regard to the p r o f e s s i o n a l  
tendency to leave certain moral choices to the " s e n s i t i v i t y "  of 
the individ ual advocate: "To leave such a choice open to the
sens iti ve and the resp on sible  without giving them c r i t e r i a  for 
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choice is to leave it open as well to the insensitive and the 
corrupt." [360]
However, be that as it may, we have not here been prim ar ily 
conc ern ed with either in se nsitive or corrupt behaviour, but 
rather with the position of the advocate - whatever his integrity 
or degree of se nsi tivity - in regard to those ethical issues 
which are intrinsic to his function. It is in regard to this 
question, therefore, that we may now summarise our con clusions.
5.3.2 - Moral Principle
Apart from the somewhat ambi valent position of the ad voca te  as 
prosecutor, it is evident from this inquiry that the object of 
the advocate in the ad versarial system, is, in Lord Thomso n' s 
words, as quoted above, "not to discover the truth" but to get 
a favoura ble judgment from the court. More than that, his 
conduct of a case in court may often be directed to wards the 
avoid anc e or m an ipulati on  of truth should this be to his cl ient's 
advantage.
Lord Thomson's remarks were, as has been said, in r e f e r e n c e  to thf 
advocate in civil proceedings, but in the light of our examinatioi 
of the function of criminal defence counsel - the main focus of 
our inquiry - the s u b o r dinatio n of truth to client i n t eres t is 
even more marked in that role. It is to the adv oc ate in this 
role that the advers ari al system affords the widest lati tu de in 
regard to the ob fus cation of fact. Indeed, the s y stem re quires  
that he should exercise such latitude in deference to his duty 
to his client and to the rights of an accused in a c r i mina l 
trial. It is in this role, consequently, that the moral 
am biguity of the ad vocate's pos ition  is most evident.
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Viewed solely in terms of the moral principles we dis cu ssed in 
regard to deception and lying, (Part 3.4), the su bor d i n a t i o n  of 
truth inherent in such a role may appear i n trinsic al ly unethical. 
It is true that, in part icular instances, moral argum ents such as 
we have discussed [361] may be advanced in ju s t i f i c a t i o n  - as, 
for example, where an advoca te is def ending an accused whom he 
knows or sincerely believ es to be innocent and cons id ers deception 
of the court to be justified in order to avoid the greater harm 
which would be caused by his client' s unjust conviction. Again, 
as has been pointed out in our discuss io n of the legal concept s 
of guilt and non-guilt, an advocate, in tendering a plea of not 
guilty - even on behalf of an accused who has c o n f i d e n t i a l l y  
c on fessed his factual guilt - is not making a false sta te ment 
to the court. But such arguments are relevant only to speci fic 
si tuation s and could not be advanc ed to justify in general terms 
a function which, intrinsically, involves the s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of 
truth to the interests of the client or cause which the advocate, 
at any particu lar time, happens to be repre senting. Such, at 
any rate, may appear to be the po sition when judged solely by 
strict moral criteria and not in the wider context of the 
ultimate objecti ves  of the adv ocate 's  function within the legal 
system - and within the society which sustains the system.
This invites the question, which we shall now address: wh et he r
ethical justif ic ation for the advo cate' s function can be founded 
on the req uire ments of the system in which he ope ra tes - whether, 
in Pro fessor Wolfram 's words, the advocate, as an "actor" wi thin 
the legal system:
" . ..........is eth ically entitled to take steps within the legal
system that are consi stent with its dictates and e x p e c t a t i o n s " .
[ 362]
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5.3.3 - The Ultimate Criterion
In di sc ussin g this subject - in the context of the role of the 
criminal defence counsel - Wolfram himself appears to take a 
sce ptical view. While ac kn o w l e d g i n g  that "the topic is a large 
and diffi cul t one", he writes:
". .....whil e a legal system might permit, or even require, the
actor to proceed in that way, it is not clear that the actor's 
conduct within the legal system is above ethical question. 
Because there is no necess ar y con gruence between legal 
en ti tlem en t of clients or of lawyers and their moral rights 
and duties, one might conclude that actions taken by lawyers 
in behalf of their clients are morally wrong even if legally 
per missi bl e. " [363]
This seems a somewhat narrow and shallow view. It is not merely 
a matter of choosing between strict moral principle and "legal 
entitl eme nt". Rather, it is between the concept of moral 
prin ci pl e on the individual level and the a p p l icatio n of those 
values which we have discu ssed which the system - and the law 
and society which sustains it - deem to be to the ult im ate 
common good. The a d v o c a t e , i n  fulfilling the role ass ig ned to 
him is a medium through which those values of the sys te m are 
applied .
It is, indeed, as the D e c l a ratio n of Perugia states [364], the 
a dv oca te' s duty "to serve the in ter ests of justice as well as of 
those who seek it"; but the interests of justice which he must 
serve are those interests as perc ei ved by the law and by the 
legal system of which he is part. In particular, the extent 
of his pro fess ional obli ga tions to the pursuit of truth is but 
a re fl ect ion of the extent to which those ob li g a t i o n s  are 
rec og ni sed by the law itself as desirable in the in t e r e s t s  of 
society /
267 .
society as a whole.
The view may, of course, be taken by some that the adver sar ial 
system's values - or its balance of values - are wrong; that, 
in particular, the relativ ely low priority which it appears to 
give to truth and t ru thfuln es s in the trial process, may be a 
defect. Some adv ocates may perso na lly take this view - and 
indeed share some of the crit icisms of the system which we have 
discussed. If s o , t h e y  are free to urge reform. In fact, as Du 
Cann points out, most re for mers of the law have come from the 
ranks of the law [365]. But when acting his role in indi vi dual 
cases, the advocate is bound - in a democratic society at any 
rate - to accept and apply those values and prin ciples  which the 
law and society for the time being uphold.
This point is illust rated in an example cited by Wolfram; an 
accused whom his lawyer knows to be factually guilty was 
subj ec te d to unlawful int er r o g a t i o n  by the police. Wo l f r a m  
poses the questioni:
"May the lawyer, on the basis of his or her moral ju d g m e n t s
about the client's criminal a c t s ....... refuse to move to
suppr ess  the evid ence..?"
He points out that the lawyer is profe s s i o n a l l y  oblige d to move
to suppre ss the evidence pro duced by the irregular i n t e r r o g a t i o n  -
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  that this may well result in the ac q u i t t a l  of
the factually guilty client and the "social costs" that this
entails:
"  the law provi ding for the exclusion of accurat e e v i dence
has itself accepted the obvious risk that the guilty will go 
free, in order that public off icials may be deterr ed  from 
i nf rin gin g the rights of all to be free of unlawful 
in terrogat ions. A lawyer is certainly  not legally re q u i r e d  
to quarrel with the plainly c o n t r ove rs ial factual and legal 
grounds that underlie the e x c l us io nary rule." [366]
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This again, however, may be said to be an under st atement  by 
Wolfram of the advocate's position. It is not merely a question 
of the advo cate's not being "legally required" to quarrel with 
the prin ci ple which under lies the Law's exclusi on ary rule; it 
would be p r o f e ss io nally unethical for him so to do. For if 
advo cates were to refuse, in such cases, to move for exclusion 
of the evidence because of their personal views as to the "social 
cost" of letting a criminal go free, they would be su bs t i t u t i n g  
their own values for those of the law - in this part ic ular case, 
what must be presumed to be the law's perc eption that the social 
cost of allowing the occasiona l criminal to go free is o utwei gh ed 
by the higher social cost of putting the innocent at risk by 
en coura gi ng  unaccep ta ble methods of police in ter rogat ion.
We may, therefore, conclude that the advo cate' s duty may be 
proper ly defined as the duty to serve his client zea lo usly within 
the bounds of the law; and in ac cordance with the r e q u i r e m e n t s  
and values of the legal system sus ta in ed by the law. In so far 
as that legal system may require him, on occasion, to
su bordina te truth to the interests of his client, he is, in so
doing, serving both his client and the law.
We may also conclude, therefore, that there is no ethica l con fl ict 
in the duality of his role as both a servant of his client and 
a servant of the law itself. It follows that, in se rv in g his 
client within the law, he is n e c e ss arily also serving the cause 
of justice - justice, that is to say, in the sense in whic h it 
must be held to be perce ived by the law - the sense in which it
is used by B o k :
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"I shall be using 'justice' and 'fairness' as synonymous. In 
doing so, I am not inten din g the larger sense of 'justice' (all 
that is right or lawful), but the narrower sense d i s t i ngui sh ed 
by Ar istotl e in his N i c o m ac he an Ethics [1130] of the just as 
re ct ifyi ng  what is d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  or wrong, d is tr ibutin g fairly 
It concerns, then, both autonomy, or liberty and equality. When 
lies are told to protect or further these, what is f u n d a men ta lly 
at stake is an equilibr iu m to be prolonged, restored, or set 
up." [367]
This concept of justice may be seen as par ticu larly  a p p r o pr ia te 
to the advers arial system - as a system which sees the maint ena nce 
of a proper "equil ibr ium" as requ iring  a degree of latitu de to 
the defence advocate in regard to truth in deference to the 
values of individ ual autonomy and liberty.
We may there fore summ ari se our con clu si ons in regard to the 
ethics of the adv ocat e' s role by saying that the v i n d i c a t i o n  of 
his role lies in his serving the cause of justice a c c o rd in g to 
law.
It remains to be added that, in regard to the verbal exchange 
between Lords Brougham and Cockburn as to the a d v o cate's prim ary 
a ll egi anc e [368], we may conclude that both their l o r d sh ips 
were wrong. It is not the ad vocate 's  duty to "reckon eve r y t h i n g  
su bo rdin at e to the interests of his client" (per Lord Brou gham) . 
His duty is, as has been said, to serve his client ze a l o u s l y  
within the law - in so far as he honestly perceives that law to 
be. For the same reason, he is not bound, as Lord Co ckburn  
would have it, to rec oncile his duty to his client "with the 
eternal and immutable interests of truth and justice" p e r c e i v e d  
as abstract concepts. The interests with which he has to 
reco nci le his duty to his client are the interests of the law 
and the princip les  and values which it reflects. Truth and 
justice are relevant interests only in the sense that those 
concep ts are reco gnise d and applie d by the law.
3 .4 Precept and Practice
3 . A . 1 - Rules and Gui delin es
Laying down rules for human be haviour in any sphere is always a 
difficult exercise. There are, basically, two options: first,
to rely on general pri nci ples or exhortat ions which are usually 
unh elpful as a guide in pa r t i c u l a r  situations - and, by leaving 
such to the subjective i n t e r p retat io n of individuals, invites 
sop histry and ex plo ita tion by the less scrupulous; or, second, 
to formulate detailed rules which clearly cannot cover every 
c on ce ivable situation and may involve the risk of app ea ring to 
imply a specious approval for any conduct not s p e c i f i c a l l y  
forbidden.
The prof es si onal canons of conduct and other g u i d el in es available  
in regard to the ethics of advocacy may be seen as a c o m p rom is e 
between both options - though the dominant approach ap pears to 
be a reliance on "a few general rules" to be "obser ve d in the 
spirit" [369] and a di sinc l i n a t i o n  to be too specific.
For reasons which will be evident from this inquiry - the 
ethical tensions of the ad versarial system, the a p p arent  moral 
am big uity of the advoc ate's function and the ethical d e l i c a c i e s  
of the issues with which he has often to cope - the task of 
formulating rules of conduct is p a rt icularl y difficult. This 
may explain, even if it does not ne cessarily ent ir ely excuse, 
those features of the rules and guid el ines which have been the 
su bject of critical comment in our discuss ion and which we may 
now briefly recapitulate.
We have noted the tendency to general ex hortatio n in terms which 
are of little practical value in actual sit uations b e ca use it
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is the int er preta ti on of such terms which is itself in question: 
such as that the advocate must act "honourably" or "fairly" or 
must not go beyond what is "lawful and proper" [370]; and that 
somet ime s the advice offered seems _e_x facie c o n t r adicto ry  - to 
be "open and truthful" with the court but not to dis close facts 
which are unf avou rable  to his case; not to "mislead" the court 
but n evert he less to be guided only by his client's inter es ts 
in deciding what facts to disclose [371]; this latter factor, 
in p a r t i c u l a r , being illu st rated by the tenuous ethical lines 
drawn in the cases of Tomblinq and Meek [372].
We have also noted what would appear to be sign if icant om iss ion s 
in regard to matters of serious import: the paucity of advice
or direction as to the use and abuse of c r o s s - e x m i n a t i o n  [373 ] ; 
the unc erta in ty and ambiva le nce of such advice as is given in 
that context in regard to attack ing truthful testi mo ny [374]; 
the absence of positive guidan ce in the general cont ext of 
perjury in criminal cases [37 5] and the omission to a d e q uately  
reco gni se and give due prom in ence to the d is tinctiv e obli g a t i o n s  
of the prosecutor as compared with those of defence coun sel [376]
Some of these u n sa tisfac to ry features may be due in part to the 
inherent di ff icu lties arising from the nature of the adv e r s a r i a l  
system, as mentioned above, but they may also be a t t r i b u t a b l e  
in no small measure to one u nder ly ing cause: a failure to
ack no wl edge and adequa tely explain the balance of values which 
the adversaria l system rep resents - spe cifically, the rel at ive 
place of truth among those values; and perhaps also, arising 
from this failure, to a desire to reconcile the p a r t i s a n s h i p  
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of the advocate 's function with a degree of comm itment to the 
pursuit of truth which it does not, in reality, reflect.
These factors may be seen as giving rise to two other
crit ic is ms which have been m e n t i o n e d : the apparent gap, in
regard to some issues, between precept and per ceived practice 
and the c o ns equen ti al v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of such precep ts to the 
acc us at ion that they are a form of wi n d o w - d r e s s i n g  de signe d to 
reassure the sceptical layman.
These mat ters are clearly of great moment to the advocate.
Given that he has a p rofe ss ional duty to serve his client 
zea lo usly  within the law, it is of crucial impor ta nce to him
that he should have clear guidanc e as to what the law and the
system require of him in regard to the propriety of p r o f e s s i o n a l  
conduct; otherwise he is exposed to the risk of being accu sed 
either of u n prof es sional conduct as regards his duty to the 
court or of failing in his duty to his client; for any failure 
on his part to protect or advance his client's interest  in a 
manner not proh ibited by the law or pro fes siona l codes of 
conduct, may be interpret ed as a failure of " z e a l " .
It follows that the lack of clear guidance exa c e r b a t e s  his 
problems and makes more perilous the ethical t i g h tr ope which he 
often has to walk. Even more, however, is he at risk from an 
i dea li stic m i s r e p r e s e n t i o n  of his function - the h i g h - p r i n c i p l e d  
pr ono u n c e m e n t s  of those who, despite their knowl edge of the 
real iti es of the adversari al system, would impose upon him a 
c om mi tment to truth as his pre-emin en t duty. Such p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  
in so far as they may be intended to reassure the scept ics , tend
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to have the reverse effect in that their patent falsity fuels 
the cynicism which they are intended to allay.
5.4.2 - Ethics and Justice
However, clear guidance on the ethical issues involved in 
advocac y - p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the criminal courts - are of importanc 
not only for the advocate himself, but also for society at large. 
In the adversarial  system, the advocate has a crucial impact on 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' o f  justice. In view of the dominant  role 
which the system assigns to him in the trial process, the manner 
in which he performs this role - and, in particular, his 
percept io n of ethical issues - can have a si gn ificant inf lu ence 
on the outcome of a trial. Indeed, in many cases it may be 
the decisi ve factor in the d e t e r mi na tion of guilt or innocence.
It follows that the advocate can - as Du Cann notes [37 7] - be 
ins tru ment al  in bringing about a mi sc arriage of justice by his 
conduct of a case. Conversely, of course, it is true that he 
can, and no doubt often does, have a beneficen t influence. But 
whether it is one or the other may depend to a sign i f i c a n t  
degree on his approach to ethical matters such as we have 
discussed.
The advocate, it is also true, is not re sponsible  for the system 
which confers this re spon s i b i l i t y  upon him; nor for the 
ado pti on of the part icula r values or balance of values which 
that system recognises. But the balance is, as we have seen, 
a delicate one and can be affected by the advo cat e's p e r c e p t i o n  
of ethical issues. The absence of clear guidance on crucial 
issues /
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issues can confound the c o n s c ie nt ious and give scope to the 
less sc ru pul ous to the detrim ent of justice.
These c o nsid er ations would seem to point to a need for a new 
approa ch by the profess ion and its codes of conduct to the 
issues discussed in this inquiry: one which, above all, will
re a l i st ically ackn owledge and reflect a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
the balance of values which the adversar ial system r epresen ts  - 
in particular, the in te raction between truth and the other 
values ens hrined in the system.
275 .
5.5 Summary of Final Conclusions
1. The advocate in the ad ve rsarial system - whether in civil 
p rocee di ngs or as defence counsel in criminal cases - is 
not p r o f e ssion al ly bound to the pursuit of truth as his 
primary objective.
2. E_x f a c i e , his r o l e , in so far as it involves the 
s u bord in ation of truth to the interests of his client or 
cause, would seem, when viewed outwith the context of its 
place and purpose within the legal system, to be i n c o m p a t i b l e  
with moral principle.
3. However, the ethics of the adv ocate 's function can only be 
proper ly judged within the perspect ive of the aims and 
pr inciples  of the law and legal system of which he is part.
4. The adv ersarial system does not ac kn owledge truth as the 
only value in the pursuit of justice but as only one of a 
number of moral and social values which it deems n e c essa ry  
to that end. In accordance with this philosophy, it 
concedes to the advocate - p a r t i cu larly in his c a p acit y as 
criminal defence counsel - the right and, in cert ain  
ci rc um stance s imposes upon him the d u t y , t o  s u b o r d i n a t e  
truth to the interests of his client.
5. The advocate, in playing his assigned role within  the 
system, is serving the ends of justice as pe r c e i v e d  by that 
system and by the law and society which upholds it. His 
duty cannot be seen either as requiring him to s u b o r d i n a t e  
all other interests to those of his client or as d e m a n d i n g  
a paramount co mm itm ent to the moral absolute of truth or
t o /
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to the concept of justice as ne cessarily  based on that 
truth. His duty is to serve his client or cause zealously 
within the bounds of the law and according to its 
req uirem en ts and values.
6. Idealisti c concepts of the advocate 's role as one 
p r e - e m in ently  comm itted to the pursuit of truth, 
m i s r e pr esent his function, exacerb ate the a d v o ca te's 
problems, and fuel cynic is m of the law and its 
pra ctitioners.
7. There is a need for clearer guidance on the ethics of 
advocacy and for codes of conduct which will a c k n o w l e d g e  
and reflect a realistic u n d e r st an ding of the bal ance of 
values which the adv ers ar ial system represents.
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